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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the relation between bodily awareness and bodily agency. Descartes‘s 
observation that we are not in our bodies as pilots in vessels suggests two thoughts about the 
special role of the body in experience and agency. The first is that we experience our bodies 
‗from the inside‘ and not just as one more material body amongst other material objects of 
perception (Feeling). The second is that we are able to act with our bodies in ways in which 
we are not with any other bodies or objects (Direct Control). 
My goal is to articulate the proper relationship between Feeling and Direct Control. 
There are three broad options: they are independent (Independence); Feeling is because of 
Direct  Control  (Enaction);  and  Direct  Control  is  because  of  Feeling  (Necessity). 
Independence  cannot  make  sense  of  the  rational  role  of  experience  in  guiding  action. 
Finding Independence unsatisfactory is the force of intuition toward articulating some kind 
of intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. Enaction is subject to 
counterexamples from paralysed subjects, pain in body parts (such as internal organs) that 
we cannot act with, and double dissociations between bodily awareness and bodily action. 
The most attractive option is Necessity, but it is still empirically inadequate.  
Whilst  the  intimacy  between  bodily  awareness  and  agency  is  not  in  doubt,  the 
counterexamples  suggest  that  their  relation  cannot  quite  be  understood  in  the  way  that 
Necessity claims. I develop a view on which bodily awareness is necessary for bodily agency, 
but not for the online control of actions (as Necessity claims). Rather, bodily awareness plays 
an essential role in action planning, since to plan an action is to have some conception of 
what  you  can  do  –  which  requires  body  schemata  and  awareness  of  current  bodily 
dispositions. 5 
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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to determine the relation between bodily awareness and bodily 
action. The specific choice of topic owes much to Michael Martin. His advice was that I 
should  branch  out  and  work  on  an  unfamiliar  area.  In  hindsight,  what  looked  like  an 
arbitrary decision to work on action was in fact the obvious choice given how my interests 
were evolving. He clearly saw that in advance.  
The big questions about action loom behind the dissertation but are not discussed 
directly. This is a methodological decision: the strategy is to sneak up on these colossal issues 
by working through smaller, perhaps more well-defined questions. The thought is that asking 
and  answering  a  series  of  more  restricted  questions  about  action  will  specify  concrete 
constraints on what a general theory of action must look like. However, it will be obvious 
that my general approach toward action is anti-reductionist, in line with how philosophers 
like G. E. M. Anscombe, Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor have seen the divide between 
the active and the passive.  
The project of this dissertation can be seen as one component of a larger project that 
examines the relation between experience and agency more generally. There are reasons for 
approaching  agency  through  this  more  unusual  route.  First  of  all,  the  question  of  their 
relation is of intrinsic interest. Second, by investigating the bond between experience and 
agency,  we  can  delve  into  agency  whilst  bypassing  direct  consideration  of  metaphysical 
questions about action. But more importantly, the debate on action has soured into endless 
epicycles on causal theories of action and deviant causal chains. My strategy is to address the 
problems of agency afresh so as to break this impasse. A recent surge of work in cognitive 
neuropsychology on the  role  of consciousness in motor control provides us with many 
interesting  challenges.  These  empirical  cases,  which  range  from  deafferented  agents  to 
functional  dissociations between  sensory  processing streams,  provide the  theorist with a 
large spread of difficult cases to consider. The thought is that by reflecting on the relation 
between experience and agency, we begin to reveal empirical and philosophical difficulties 
for naive accounts of the relation we are drawn to. Finally, insofar as we are interested in a 
concept of agency that allows us to recognise non-human animals as agents, an investigation 8 
 
of the more primitive link between experience and agency will be more serviceable than 
exclusive consideration of aspects of human reason and how these guide agency. Thus, my 
approach promises to yield a more concrete grasp of the phenomena of agency. 
The primary influence on this dissertation is Brian O‘Shaughnessy‘s oeuvre. This may 
not be obvious to the superficial reader, since a large part of the thesis is devoted to arguing 
against O‘Shaughnessy‘s views. But sustained critical engagement with a philosopher‘s work 
is the highest respect that another philosopher can pay. Unfortunately I have not been able 
to take full advantage of the publication of the revised edition of his monumental work The 
Will (2008), since I only had access to a copy late in the revision process. (I hope to make 
good on the obligation to study the revised work in detail in my review for the European 
Journal of Philosophy.)  The other major influence  is the  series of volumes  brought out by 
Naomi Eilan and collaborators since the early 1990s, beginning with  Spatial Representation 
(1993) up to the most recent volumes in Oxford University Press‘s Consciousness and Self-
Consciousness series. 
I  have  been  privileged  to  be  supervised  by  Michael  Martin,  Paul  Snowdon  and 
Christopher Peacocke. It felt as if I was being taught by Wittgenstein, Moore and Kant. 
Anyone who has worked with Michael Martin will know how his influence extends to the 
roots of this thesis.  Paul Snowdon has exercised a powerful but silent influence on my 
thinking since my arrival in London. His inimitable way of philosophising – never taking 
anything  for granted  whilst always probing from  unexpected angles  – has made  a deep 
impression on me. He has also been an exemplary chamber music partner.  Christopher 
Peacocke provided fresh impetus as I was completing the thesis. I am grateful to him for 
discussions on a wide range of issues, especially on the nature of spatial representation, 
agent‘s awareness in acting, and also architectural constraints on personal level explanations 
of mental phenomena. I also wish to thank two other philosophers who taught me prior to 
the PhD. My year of training under the watchful eye of Sebastian Gardner was a formative 
period. Jerry Valberg supervised me for the MPhil paper in phenomenology and has since 
remained a close friend. He gave me a substantial set of comments on an early draft of this 
material. His ability for uncannily close observation and phenomenological description of 
the familiar is without par. 
It has been my good fortune to be part of a coterie of philosophers with interests in 
action in London. Parts of this work have been discussed at meetings of the Action-in-9 
 
London  working  group.  I  thank  Jennifer  Hornsby,  Tom  Pink,  Jerry  Valberg  and  other 
members  of  Action-in-London.  Jennifer  Hornsby  has  provided  a  constant  series  of 
challenges to my arguments against O‘Shaughnessy‘s views; the emphasis on normal agents 
is a response to her sustained questioning. Tom Pink filled me in on the intricate histories 
behind Descartes‘s ‗pilot in the ship‘ metaphor and the notion of control. I am also grateful 
to the audiences on several other occasions in London, Sheffield, Budapest, and especially at 
the finals of the CNCC Essay Award in Edinburgh for their comments and questions. On 
that occasion, the Dresden psychologist Thomas Goschke gave a probing commentary on 
some  of  the  material  in  chapters  4  and  5  concerning  the  idea  that  bodily  awareness  is 
necessary for the online control of action. 
I have had constant discussions on this material over an amazing variety of food and 
drink with Victor Gan, who provided much help with neurological material and medical 
details about anaesthesia and reflexes. Special thanks as usual are due to him. It is hard to 
express what I owe him except to say that I cannot imagine life without such a friend. It goes 
without saying that all of my ideas have been vetted by Krisztina Orbán. She is my fondest 
and most exacting critic. Her unwavering support has been the foundation upon which my 
work has rested. 
The doctorate is a watershed in one‘s training and it is only appropriate for me to 
acknowledge intellectual debts that I have incurred over the years. Mr. and Mrs. Eugene 
Seow encouraged my forays into what I did not then know were questions in philosophy and 
theology at a young age in an environment where such inquiry is frowned on. My first direct 
encounter with philosophy was when Mr. Victor Cole scribbled ‗cogito ergo sum‘ on the 
blackboard in 8
th grade. It still remains an epiphanic moment. Ms. Virginia Lapid introduced 
me to the rigours and joys of classical music. I have tried to apply the humanistic lessons she 
taught me through music in other spheres of my life. Three philosophers mentored me from 
philosophical  infancy  and have stuck  with me  despite  my  meandering,  which they have 
tolerated with unusual forbearance: Tim Crane, Dean Zimmerman, and especially Timothy 
O‘Connor. I must thank all of them for their friendship and guidance. I hope this thesis goes 
some way toward vindicating their faith in me. 
London is at once a tempting and treacherous place to live, as Dickens and Brecht 
observed. I am grateful to the Mind Association for a non-EU doctoral studentship from 
2006 to 2009 that delivered me from my ‗three penny opera‘ circumstances. A number of 10 
 
friends made staying in London tolerable – and even delightful at times. First and foremost 
there is Victor Gan, Renaissance man. David Ralph and Kseniya Yershova-Ralph provided 
occasions for laughter. Julia Peters was a model of elegance. Jerry Valberg was a wellspring 
of wisdom and wit. However well I plan, when I return to London in the autumn, semester 
invariably  begins  with  some  mishap.  (I  cannot  believe  the  doctorate  will  change  this.) 
Funding always comes late, if it comes at all – whether because of some new bureaucratic 
decree  or  administrative  error  or  even  a  postal  strike…  Victor  Gan,  Julia  Peters,  Paul 
Snowdon  and  Jerry  Valberg  provided  emergency  financial  and  logistical  aid  and  moral 
support during these difficult spells. 
Many individuals were crucial to the production of the dissertation. The last stage 
was fraught with difficulty and spanned two continents and four countries. I have relied 
heavily on feedback from Paul Snowdon, who laboured tirelessly over my drafts during the 
festive season, and Krisztina Orbán, who made herself available for discussion at the oddest 
hours. The errors that remain are mine. Gábor, Erzsebet and Gergő Orbán offered crucial 
support in Budapest. My brother, Wong Hong Ting, donated a laptop to me after mine was 
consumed by a virus. He also provided good cheer, companionship, and exemplary technical 
assistance  throughout  this  final  stage.  The  final  revisions  were  completed  in  the  idyllic 
surroundings of Tanjung Park, Penang, Malaysia in the company of my extended family and 
the sea. I have saved my most significant debt for last. I take this opportunity to express my 
gratitude to my long-suffering parents who have had to endure much that is foreign to their 
constitution. It is not easy to bring up a child with philosophical leanings, accustomed as 
such children are to flights of fantasy and reason, in an environment where reflection is 
anathematised. I hope my work – in spite of its inadequacies – will go some way toward 
assuaging their worries about philosophising as a way of life. This dissertation is dedicated to 
them. It is in many ways the fruit of their labours. 
 
W.H.Y. 
Penang, Malaysia 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Bodily Awareness in Bodily Action 
 
 
1.1. The Cartesian Non-Pilot: Feeling and Direct Control 
1.2. The question of this dissertation: how are Feeling and Direct Control related? 
1.2.1. The two factors: Feeling and Direct Control 
1.2.1.1. Feeling: varieties of bodily awareness 
1.2.1.2. Direct Control: teleologically basic action  
1.3. Bodily awareness in action 
1.3.1. Bodily awareness in ordinary action 
1.4. The four responses prefigured 
1.5. A preview of empirical and theoretical obstacles ahead 
1.6. Sketching the general line of argument 
1.7. The scope of this thesis: our question and related questions  
1.8. Summary 
 
 
As human beings, we find ourselves in a particular situation. Our plight is that of finite 
material creatures set in a world that is in essence independent of us. This situation makes 
certain demands on us: survival dictates that we must be subjects and agents. We must know 
of the ambient things, creatures and goings-on and we must be capable of intervening to 
satisfy our needs. The use of the conjunction in expressing our condition may suggest the 
independence of these two elements. This is misleading: we are acting subjects or perceiving 
agents. The sensory and the volitional are two ravelled aspects of our nature. 
The sensorimotor knot at the heart of our survival has many facets. We see, we hear, 
we touch, we smell, we taste. And we can act on our sense experiences in each of these 
modalities. We chase pigeons, flee upon hearing bears, grope in darkness for switches, locate 
gas  leaks,  spit  foul  wines.  This  is  all  familiar.  What  is  less  noticed  is  another  set  of 
experiences that are at once ubiquitous yet unattended to. These experiences tend to lurk in 
the background, in the shadow of our experiences of the world outside. On occasion, they 
cry out for attention, as when one experiences an acute pain, an intense pleasure, or an 
urgent  itch.  But  their  typical  manifestation  is  inconspicuous.  I  am  referring  to  our 12 
 
experiences of our bodies and their various parts ‗from the inside‘, experiences which we 
may unify under the label of bodily awareness. Bodily awareness really consists of a ragtag 
group  of  ways  of  sensing  one‘s  body:  familiar  instances  include  the  experience  of  the 
location, movement, and temperature of parts of one‘s body, whether one is fatigued or 
hungry, whether some part of one‘s body is hurt, and whether one is upside down.  
Once  we  bring  out  the  presence  of  this  ‗modality‘,  its  importance  is  obvious. 
Regardless of the sensory modality or modalities involved in a sensorimotor transaction, it 
will (typically) involve acting with one‘s body in some way even if the action goes beyond the 
boundaries of one‘s body as it often does. Intuitively, to act with a body part, one needs to 
know the state and position of it in order to have some sense of what one needs to do in 
order to achieve one‘s aims in the scenario. This sense may be inarticulate, and may consist 
in no more than an agent being able to demonstrate what he will do whilst saying, ―I‘ll do 
something like this‖. The thought, then, is that bodily awareness is always there to provide 
these parameters, presenting them to the acting subject so that he can control his actions. 
After all, we are not always looking at or touching those body parts that we can act with, yet 
we are almost always ready to act with those body parts that we can act with. So bodily 
awareness can come to seem central to the possibility of sensorimotor action. 
Despite the intuitive force of these sketchy thoughts, this alleged centrality of bodily 
awareness in sensorimotor action is hard to articulate and as a consequence it is hard to 
evaluate. This dissertation is an attempt to determine the role of bodily awareness in bodily 
action. The point of this introductory chapter is to provide some sense of the phenomenon 
we are interested in and the project we will pursue in this dissertation. To this end we will 
attempt to marshal the relevant considerations so that we might begin to pose a question 
concerning the role of bodily awareness in bodily action. My focus will be on (one) isolating 
and  identifying  the  issues  of  relevance,  (two)  explicating  their  significance,  (three) 
introducing various alternative ways of understanding the issues at hand so that we have a 
firm grasp of the problem of interest, and (four) delimiting the scope of the thesis. 
We begin with Descartes‘s famous observation about what our relation to our bodies 
is not like, from which we extract two aspects of the distinctive relation we have to our 
bodies: how we feel our bodies ‗from the inside‘ and how we can act directly with our 
bodies. We discuss each aspect in turn. The goal of the dissertation is to articulate the proper 
relationship between these two aspects. Once we put the problem like this, we can see three 13 
 
broad options based  on  different  relations between  the  two  aspects:  (one) that the  two 
aspects  are  independent,  (two)  that  direct  control  over  one‘s  body  confers  feeling,  and 
(three) that feeling is necessary for direct control. My own view will be a fourth alternative 
that is a variation on the third option. I will approach these accounts by first exploring how 
bodily awareness figures in the control of ordinary action and seeing the four options as 
options that arise in response to the demand for explanation. The four options are briefly 
surveyed and this will be followed by a preview of the empirical and theoretical obstacles 
ahead. I end the chapter by sketching the general line of argument of the dissertation and 
making clear the scope and limits of this investigation. 
 
 
1.1. The Cartesian Non-Pilot: Feeling and Direct Control 
 
There appears to be an intimate connexion between feeling our limbs ‗from the inside‘ and 
our power to act directly with them. This intimacy can be brought out by the difficulty of 
conceiving of how one might move a limb that is completely without feeling where one does 
not have any other form of perceptual feedback available. Or consider how some intricate 
task involving complex physical elements – such as juggling clubs or skiing – would be 
possible in the absence of any bodily awareness. This connexion between bodily awareness 
and bodily action is not restricted to the exercise of unusual motor skills but pervades all 
motor activities. Even the success of mundane everyday tasks, which we take for granted, 
would no longer be guaranteed. Just imagine running after a bus under complete anaesthesia. 
The intimate connexion is reflected in the phenomenology of ordinary agency: in agency as 
we know it, bodily awareness seems to be crucial to how we control our actions. Thus there 
is prima facie reason to think that bodily awareness plays some kind of crucial role in the 
control of bodily action. 
What exactly is the significance of bodily awareness in action for us? An apt starting 
point for our reflections here is Descartes‘s observation in his Sixth Meditation that we are not 
in our bodies as pilots are in their ships.
1 Let us refer to this distinctive phenomenology of 
embodiment as the  Cartesian Non-Pilot.  Though  Descartes‘s  remark  was  directed  at  the 
distinctive character of bodily awareness – how one experiences one‘s body and its various 
                                                 
1 Sixth Meditation; CSM vol. 2, p. 56. 14 
 
parts ‗from the inside‘ and not just as one material object amongst others – it is equally 
appropriate for capturing the distinctive role the body plays in action. We are able to act with 
the body in ways which we are incapable of acting with other bodies or objects.  
There  are  thus  two  aspects  to  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot,  as  the  phenomenology 
dictates: (one) feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and (two) the direct control one has over 
one‘s body. I shall refer to the first aspect as Feeling and the second as Direct Control. A natural 
thought is that the special roles of the body in awareness and in action complement each 
other. One way, perhaps the most intuitive, to develop this thought is to implicate bodily 
awareness in the control of bodily action. This is an appealing line of thought, for, as we 
observed earlier, there appears to be an intimate connexion between feeling our limbs ‗from 
the inside‘ and our power to act directly with them. A recurring theme of the dissertation will 
be the extent to which accounts of the relation between bodily awareness and bodily action 
can remain faithful to the Cartesian Non-Pilot. 
 
 
1.2.   The question of this dissertation: 
what is the relation between bodily awareness and bodily action? 
 
Having  distinguished  the  two  aspects  to  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot  –  Feeling  and  Direct 
Control – we are now in a position to state the question of this dissertation. The goal of this 
dissertation is to articulate the proper relationship between Feeling and Direct Control. Our 
question is: What is the connexion between feeling one’s body ‘from the inside’ and one’s power to act 
directly with it? 
In  order  to  set  about  answering  our  question  we  will  first  need  to  have  a  better 
understanding of the two aspects of the Cartesian Non-Pilot the relationship between which 
we want to determine. Let us turn to examine each aspect in turn. 
 
 
1.2.1.   The two aspects: Feeling and Direct Control 
 15 
 
1.2.1.1.   Feeling: varieties of bodily awareness 
 
The  first  aspect  of  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot  is  how  one  experiences  one‘s  body  and  its 
various parts ‗from the inside‘ and not just as one material object amongst others. Putting 
Descartes‘s observation in this way may make it seem more foreign than it is. Descartes is 
calling attention to experiences of one‘s body that are very familiar to all of us – familiar but 
little noted. Everyone has had experiences of sitting in the dark. Even if it is pitch black and 
one can neither see anything nor is trying to grope around to see where one‘s limbs are, one 
knows exactly where one‘s limbs are, whether one‘s legs are crossed, whether it is the left leg 
that is crossed over the right, whether one‘s arms are crooked or straight, and so on. Notice 
that we do not know about the state and position of our friends sitting beside us in the dark 
unless we are touching them. This sense of the position and spatial disposition of one‘s 
limbs and of one‘s body provides one only with experience of one‘s body and its parts, and 
we do not sense other animate bodies or inanimate objects in this way. 
In denying that we are present in our bodies as pilots are in their ships, Descartes 
also means to contrast bodily awareness with visual awareness. If we were as pilots to our 
bodily vessels, then Descartes tell us that ―[we] … would not feel pain when the body was 
hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight 
if anything in his ship is broken‖.
2 The contrast Descartes draws here between confused 
sensation as opposed to what is manifest to the understanding is particular to his theory, but 
there  is  a  simpler  and  more  obvious  difference.  The  ‗sole  object‘  character  of  bodily 
awareness – that one can only be aware of one‘s own body ‗from the inside‘ – contrasts with 
the objects that visual awareness can present. One‘s body is not the only material body that 
one can be visually aware of. And as a matter of fact one is mostly attending visually to other 
bodies rather than one‘s own.
3 
Up to this point we have been building up an intuitive understanding of what bodily 
awareness is like partly by meditating on Descartes‘s observation and partly by considering 
an everyday example of bodily awareness. But there are many varieties of bodily awareness 
                                                 
2 CSM vol. 2, p. 56. The reference to the intellect is because Descartes thinks that ―[he is] nothing but a 
thinking thing‖, which I have omitted from the quotation so as to not obscure the point about the distinctive 
phenomenological relation we have to our bodies. 
3 This is not to say that one‘s body cannot occupy a distinctive position in one‘s visual experience in some 
sense, as Ernst Mach pointed out in The Analysis of Sensations (1959). For discussion see Valberg 2007, ch. 15. 16 
 
that we have not yet touched on. Let us approach them by considering the various internal 
channels that inform us about the state of our bodies: we receive (1) information about 
pressure, temperature, and friction from receptors at or just below the surface of the skin; (2) 
information about the relative state of body segments from receptors in the joints, some 
sensitive to static position, some to dynamic information (proprioception and kinaesthesia); 
(3) information about balance and posture from the vestibular system in the inner ear and 
the head/trunk dispositional system and information from pressure on any parts of the body 
that might be in contact with a gravity-resisting surface; (4) information from skin-stretch 
about bodily disposition and volume; (5) information from receptors in the internal organs 
about nutritional and other states relevant to homeostasis and well-being; (6) information 
about effort and muscular fatigue from muscles; (7) information about damage to body parts 
(from nociceptors); and (8) information about general fatigue from cerebral systems sensitive 
to blood composition.
4 
It is important t o note that not all these information channels operate at the 
conscious level. For example, the vestibular system and the postural system are largely 
unconscious (and hence are not typically forms of bodily experience) even though they are 
responsible for experiences such as that of feeling upside down.
5 Our question concerning 
the significance of bodily awareness vis -à-vis bodily action focuses on awareness of one‘s 
body and its parts where this awareness is understood to be a form of experience of its 
objects. In particular, we are interested in those forms of bodily awareness that are conscious 
experiences of one‘s body ‗from the inside‘. For the most part, we will be focusing on spatial 
properties  presented  in  proprioception  and  kinaesthesia,  i.e.  on  static  and  dynamic 
information about the state and position of various body parts relative to each other, since 
these provide the primary parameters for motor control. It is important to note that the 
story we will tell for how proprioception and kinaesthesia relate to motor control may differ 
from  how  other  forms  of  bodily  awareness  figure  in  the  control  of  bodily  action.  For 
example, how pain is implicated in action may be very different from how proprioception 
                                                 
4 This list, which is fuller than what one typically encounters in philosophy, is still rather incomplete, but covers 
the  key  internal  channels.  The  list  derives  from  Eilan,  Marcel  and  Bermúdez  1995,  p.  13,  but  has  some 
additions of mine. 
5 The question of how subpersonal informational channels relate to personal level phenomena is a non -trivial 
one which we shall return to in discussing bodily schemata later in chapters 5 and 6. 17 
 
and kinaesthesia are implicated in action, and how pain is implicated is likely to be very 
different from how fatigue, nausea, or a feeling of effort is implicated in motor control. 
Our discussion has implicitly assumed that bodily awareness is a form of perception 
of one‘s body and its parts. Why should bodily awareness be thought of as perceptual? I will 
not attempt to undertake  a full  defence  of the  claim,  but will  restrict myself to several 
remarks that indicate the plausibility of treating bodily awareness as a form of perception.
6 
Our position contrasts with one where bodily awareness is understood as entirely subjective; 
that is to say, bodily awareness is not ‗of‘ anything.
7 The subjectivist account contends that 
whilst we may differentiate between an experience and what it is of in the case of perception, 
no echo of this distinction can be found in bodily sensations such as pain. Thus the account 
requires us to maintain that bodily sensations are not experienced as directed at parts of 
one‘s body but are rather subjective signs that come to be associated with these parts. This is 
at odds with our experience of bodily sensations, many of which come as intrinsically spatial, 
such  as  backaches  and  itches.  (In  saying  that  located  bodily  sensations  are  ‗intrinsically 
spatial‘, I mean that the experience of a located bodily sensation is intrinsically an experience 
of a sensation as presented as being at a certain seeming body part, and this spatial aspect of the 
experience may not be subtracted without mutilating the sensation.) These are felt as located 
in  certain  regions of one‘s body  and inform the  subject  about that region of his body. 
Furthermore, bodily awareness, like other perceptual modalities, is subject to illusion: as 
projected pains, various proprioceptive illusions induced in experimental conditions, and 
phantom limbs attest to.
8 Thus bodily awareness bears the marks of a perceptual modality: it 
is sensuous, intentional, and subject to illusion. This suggests that in bodily awareness one 
comes to be acquainted with an element of the objective order: one‘s body. There are other 
worries that may be raised, such as whether the disparate sources of information that come 
under  the  rubric  of  ‗bodily  awareness‘  –  senses  of  pain,  temperature,  pressure,  balance, 
position, fatigue, and movement – should be treated as a single sense modality. This is not 
something that we need to decide on for the purposes of this dissertation, for all we need is 
that bodily awareness is a sensuous way of directly gaining information about one‘s body – 
                                                 
6 I am here drawing on M. G. F. Martin‘s work on bodily sensations. See Martin 1993, esp. pp. 207-209 and 
Martin 1995. 
7 An example of such a view is McGinn 1982. 
8 For projected sensations, see B￩k￩sy‘s Sensory Inhibition (1967). The classic paper on experimentally induced 
proprioceptive illusions is Lackner 1988. For phantom limbs, consult Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998. 18 
 
whether  it  is  a  single  sense  modality  or  consists  of  a  ragtag  collection  of  information 
channels is immaterial.
9 
 
 
1.2.1.2.   Direct Control: teleologically basic action 
 
It is somewhat harder to characterise the notion of Direct Control. It is plain that we are 
able to act with our bodies in ways in which we are not with any other bodies or objects  – 
that acting with our bodies is not like a form of remote control. We are able to strive with 
our bodies on demand; and even when the range of our actions goes beyond the boundaries 
of our bodies, we typically act on other bodies or objects by acting with our bodies. We 
might try to capture this direct control by fixing on an intuitive notion of acting directly with 
a body part. One directly acts with a body part when one is able to just perform the action 
with the body part without performing any other action – as when I just raise my right arm, 
as opposed to when I use my left arm to raise my right hand, or when I just wriggle my left 
toe, rather than using my right hand to wriggle it. In this sense of ‗acting directly‘ with a 
body part, we are able to act directly only with our body, and even then only with certain 
parts of our bodies. For example, people cannot move their noses except by moving their 
heads or by twisting their nose with their hand, and most people cannot wriggle their ears. 
And unless telekinesis is possible, there is no ordinary means by which I can directly move 
your limbs or other objects around the room. So we do have some notion of what it means 
to have direct control over one‘s body and its parts. 
Our notion of acting directly with a body part or direct control over a body part 
corresponds to what is known as ‗teleologically basic action‘ in the literature (Hornsby 1980, 
ch. 6). An action of an agent A is teleologically basic if A performs it in order to perform 
some other action, but does not perform some other action in order to perform it. We shall 
                                                 
9 Let me make two remarks about the question of whether bodily awareness consists of a single modality or 
many  modalities.  One,  unless  the  question  is  situated  within  a  larger  discussion  of  the  significance  of 
individuating (and thus counting) sense modalities (see, e.g., Nudds 2004), it is unclear what the theoretical 
significance of the question is. Two, absent such criteria of individuation, this question cannot be answered. 
This issue, however interesting, does not have direct impact on the project pursued in this thesis. We can pose 
the question of the relation between bodily awareness and bodily action whether bodily awareness is conceived 
as a single sense modality or many (related) modalities. 
  There  is  a  further  objection  against  bodily  awareness  as  a  form  of  perception  that  we  have  not 
considered here. This is the idea that perception can potentially present one with an array of different objects, 
but bodily awareness only and ever presents one with one‘s body. I will discuss this objection in chapter 5. 19 
 
have more to say about directly acting with a body part and basic actions later on in the 
dissertation, but let us leave the characterisation of Direct Control at this intuitive level for 
the moment. 
 
 
1.3.   Bodily awareness in action 
 
Up to this point we have distinguished the two aspects of the Cartesian Non-Pilot, posed the 
question of this dissertation in terms of the relation between the two aspects, Feeling and 
Direct Control, and examined each aspect in turn. In order to have a more concrete grasp of 
the problem that we are approaching, it will be useful to consider some examples of how 
bodily awareness figures in action. We will look at some cases where it is plausible to think 
that bodily awareness figures in some sense in the control of action, focussing on the role of 
bodily awareness in ordinary action. After that, we will be ready to consider in outline the 
four responses to the question of this dissertation. 
 
 
1.3.1.   Bodily awareness in ordinary action 
 
What are the grounds for thinking that bodily awareness figures in the control of bodily 
action? There are numerous ordinary activities for which bodily awareness seem crucial. 
Think of how experience of one‘s body – awareness of one‘s posture – figures in finding 
objects  in  total  darkness.  Or  take  shaving,  for  example.  Whilst  a  mirror  is  often  used, 
awareness  of  pressure  and  facial  contours  appears  to  be  critical  (O‘Shaughnessy  2003). 
Finally, think back to some of the examples we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
Imagine skiing in the absence of bodily awareness or, more simply, running after a bus under 
complete anaesthesia. It‘s hard to see how these activities are possible in the absence of 
bodily awareness. Thus, there appear to be intuitive grounds for taking bodily awareness to 
be crucial to the control of bodily actions as we know them  – that is, in our everyday 
experience of bodily actions. 
Might we think of the relation between bodily awareness and bodily agency as a 
specific  instance  of  a  more  general  perception-action  link,  one  on  which  perception,  in 20 
 
general,  serves  to  guide  physical  action?  Physical  action  is  mostly  a  distinctive  kind  of 
reaction to perceptually registered environmental changes. Two aspects of this encounter 
merit discussion. In reactive mode, perception is what jolts the agent into action. It is what 
precipitates the action, as when the sight of a fly wandering into one‘s study mobilises one to 
swat. But more than that, it provides one with the objects that one‘s action is directed at. 
The object of my swatting is not accidentally the fly that I sighted. It is not that seeing the fly 
occasions my swatting, and the fly that I swat at just happens to be the fly that provoked my 
action. (There is only one fly around.) Rather, my swatting is directed at that very fly that I 
saw. Having identified the object of my action, perception now enables me to track my 
target so as to monitor the success of my campaign as I chase the fly around the study, 
swatting left and right. To sum up what we have learnt from our little episode: action is 
―concerned to wreak change in the world, and in consequence one must be aware of its 
objects,  firstly  to  know  where  the  Will  is  to  strike,  secondly  to  monitor  its  effects‖ 
(O‘Shaughnessy 1992, p. 226). 
One way to think about the connection between bodily awareness and bodily agency 
is to think of it as a special instance of this more general connection between awareness and 
agency. On this picture, we arrive at the connection between bodily awareness and agency 
when we retreat from the world back within the limits of the embodied agent. Now the 
object of the will is the agent‘s own body and the objects of awareness are its parts. (This is 
neither  to  say  nor  to  suggest  that  acting  with  one‘s  body  is  like  swatting  a  fly.)  One 
distinction to bear in mind is that even if we have reasons for thinking that consciousness of 
the objects of action is required for one to make sense of rational action on these objects, 
this does not show that consciousness is thereby required for acting with one‘s body; it 
would be a gross error to think that in acting with one‘s body, the limb-effector would be an 
object of one‘s action in the sense of being something that one acts on. (Having noted this 
distinction, let me emphasise that I do not wish to prejudge any issues at this stage.) On this 
picture, there are, as in perception at large, two ways in which awareness figures in the 
control of action: first of all, awareness provides the objects that the action is directed at, 
which in this case are parts of the agent‘s body; and second, it provides a means to monitor 
the action as it unfolds. Such a picture may or may not be correct. But even if we see the 
connection  between  bodily  awareness  and  agency  as  deriving  from  a  more  general 
perception-action link, we must realise that each distinct perceptual modality has its own 21 
 
quirks in how it guides action (if it does so at all), and that any attempt at characterising a 
more general perception-link must be sensitive to this.  
Attention in the case of bodily experience tends in many cases to be recessive: the 
body is seldom at the focus of experience even when one is aware of one‘s body whilst 
undertaking a certain bodily activity. Consider how, for example, one is aware of one‘s legs 
when strolling down a street, but how one‘s experience is primarily directed outward, toward 
the trees, buildings and people that one sees and hears, toward the smells that waft out from 
the odd window. This is not to say that bodily experience plays little or no role in guiding 
one‘s actions, perhaps in contrast with vision, which appears to be central for sighted agents, 
but rather that if we are to understand the role of bodily awareness in guiding action, then 
we  have  to  be  sensitive to  its  recessive  character.  Our  commonsensical  picture  of  how 
experience guides action is, of course, wedded to how vision guides action (in the central 
cases). If we indiscriminately employ the same model in the bodily case, then we lose sight of 
what is distinctive in how bodily awareness guides action. In the visual case, our canonical 
picture seems to be one where the objects of action are focal and where experience allows us 
to track both the object we are acting on and our progress as the activity unfolds.
10 Think of 
how one tracks the tennis ball in a game with a colleague or how one tracks a pickpocket as 
one chases him. Yet this cannot be how we understand the role of bodily awareness in 
guiding ordinary action. In the tennis case, unless I am learning how to hit a particular 
stroke, say a forehand with topspin, my attention will be directed outwards to the ball (and 
my  opponent) and not inwards toward the sequence of positions that my arm moves 
through (among other things). Indeed, if attention in the bodily case had to be focal in 
guiding action, then it would appear to compete with my visual attention focused on the ball 
– to the detriment of my game.
11 This is not to say that there are no cases where bodily 
                                                 
10 There are cases where this canonical picture is less plausible. Consider a case of walking to a particular 
location, say from Bloomsbury to the Strand. One‘s walking is certainly visually guided, but is unlike tracking a 
fly as one tries to swat it or trying to hit a tennis ball, since there is no obvious focal object of attention that one 
tracks as one walks. I am grateful to Jennifer Hornsby for probing me on this point.  
11 As O‘Shaughnessy (1992, p. 227) points out. However, we should note that not all bodily experiences have 
this recessive character. A significant class of them, pains, have a tendency to monopolise attention – a feature 
which helps them to play their functional role. Monopolising attention by causing suffering to the subject 
induces the subject to act in ways to alleviate the injury associated with the pain. This is at a piece with 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s point: when pains have this feature, they monopolise attention in a way that (one) makes 
acting with the painful limb difficult and (two) disrupt our other projects by shifting attention away from them. 22 
 
awareness guides action by being in focal attention, but only that the recessive case is central 
in ordinary action.
12 
  A further wrinkle that we must be aware of here is the multi-modal character of most 
experiences. If experiences typically are ‗rich‘ in that the different sense modalities may even 
contribute to experience of a single object – one sees and touches the sculpture, one sees, 
feels and hears the violin  – then it may be unhelpful to approach the question of how 
experience relates to action by trying to single out the role of each particular sense modality. 
Experiences  may  have  such  a  unified  and  holistic  character  that  it  is  impossible  to 
decompose an experience into constituents such that the issue of guidance may be raised 
with respect to each constituent. Perhaps we can only understand experience as such guiding 
one‘s action; and even if we have sensory deprivation studies that tell us about the relative 
contributions  of  the  distinct  sense  modalities,  their  properties  in  isolation  may  not 
correspond to their properties when they join forces with other modalities to constitute a 
holistic  multi-modal  experience.
13 This issue raises serious philosophical pro blems that I 
cannot hope to resolve in this dissertation. However, I will attempt to be as sensitive to this 
issue as I can.  
Now that we have a rough idea of some ways of how bodily awareness figures in the 
control of ordinary bodily action, let us turn t o survey the accounts of the relation between 
bodily awareness and bodily action. 
 
 
1.4.   The four responses prefigured 
 
The previous section explored some ways in which bodily awareness appears to figure in the 
control of action. This gave us a better se nse of the significance of our question, as well as 
some insight into what is at stake in answering the question. We are now ready to consider 
how to approach our question in full generality. Given that the Cartesian Non-Pilot consists 
of two elements, Fee ling and Direct Control, considering the different ways these two 
elements can relate will present us with alternative answers to our question. Here we will 
consider in outline the four responses to the question of this dissertation.  
                                                 
12 A consequence of this is that the strategy Eilan (1998) and Campbell (2003) use to link consciousness and 
attention cannot be employed in the bodily case. I return to discuss this issue in chapters 5 and 6. 
13 I am thinking of cases like the rubber hand illusion and the McGurk effect. 23 
 
Our  project  is  to  articulate  the  proper  relationship  between  Feeling  and  Direct 
Control. Three general options immediately present themselves: (one) that the two aspects 
are independent, (two) that direct control over one‘s body confers feeling, and (three) that 
feeling is necessary for direct control. 
The first and simplest option is that there is no relation between the two aspects of 
the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot.  Feeling  and  Direct  Control  are  independent.  Call  this  position 
Independence. Independence is inspired by P. F. Strawson‘s animadversions to the unique role 
of one‘s body in perceptual experience. In developing an argument for Independence, we 
will  exploit  Strawson‘s  procedure  for  arguing  against  the  unique  role  of  one‘s  body  in 
perceptual experience and apply it to the sensorimotor transactions of a subject in the light 
of Sydney Shoemaker‘s functional theory of embodiment. 
The second option is that we feel our bodies ‗from the inside‘ because we have direct 
control over our bodies. Feeling holds in virtue of Direct Control. Call this position Enaction. 
The  idea  behind  Enaction  is,  very  crudely,  that  perceptual  experience  is  in  some  way 
constituted by an agent‘s sensorimotor activity. The enactive view is typically developed with 
reference to vision or perceptual experience at large, but rarely focused on bodily awareness 
and direct control. We find the general enactive position developed in different ways in the 
work of Stuart Hampshire, Bill Brewer, Gareth Evans, and Susan Hurley, among others. We 
shall develop our position concerning Feeling and Direct Control by drawing on elements of 
their work and applying them to the specific case of bodily awareness and action, and also 
considering work by Brewer and O‘Shaughnessy specifically on bodily action as a condition 
of bodily awareness.  
The third broad option is that we have direct control over our bodies because we 
feel our bodies ‗from the inside‘. Another way to put this is that Feeling is necessary for 
Direct Control. There are two ways that this claim may be developed. 
The first and more obvious way to develop the third option is to claim that feeling a 
body part ‗from the inside‘ is necessary for any instance of directly acting with that body 
part.  Call  this  Necessity.  O‘Shaughnessy  has  forcefully  developed  this  line  of  thought. 
Necessity is the analogue in bodily awareness of a more familiar (but also seldom articulated) 
thesis concerning visuomotor control: that online control of actions is based on conscious 
visual experience. In other words, conscious visual experience of the objects on which one is 
acting is necessary for any instance of online visuomotor control. 24 
 
The second way to develop the third option also claims that we have direct control 
over our bodies because we feel our bodies ‗from the inside‘, but relaxes the link between 
Feeling and Direct Control. Necessity represents the most attractive answer to our question, 
but falls prey to various empirical counterexamples which show that online control cannot 
be due to conscious bodily awareness. This suggests that if we are to hold on to the idea that 
there is an intimate connexion between bodily awareness and agency, the connexion between 
bodily awareness and bodily action will be a less tight and less obvious one than bodily 
experience playing a direct role in online control. Rather, I claim that bodily experience plays 
an essential role in action planning, since to plan an action is to have some conception of 
what  you  can  do  –  which  requires  body  schemata  and  awareness  of  current  bodily 
dispositions. My proposal is that the point of bodily awareness is to give the agent a sense of 
what he can do with his body parts so that he can plan his actions. In other words, the 
function of bodily awareness is to provide for a sense of practical possibilities of action 
afforded by one‘s body. This then allows the agent to plan his actions. Call this position 
Planning. I will be arguing that Planning is the best answer to our question. 
 
 
1.5.   A preview of empirical and theoretical issues ahead 
 
In order to decide which view is best, we will need to carve out a line of argument exploiting 
various empirical and theoretical obstacles which the views come up against. I will briefly 
preview these obstacles in this section. At the end of this section we will also discuss certain 
issues pertaining to the dialectical strategy and methodology employed in our investigation. 
The driving idea of the dissertation is the Cartesian Non-Pilot. Consistency with the 
Cartesian Non-Pilot will be the basic phenomenological constraint on the correct articulation 
of the relation between bodily awareness and agency. We will often return to check if a view 
can  accommodate  the  two  elements  of  Descartes‘s  observation  and  their  unity  in  our 
everyday experience of bodily action. 
In carving out our line of argument, a series of empirical considerations will play a 
very important role. The empirical considerations divide into two groups: The first group 
consists of three basic classes of empirical counterexamples that will present different kinds 
of obstacles that a proper account of the  relation between  bodily awareness and bodily 25 
 
action  will  have  to  meet.  The  second  group  are  considerations  of  a  neuropsychological 
nature concerning dissociations between somatosensory processes that are used in online 
control of action and those that are responsible for experience of one‘s body. 
The three basic classes of empirical  counterexamples that we will employ are as 
follows. First, there is the case of deafferented agents. These are agents who are able to 
directly act with parts of their body despite lacking any awareness of these parts of their 
body ‗from the inside‘ (e.g. Cole and Paillard‘s patients, IW and GL; see Cole and Paillard 
1995). Second, there  is the  case  of direct brain  control of physical  apparatus (including 
neuroprosthetic devices) that has been made possible by various brain-machine interface 
technologies. Agents can be trained to exploit their brainwaves to directly control external 
physical devices, such as computer cursors (Carmena et al. 2003) or even robot arms (Velliste 
et al. 2008). Though brainwave controlled prosthetic limbs are not yet available, the obstacles 
to these are ―merely technological‖ (Donoghue 2002). The third class of empirical facts is 
perhaps the most important, for they include instances of paradigmatic ordinary actions 
whereas the previous two do not. There is strong evidence from cognitive psychology that 
the majority of our bodily actions seem to be accomplished without conscious attention to 
or  awareness  of  the  body  parts  involved.  We  will  examine  a  variety  of  different  cases, 
including that of fast reaching actions and various experiments that involve proprioceptive 
illusions (Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998, Marcel 2003). 
Also  of  crucial  importance  is  another  set  of  empirical  considerations  from 
neuropsychology,  concerning  the  dissociation  of  various  somatosensory  pathways 
subserving perception and action (Dijkerman and de Haan 2007). This set of considerations 
is important because they help us to make sense of why the aforementioned empirical data 
concerning the automaticity of much of everyday action is possible. Similar to dissociations 
between the ventral and dorsal pathways in the visual cortex for experiential and semantic 
purposes  as  opposed  to  online  visuomotor  control  (Milner  and  Goodale  1995,  2006; 
Jeannerod  1997),  the  results  here  indicate  that  somatosensory  processes  subserving  the 
control of action and those subserving one‘s experience of one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ can 
come apart in a number of instances.  
Let us turn now to the theoretical issues. There are two general sets of issues: the 
first concerns whether there is a general model of how sensory awareness figures in the 
control of action and the second concerns whether bodily awareness is in some sense special 26 
 
in sensorimotor control. These two issues have implications for the dialectical strategies 
employed in this thesis. After introducing these two issues, I will turn to comment on certain 
issues concerning the dialectical strategies I employ.  
The first issue is a large one the full resolution of which goes beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, since we are here concerned specifically about the relation between bodily 
awareness and bodily action. However, we certainly will have to bear the issue in mind. For 
an illustration of how the general model of sensorimotor action affects one‘s account of the 
relation between bodily awareness and action, we only have to look at O‘Shaughnessy‘s 
account. Whatever special grounds he has for holding his account of bodily awareness and 
bodily action, it is clear that the general thrust of the account derives from a more general 
conception of how experience interacts with action of which bodily experience and bodily 
action is a specific instance (O‘Shaughnessy 1992 and 1995). But it is also clear that we 
cannot just directly transpose the general model of sensory control of action from vision, 
which is the modality of choice for giving such general models, to bodily awareness – unless 
we think that bodily awareness is, in some sense, ‗structurally isomorphic‘ to vision. Clearly 
there  are  differences,  and  one  large  question  is  whether  the  differences  are  substantial 
enough to put pressure on the thought that there is a general conception of how experience 
interacts with action that applies across the board. This leads us to the second issue.  
A proper articulation of the relation between each form of sensory awareness and 
bodily action needs to be sensitive to distinctive features of the sensory modality in question. 
This raises the question of whether bodily awareness is in some sense special, and, if so, in 
what respects.  Issues here  include whether,  and if so,  how, the  various  sense  fields are 
structured differently. One key difference is the role of attention in the visual as opposed to 
the  bodily  awareness.  In  visual  awareness,  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  conscious  visual 
attention is playing a crucial role in the selection of objects for the action system to engage 
with even if visual experience is not setting the parameters for online control (Jeannerod 
1997, Goodale 1998, and Campbell 2003). However, such an understanding of the relation 
between sensory awareness of the modality in question and motor control does not seem to 
be available for bodily awareness, since bodily awareness is mostly recessive and seldom at 
the centre of one‘s attention (as O‘Shaughnessy has emphasised in various places) – save in 
cases of pain, but those are not the central cases for understanding how bodily awareness 
figures  in  motor  control.  We  have  hinted  at  the  importance  of  being  sensitive  to  the 27 
 
distinctive  characteristics  of  bodily  awareness  when  considering  how  it  supports  bodily 
action. There is a converse difficulty which we alluded to earlier in discussing the role of 
bodily awareness in ordinary action. We also have to be sensitive to the multi-modal (or 
perhaps even cross-modal) character of most experiences. Experiences may have such a 
unified and holistic character that it is impossible, or at least very difficult, to decompose an 
experience into constituents such that the issue of guidance may be raised with respect to 
each  constituent.  I  will  not  have  very  much  to  say  concerning  this  difficulty  in  this 
dissertation, but will attempt to be as sensitive to the issue as possible in my discussion. 
Having noted these two general issues, I want now to comment on aspects of the 
dialectical strategy that will be employed in this dissertation. There are two aspects of the 
methodology  employed  that  I  would  like  to  highlight.  The  first  concerns  the  role  of 
discussions  of  exteroceptive  experience  and  action  control  in  our  argument;  the  second 
concerns  the  distinction  between  the  relation  between  experience,  especially  bodily 
experience, and either a general capacity for action (which would presume that the agent would 
have a general capacity for control of his actions as well) or the control of particular bodily 
actions. Let us discuss each aspect in turn. 
Why do I sometimes discuss the relation between awareness and agency generally 
rather than only discussing the case of bodily awareness and bodily action? First of all, it is 
often difficult to directly approach the issue of bodily awareness and how it relates to bodily 
action. Difficulty is, of course, no excuse. But, as we have repeatedly noted, bodily awareness 
is  often  not  at  the  centre  of  one‘s  attention.  It  is  hard  to  report  or  reflect  on  the 
phenomenology of what is not in focal attention, so this exacerbates any problems that one 
faces in understanding and theorising about  the relation between awareness and agency. 
Given this, it is useful to consider models derived from consideration of how vision guides 
action or other exteroceptive modalities (where attention is often focal).
14 This serves two 
functions: it provides a springboard for discussion of the specifics of bodily awareness and 
its role in action control (by a consideration of similarities and differences) and it  provides 
putative models of how bodily awareness and bodily action might relate . A further, and 
                                                 
14 Though it is important to emphasise that in the exteroceptive cases the objects of action are things that one 
is acting on, and these are what is claimed to be in focal attention (at least some of the time or perhaps in 
central cases), whereas in the case of bodily awareness what is not in focal attention is the effector – often a 
limb – one is acting directly with. This is a crucial distinction that must be borne in mind at all times in 
theorising about the relation between bodily awareness and bodily action. 28 
 
critical, reason why we will often begin with discussions of awareness and agency, or situate 
our discussions of bodily awareness and bodily action within a discussion of awareness and 
agency, is that this way of approaching the role of bodily awareness is more ecologically 
valid. In cognition or perception ‗in the wild‘, as we might put it, bodily awareness is seldom 
working alone, but is usually working in concert with some other sense modalities. Thus the 
discussion of the general connections allow us to better examine the role of bodily awareness 
in vivo. 
The  second  aspect  of  the  dialectical  strategy  that  I  want  to  comment  on  is  my 
employment of the notion of a general capacity for bodily action on the part of the agent, 
and not just of that of the control of particular bodily actions. The distinction between a 
general capacity for action, or the general capacity for the control of actions, and control of 
particular actions is obviously significant. One concerns an agent‘s capacity for bodily action 
whereas the other concerns an instance of the agent‘s exercising his capacity for bodily 
action. Naturally where the former is not present, the latter cannot be present as well, and 
there are further interesting aspects of the relation between a capacity and an exercise of it. 
The connection that I am investigating in this thesis is between Feeling and Direct Control; 
thus it is that between feeling a certain body part ‗from the inside‘ and acting directly with it 
– on some particular occasion. Whilst this is the focus of the project, it is obvious that if 
there is some connection here then there will likely be a connection at the more general level 
between bodily awareness and the capacity for bodily action. In fact, it is hard to see how a 
connection  between  Feeling  and  Direct  Control  without  there  being  a  more  general 
connection as well between the bodily awareness and the capacity for bodily action. Now it 
is also clear that if we do indeed have connections at both these levels, they will not be the 
same  connection.  So  it  is  crucial  that  it  is  clear  in  the  discussion  which  of  these  two 
connections is the one being investigated. There are occasions where the more general thesis 
will predominate, as in the discussion of chapter 3 (on Enaction), when discussion of the 
more general thesis is necessary. But the focus is on the connection between controlling 
action with a body part and feeling in the body part that one acts with. When discussions of 
both connections are in play, then I will flag this if it is not already clear from the context. 
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1.6.   Sketching the general line of argument 
 
To bring this introductory chapter to an end, I will now sketch the general line of argument 
of this dissertation. 
Beginning with Descartes‘s observation that we are not in our bodies as pilots are in 
their ships, we isolated two aspects in Descartes‘s remark: (one) that one feels one‘s body 
‗from the inside‘ and does not feel any other material object in this way and (two) that we 
can directly act with our body in a way which we cannot act with other material objects. We 
dubbed the first aspect Feeling and the second Direct Control. This allowed us to pose the 
question of the dissertation: what is the relation between Feeling and Direct Control? 
In the second chapter we will consider the simplest of the four responses to our 
question: Independence, which is the claim that Feeling and Direct Control are independent. 
We  will  develop  an  argument  for  Independence  through  exploiting  a  procedure  of 
Strawson‘s for arguing that it is a contingent fact that one‘s body plays a unique role in 
perceptual  experience  and  applying  it  to  sensorimotor  transactions.  With  the  help  of 
Shoemaker‘s theory of embodiment, we will attempt to imagine a case where a subject is 
sensorily embodied in one body but volitionally embodied in a different body. If this case is 
a real possibility, then feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and direct control of one‘s body 
are independent  of each other and there  can be no intimate  connexion between  bodily 
awareness and bodily agency. I will argue that the key problem with Independence is that it 
cannot  make  sense  of  the  rational  role  of  experience  in  guiding  action.  Finding 
Independence  unsatisfactory  is  the  force  of  the  intuition  toward  some  kind  of  intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
Following  our  discussion  of  Independence,  we  will  turn  to  examine  the  three 
responses which claim that there is some kind of deep connexion between bodily awareness 
and bodily agency. Broadly speaking, there are two directions of explanation, one is that 
bodily agency is possible because of bodily awareness, and the other is that bodily awareness 
is possible because of bodily agency. We will examine the latter direction of explanation first. 
Enaction – the view that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ because one has 
direct power over it – is appraised in the third chapter. Because no theorist has developed 
the claim for bodily awareness in detail, we will approach Enaction by way of considering a 
more general dependency on perception on action, drawing on materials from Hampshire, 30 
 
Evans, Brewer, and Hurley. I will argue that Enaction falls prey to counterexamples from 
paralysed subjects and pain in body parts (such as internal organs) that we cannot act with, 
and that recent empirical work showing double dissociations between bodily awareness and 
bodily  agency  present  an  obstacle  for  any  account  that  claims  that  bodily  action  is  a 
condition on bodily awareness.  
This leaves us with the other direction of explanation – that bodily agency is possible 
because of bodily awareness – as the most attractive general picture of the relation between 
bodily awareness and bodily action. This picture  is also the  most intuitive one, for our 
ordinary model of sensorimotor control seems to be one where we act on an object at a 
location because we experience that object at that location. I reach to the left of my laptop 
for the coffee mug because I see it there. 
The most straightforward way to develop this picture is O‘Shaughnessy‘s claim that 
feeling a body part ‗from the inside‘ is necessary for any instance of directly acting with that 
body  part,  which  we  have  dubbed  Necessity.  We  will  look  at  Necessity  in  chapter  four. 
O‘Shaughnessy has forcefully developed this line of thought. Attractive as this idea is, it is 
still  empirically  inadequate.  I  will  develop  various  empirical  counterexamples  against 
Necessity: (one) the case of deafferented agents, who appear to be able to directly act with 
parts of their body that they have no sensation in; (two) the case of direct brain control of 
physical  apparatus  (including  neuroprosthetic  devices)  that  has  been  made  possible  by 
various brain-machine interface technologies; and (three) the majority of our bodily actions 
seem to be accomplished without conscious attention to or awareness of the body parts 
involved. Each case presents different difficulties for Necessity, but they unite in opposing 
any claim that the contribution of bodily awareness to bodily agency is indispensable. 
This clears the way for me to present my own views on these matters in chapters five 
and six. I will develop a different form of the general claim that bodily action is possible 
because of bodily awareness that retains the insights of Necessity but does not fall prey to 
the counterexamples. Whilst the intimacy between bodily awareness and agency is not in 
doubt, the counterexamples suggest that their relation cannot quite be understood in the way 
that Necessity claims. It is unlikely that bodily experience plays a role in online control, since 
this  is  mostly  non-conscious.  Rather,  bodily  experience  plays  an  essential  role  in  action 
planning, since to plan an action is to have some conception of what you can do – which 
requires body schemata and awareness of current bodily dispositions. My proposal is that the 31 
 
point of bodily awareness is to give the agent a sense of what he can do with his body parts 
so that he can plan his actions. In other words,  the  function  of bodily awareness is to 
provide for a sense of practical possibilities of action afforded by one‘s body. This then 
allows the agent to plan his actions. 
When we plan actions, what we do is to form some conception of actions that we 
want to undertake on the basis of some conception of our abilities. But we can have no 
conception of what we can do with our body, without having bodily awareness. The role of 
bodily awareness in paradigm cases of embodiment, then, is to provide for a conception of 
the body and its limits such that we have a conception of how we can act with our bodies. 
Notice  that  the  claim  is  not  that  conscious  bodily  awareness  is  required  for  any  one 
particular  action  that  we  undertake  within  the  range  of  central  cases  of  ordinary  bodily 
action,  but  that  the  possibility  of  basic  bodily  action  presupposes  background  bodily 
awareness such that the subject possesses some sense of how he may strive with his body. 
 
 
1.7.   The scope of this thesis: our question and related questions 
 
The question of this dissertation is the relation between Feeling and Direct Control. There 
are a number of ways to approach this question, of which our project in this dissertation 
represents  only  one.  A  rough,  but  not  entirely  accurate  way  of  construing  the  project 
pursued here is that we are concerned with the most direct or immediate relation between 
bodily awareness and bodily action – where this finds expression in terms of primarily causal, 
rational, and to a lesser extent constitutive connections of content. If we are considering the 
direction of explanation that I find most congenial (i.e. that bodily awareness is a condition 
on bodily action), one way to put this would be to say that the project is concerned with 
evaluating the role of bodily awareness in de facto control of one‘s bodily actions. This is to 
consider a substantial explanatory role for bodily awareness in bodily action. Depending on 
what one thinks de facto control comes to, this includes, but may not be exhausted by online 
control  based  on  parameters  derived  from  conscious  bodily  experience.  Our  primary 
emphasis will be on de facto control of bodily action based on bodily awareness and whether 
this is tenable. This is not to deny that there are other interesting connections to be explored 
in this and surrounding areas, in response to the question that we are posing. A guiding 32 
 
assumption here is that the role of bodily awareness in the direct control of bodily action – 
or the more direct relation between bodily action and bodily awareness, whatever it might be 
– is a more basic question that must first be explored in depth, before we turn to exploring 
connections that come on top of the basic question of de facto control and may be based on 
assumptions about the nature of de facto control.  
  The  kinds  of  connections  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  action  that  are 
discussed in this dissertation include (one) causal connections, (two) rational connections, 
and,  to a much lesser extent, (three) constitutive connections of content.  These  are the 
connections that, I assume, are implicated in the consideration of the issue of the role of 
bodily awareness in de facto control of bodily actions. I emphasise, once again, that this is not 
to deny that there are other putative connections to be pursued as possible answers to our 
question. Other important connections include: (four) connections that hold between bodily 
awareness and an agent‘s knowledge of his action as it unfolds in virtue of his controlling his 
action (see, e.g., O‘Brien 2003 and 2007), (five) connections between ownership of bodily 
actions and ownership of one‘s body due to being aware of it ‗from the inside‘ (see, e.g., 
Dokic 2003), and (six) bodily awareness and an agent‘s sense of control or agency (where this 
contrasts with de facto control).
15 Obviously there are other possible connections that might 
be pursued, and these listed may only be the tip o f the iceberg. One major issue that relates 
to the question of this thesis is that of knowledge of action.  This is, of course, an issue of 
utmost importance in action theory and philosophy of mind; the modern discussion of this 
issue takes off from Anscombe‘s classic monograph, Intention. I will not be pursuing the 
question of the nature of our knowledge of action, if we do indeed have such knowledge, 
and the related question of how knowledge of one‘s action is possible in this dissertation. 
Once again, my guiding assumption is that answers to the epistemic question of knowledge 
of one‘s action presupposes and relies on a certain conception of the direct relation between 
bodily awareness and action, so that this more basic question needs to be answered first. 
Regardless of whether one thinks there are deeper or stronger ‗intuitions‘ that are to be had 
about connections that hold between bodily awareness and ownership of one‘s body and 
                                                 
15 Some of the discussion in the later chapters might be thought to relate to some of these issues, especially the 
discussion in chapter 6. However, I do not always understand what theorists who use these terms mean when 
they employ them, especially talk of ‗ownership‘ and ‗sense of control/agency‘, which is part of the reason why 
I have not couched discussion explicitly in these terms. An example of one usage in the literature which I find 
unhelpful is using them to designate special ‗qualia‘ of certain experience. This is often found in the works of 
French analytic philosophers and their collaborators.  33 
 
actions, or a sense of agency, or to knowledge of action, the direct relation between bodily 
awareness and bodily action needs to be investigated. If such a project is considered shallow 
in comparison, then so be it. It may be shallow, but is without doubt foundational.  
  I obviously do not want to prejudge the results of this investigation here, though in 
introducing the topics and sketching my line of argument, I have already shown my hand, so 
to speak. In this section, my sole aim was to set down some of my assumptions and guiding 
principles of this project, so as to indicate the scope and limits of this thesis to its reader and 
pre-empt possible misunderstandings.
16 
 
 
1.8.   Summary 
 
In this introductory chapter we began with Descartes‘s observation that we are not in our 
bodies as pilots are in their ships. We analysed Descartes‘s observation and isolated two 
aspects to it, Feeling and Direct Control, discussing each in turn and posing the question of 
the dissertation in terms of what the relation between the two aspects is. We then took a 
closer look at some examples of how bodily awareness figures in ordinary bodily action. 
Having acquired a better grasp of what is at stake in our problem, we briefly discussed the 
four views in  response  to our problem that we  will study in this dissertation.  This was 
followed by a preview of empirical and theoretical obstacles ahead that will figure in the 
subsequent chapters in this dissertation. Finally, we drew matters to a close by sketching the 
general  line  of  argument  of  the  dissertation  and  indicating  the  scope  and  limits  of  the 
project. 
                                                 
16 A study of the possible variety of connections and pressures from the empirical literature is to found in the 
Introduction  to  Roessler  and  Eilan  (2003).  Other  discussions  include  Peacocke  (2003),  Eilan  (2010),  and 
Roessler (2010).  34 
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Independence:  
Feeling and Direct Control are Independent 
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In this chapter, we will consider the simplest response to our main question: that Feeling and 
Direct Control are independent. We earlier dubbed this position Independence. The primary 
argument for Independence is the alleged conceivability of Feeling without Direct Control 
and vice versa. The two-way conceivability claim is then taken to show that feeling one‘s body 
‗from the inside‘ and direct control of one‘s body are independent of each other. If this is 
correct, there can be no intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. I 
will argue that Independence is false by way of arguing that the conceivability claims do not 
establish  the  possibility  that  Feeling  and  Direct  Control  can  come  apart.  Finding 
Independence  unsatisfactory  is  the  force  of  the  intuition  toward  some  kind  of  intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
The  task  of  this  chapter  is  to  articulate  Independence  and  then  refute  it. 
Independence is inspired by P.F. Strawson‘s rejection of the unique role of one‘s body in 
perceptual experience. We begin by presenting Strawson‘s case for vision, and then extend it 
to the unique role of the body in bodily awareness and bodily action. The extension will 
proceed via exploiting Sydney Shoemaker‘s functional theory of embodiment. Once we have 35 
 
a  formulation  of  Independence,  we  will  be  able  to  consider  why  Independence  is 
unsatisfactory. We will do this by first exercising ourselves on Strawson‘s contention about 
vision, and then applying our lessons to Independence. Despite the ingenuity of this line of 
argument, I shall argue that it ultimately collapses. However, the Independence theorist has 
other resources to draw on. At this juncture we will consider an alternative argument for 
Independence drawing on (one) a picture of the relations between perception and action as 
merely  causal  and  (two)  actual  cases  of  dissociations  between  sensory  and  volitional 
embodiment. Responding to this argument will require meeting a number of fundamental 
issues head on. To this end, we will consider the pathologies of blindsight and numbsense in 
the light of three important contrasts regarding the general nature of action. We will then 
clarify the significance of pathological cases in our inquiry. We end with a discussion of 
Anscombe‘s  view  of  bodily  sensations,  which  is  intended  to  bring  home  how  we  are 
committed to the thesis that there is a substantial dependency between bodily awareness and 
bodily action for normal agents. 
 
 
2.1.   Articulating Independence 
 
We began this dissertation with Descartes‘s observation that we are not lodged in our bodies 
as pilots are in their ships. Strawson, too, is not insensitive to Descartes‘s observation and 
issues  of  phenomenology  in  general;  after  all,  he  is  pursuing  a  project  of  descriptive 
metaphysics. Indeed, Strawson sets the stage of the very section of Individuals (1959) that 
interests us here (section 2 of the celebrated chapter on persons, pp. 90-94) by alluding to 
Descartes‘s observation. Given that Strawson then goes on to argue that the unique role of 
one‘s body in perceptual experience is but a contingent fact, the question arises as to the 
extent to which a proponent of Strawson‘s position can accept Descartes‘s observation; and 
if not, whether Independence commits us to being pilots in ships with respect to our relation 
to  our  bodies.  But  let  us  hold  off  these  questions  until  we  have  a  clear  statement  of 
Independence before us. 
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2.1.1.   Strawson on the role of one‘s body in perceptual experience 
 
Strawson is discussing the (alleged) uniqueness of the body in the context of answering the 
two driving questions in ‗Persons‘: (1) ―Why are one‘s states of consciousness ascribed to 
anything at all?‖ and (2) ―Why are they ascribed to the very same physical thing as certain 
corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, &c.?‖ (p. 93). It might be thought, as 
Strawson notes, that the unique role of one‘s body in one‘s perceptual experience provides 
the key to answering both questions. Strawson denies this. He does so by arguing that the 
uniqueness of one‘s body in one‘s perceptual experience is but contingent, and does not 
reflect any deep feature of our understanding of lived experience. Strawson is correct that 
the  uniqueness of one‘s body  in  one‘s perceptual experience  provides no answer to his 
questions about ascription, but there is no reason to impugn uniqueness for that very reason. 
Strawson attacks uniqueness by arguing that it is a contingent fact that only a single 
body – one‘s body – is causally central in perceptual experience. His thought is that if the 
uniqueness  of  one‘s  body  in  one‘s  experience  is  shown  to  be  contingent,  and  that  the 
apparent uniqueness reflects no deep conceptual feature, then the uniqueness of a subject‘s 
body in perceptual experience cannot be used to answer his questions about ascription. (This 
then provides the platform for his claim that the questions have no answer save that our 
concept of person is primitive.) Our concern is with Strawson‘s claim of contingency rather 
than his questions about ascription. 
Strawson attempts to reveal this contingency by asking what this uniqueness comes 
to. The perceptual modality he explores first, and also in greatest detail, is vision (pp. 90-91). 
Strawson remarks that the dependence of visual experience on one‘s body is more complex 
and multifaceted than might initially appear. He identifies three general ways in which one‘s 
body contributes to one‘s visual experience. First, there are all those empirical facts about 
the eye, including ―all the facts known to ophthalmic surgeons‖ (p. 90), of which the most 
well known one is that the subject sees nothing if his eyelids are closed. Second, what comes 
into  view  –  given  a  fixed  possible  field  of  vision  –  depends  on  the  orientation  of  the 
subject‘s eyes, which is a function of the orientation of the subject‘s head and eyeballs. 
Third, the subject‘s possible field of vision depends on the position of his body, and in 
particular his head, since the organ of sight is located there. By a possible field of vision, I 
mean  what  is  visually  available  from  a  certain  spatial  location  under  all  orientational 37 
 
transformations of the subject‘s eyes.
17 In dividing the dependencies on one‘s body into 
three groups, Strawson means to emphasise that whilst visual experience is dependent in 
these three ways on facts about one‘s body, this, he contends, does not entail that these 
dependencies must all trace back to a single body. Rather, it is ―a contingent fact that it is the 
same body‖ (p. 90). 
Strawson proceeds to argue that this contingency is manifest when we consider how 
it is possible for us to imagine a certain kind of scenario where there is a single subject of 
experience but each class of dependencies is causally tied to a separate body. The possible 
scenario Strawson claims to be disclosed in imagination is the following: There is a single 
subject  of  visual  experience,  S,  and  three  separate  bodies,  A,  B,  and  C,  that  S‘s  visual 
experience is causally dependent on in the three different ways we carved out. (One) S‘s 
visual experience depends on the state of A‘s eyes and whether A‘s eyelids are open; the 
state of B‘s and C‘s eyes and whether their eyelids are open is irrelevant to whether S sees. 
(Two) S‘s possible field of vision depends just on where C is; the locations of A and B are 
irrelevant to where S sees from.  (Three) Given a fixed possible field of vision, determined 
by where C is, then what comes into view for S (out of all the things that might be seen from 
where C is) depends just on the orientation of B‘s head and eyeballs, wherever B might be 
located.  Thus  we  have  described  a  scenario  where  the  visual  experience  of  a  subject  S 
causally depends in three different ways on three different bodies. If Strawson‘s scenario is 
coherent – if imagination here is correctly picking up on possibility – then we seem to have a 
possible case where there is no unique body that occupies a causally central position in that 
subject‘s  visual  experience,  but  rather  three  bodies  that  the  subject‘s  visual  experience 
depends on in complex ways. Thus, if Strawson is right, then ―this complex uniqueness of 
the single body appear[s] to be a contingent matter, or rather a cluster of contingent matters‖ 
(p. 92).
18 
                                                 
17 Strawson‘s division  of the dependencies into three groups, and also his  specific way  of carving up the 
dependencies, is to some extent arbitrary; though this is not to say that the division does not reflect certain 
broad divisions which are conceptually salient in our understanding of vision. His focus on the eyes, however, 
is strange, since the eyes by themselves do not constitute the visual system, and the isolation of ophthalmic 
facts does not reflect the brain‘s crucial role in vision. Our subsequent rejection of Strawson‘s position is 
independent of this deficiency and does not exploit it. 
18 This unusual psychophysical arrangement would, of course, have ramifications for  S‘s visual experience of 
himself, or rather of those bodies that his visual experience is causally dependent on. Strawson attempts to 
capture various possibilities on p. 91; this is one of the most bizarre stretches of argument in Individuals and I 
am not sure that the visual possibilities are as Strawson describes, even on his assumptions. 38 
 
Audition is subject to a similar treatment: ―We might imagine ‗the point from which‘ 
sound  is  heard  by  a  given  hearer  being  dependent  on  the  location  of  one  body,  while 
whether  that  hearer  heard  anything  at  all  depended  on  the  condition  of  the  ears,  the 
eardrums, &c. of another body‖ (p. 92). Oddly enough, when discussing touch, Strawson 
appears to emphasise how a single body has a special position vis-à-vis a subject‘s tactile 
experiences and does not consider how the empirical facts about the causal dependencies 
might be broken down into distinct contributions. This may be a rhetorical manoeuvre so 
that his thesis may come across more dramatically. It is clear, however, that Strawson thinks 
that his arguments with respect to sight and audition can be adapted to other perceptual 
modalities, for he claims that ―it seems that we can imagine many peculiar combinations of 
dependence  and  independence  of  aspects  of  our  perceptual  experience  on  facts  about 
different bodies‖ (p. 92). Following Strawson, we might isolate different causal factors in 
how a subject‘s tactile experience depends on his body (or bodies). We can, at the very least, 
isolate  two  major  factors:  what  we  might  call  the  possible  field  of  touch  (roughly,  the 
ambient space and the objects there) and whether the body is anaesthetised. Thus we might 
imagine a scenario where what objects the subject can touch depends on the location of one 
body, but whether that subject can have tactile experiences of these objects at the location of 
the first body depends on whether some second body is anaesthetised.  
What about bodily awareness? Can we make a distinction here between the space 
and objects within that space picked up by one sensory ‗organ‘ (at a location) and the state of 
another sensory ‗organ‘ which jointly provide for a complex web of dependencies that the 
subject‘s experience requires? Following Strawson, it seems that we can distinguish between 
the possible field of bodily awareness – roughly, one‘s body and its parts – and whether the 
body is anaesthetised. These two causal factors can once again be placed in two different 
bodies. We might imagine a scenario where the object one senses through bodily awareness 
is some body, A, but whether one feels anything ‗from the inside‘ depends on whether some 
distinct body, B, is anaesthetised. Thus Strawson‘s procedure appears to be applicable across 
the  different  perceptual  modalities  to  undermine  the  idea  that  a  single  body  occupies a 
unique position in the subject‘s perceptual experience. 
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2.1.2.   Shoemaker on embodiment 
 
To argue for Independence, we will need to employ Strawson‘s style of argument not just 
with respect to an agent‘s perceptual experience, but also his actions. The procedure that 
Strawson  employs  is  as  follows:  Consider  some  phenomenon  where  the  subject‘s  body 
seems to play a unique role or occupy some unique position vis-à-vis the phenomenon. The 
unique role of the body (at least) partly consists in the obtaining of some complex causal 
dependencies between the phenomenon and the subject‘s body. If we able to isolate and 
identify different causal factors amongst the complex dependencies that hold, then we are in 
a position to imagine a scenario where it will be true to say that the subject is exhibiting that 
phenomenon in question even though these causal dependencies cannot all be traced to one 
body, but may be traced to a whole series of bodies. It is clear from this description that the 
application of the procedure need not be restricted to perceptual experience.  
Independence claims that feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and one‘s ability to act 
directly with one‘s body are independent; there is no necessary connexion between bodily 
awareness and direct control of bodily action. In order to establish Independence, we will 
have  to  show  that  we  can  have  direct  control  of  one‘s  body  in  the  absence  of  bodily 
awareness  and  also  bodily  awareness  in  the  absence  of  direct  control  of  one‘s  body. 
Strawson‘s procedure provides us with a clear way to do this. In order to apply Strawson‘s 
procedure  to  the  sensorimotor  transactions  of  subjects,  which  is  the  set  of  causal 
dependencies we  want to tease  apart,  it will  be  useful  to have a sketch  of the  relevant 
sensorimotor relations so that we can consider how they come apart. We can find just such a 
sketch  in  Shoemaker‘s  discussion  of  embodiment  in  his  paper  ‗Embodiment  and 
Behaviour‘.
19 
Shoemaker proposes two criteria of embodiment, one in terms of a subject‘s capacity 
for acting with a body and another in terms of a subject‘s perceiving with that body: 
  
(1) A subject is volitionally embodied in a certain body ―to the extent that the volitions 
of the [subject] produce in that body movements that conform to them or 
                                                 
19 John Foster has a similar theory of embodiment, which differs only on points of detail that pertain to the 
Cartesian dualist‘s position. See Foster‘s The Immaterial Self, pp. 261-266. I have chosen to employ Shoemaker‘s 
theory for ease of exposition because of his explicit criteria of volitional and sensory embodiment. 40 
 
fulfil them, that is, movements that the [subject] is trying to produce or which 
are constitutive of actions he is trying to perform.‖ 
 
(2) A  subject  is  sensorily  embodied  in  a  certain  body  ―to  the  extent  that  the 
interactions of that body with its surroundings produce in the [subject] sense-
experiences corresponding to, and constituting veridical perceptions of, aspects 
of those surroundings.‖
20 
 
Shoemaker  is  assuming  a  (broadly)  volitionist  account  of  action  and  a  causal  theory  of 
perception  of  the  Gricean  sort.  Though  these  accounts  of  action  and  perception  are 
contentious, one need not buy into these specific assumptions to see the general thrust 
behind his functional account of embodiment. What we need for the purposes of developing 
Independence is a general sense of how we can disentangle the unique role of the body in 
sensorimotor transactions, dividing the dependencies into the role of the body in sensory 
transactions and the role of the body in motor transactions. This is what Shoemaker‘s two 
criteria of embodiment provide us with. For the purposes of developing Independence, we 
will need to slightly amend Shoemaker‘s criteria for sensory embodiment since, as stated, it 
concerns  only  perception  of  the  ambient  environment.  Another  condition  on  sensory 
embodiment is that the subject has to be able to accurately perceive the states of his own 
body and its parts. Let us modify Shoemaker‘s criterion for sensory embodiment so that it 
includes a clause covering bodily awareness: 
 
(2*) A subject is sensorily embodied in a certain body to the extent that (one) the 
subject has veridical perceptions of the state of that body and its various parts 
through bodily awareness and other exteroceptive perceptual modalities and 
(two)  ―the  interactions  of  that  body  with  its  surroundings  produce  in  the 
[subject]  sense-experiences  corresponding  to,  and  constituting  veridical 
perceptions of, aspects of those surroundings‖.
21 
                                                 
20 ―Embodiment and Behavior‖, p. 117. I have substituted ‗subject‘ for Shoemaker‘s term ‗person‘ because of 
its neutrality. 
21 By ‗state of one‘s body‘ I mean to include such things as the position and spatial disposition of one‘s limbs, 
whether one is upside down, temperature, level of fatigue and other properties that can be sensed through 
bodily awareness. See chapter 1, section 1.2.1.1. 41 
 
 
Without this amendment, Shoemaker‘s criterion would not be able to capture the plight of 
deafferented agents who suffer more from a sensory deficiency than a volitional one. 
Shoemaker  suggests  that  volitional  and  sensory  embodiment  are  ―together  the 
primary criteria of, or constitutive factors in, embodiment simpliciter‖.
22 We can take normal, 
healthy human beings as instances of subjects who are ‗paradigmatically embodied‘; they are 
paradigmatically embodied in their bodies because of ―the significant extent to which they 
are volitionally and sensorily embodied in them‖.
23 Embodiment naturally comes in degrees. 
As we move away from subjects who are paradigmatically embodied in their bodies to other 
less fortunate subjects, we meet with subjects, such as paralytics, with deficiencies in the 
extent to which they can act with their bodies, and subjects, such as the blind or deaf, with 
deficiencies in the extent to which they are sensorily embodied in their bodies. We have 
actual cases where the two criteria come apart. Thus, a subject may satisfy one criterion of 
embodiment to a significant extent whilst only satisfying the other criterion poorly. Cases 
like these do not challenge the claim that the body has a unique role to play in sensorimotor 
transactions, but rather show that certain kinds of breakdowns are possible in the extent to 
which a subject‘s body can sustain various aspects of a subject‘s life, such as his experiences 
of  his  own  body  and  his  surroundings,  and  his  ability  to  act.  Shoemaker‘s  theory  of 
embodiment  does not entail  Independence,  but provides us with a crucial  plank  to put 
forward an argument for Independence.
24 
 
 
2.1.3.   Extending Strawson‘s argument to the case of Feeling and Direct Control 
 
We began this dissertation by noting the special roles of a subject‘s body in bodily awareness 
and also in action, and suggesting that the special roles of the body in awareness and in 
action complement each other. What Shoemaker‘s theory of embodiment brings out is how 
                                                 
22 ―Embodiment and Behavior‖, p. 117.   
23 ―Embodiment and Behavior‖, p. 120.  For discussion of what ‗significant extent‘ amounts to, and the extent 
to which we can demarcate what counts as sufficient, see ―Embodiment and Behaviour‖, p. 120 and Foster‘s 
remarks at The Immaterial Self, pp. 265-266. 
24 Note here that on some of the more distinctive cases that Shoemaker‘s theory allows for there will be 
questions as to the location of the subject that will have no straightforward answer. See Dennett‘s ―Where am 
I?‖ in Brainstorms (1981) for discussion. 42 
 
the complex phenomenology of unity that Descartes alludes to in denying that our relation 
to our bodies is as pilots to their ships can be understood in terms of the contribution 
provided by one‘s body in action (volitional embodiment) and that provided by one‘s body 
in perception (sensory embodiment). 
At this juncture we appear to be able to employ Strawson‘s procedure to tease apart 
various elements in the phenomenology thought to be inextricably linked. When we consider 
the unique role of the body in the sensorimotor transactions that the subject enters into, the 
causal dependencies that characterise this uniqueness can be divided into those that have to 
do with the body‘s role in perception and those that have to do with its role in action. This is 
brought out clearly by Shoemaker‘s theory of embodiment. We can see that these two classes 
of causal dependencies are (at least) to some extent separable, since there are subjects who 
are partially paralysed and yet retain their perceptual capacities and deafferented agents who 
are able to act with parts of their body despite lacking certain forms of sensory awareness. 
Thus subjects may be embodied without being paradigmatically embodied. A subject may be 
volitionally embodied in a certain body and yet not be sensorily embodied in that body to a 
significant extent; conversely, a subject may be sensorily embodied in a certain body and yet 
not be volitionally embodied in that body to a significant extent. Notice, further, that whilst 
Shoemaker‘s definitions of volitional embodiment and sensory embodiment each single out 
a certain body, it is left open whether the body singled out is the same in both definitions for 
a specific subject. We are now in a position to imagine a scenario where a subject, S, is 
volitionally embodied in a body V and sensorily embodied in a body P, where V and P are 
different bodies. Thus we seem to have described a scenario where the causal burden of our 
subject‘s sensorimotor transactions is divided across two different bodies, one of which is 
responsible for action and the other for perception. 
If the scenario adumbrated above is coherent – i.e. if imagination here is correctly 
picking up on possibility – then we seem to have a possible case where there is no unique 
body that occupies a causally central position in that subject‘s sensorimotor transactions, but 
rather two distinct bodies that the subject S‘s sensorimotor transactions depend on, where V 
is the body that S acts with and P is the body that S perceives with and feels ‗from the 
inside‘. Thus, for the subject S, the unique role of body V in his action has no link with the 
unique role of body P in his perception. If this is right, the complex uniqueness of the single 
body in sensorimotor transactions is a contingent matter. There is no necessary connexion 43 
 
between perceiving with one‘s body and acting with one‘s body as Descartes‘s observation 
might suggest, since these activities may be divided amongst multiple bodies for a single 
subject.  
The  argument  just  presented  is  more  general  than  what  is  needed  to  establish 
Independence, since Independence only concerns the relation between bodily awareness and 
bodily  action,  but  we  have  put  forward  an  argument  for  the  dissociation  of  perceptual 
awareness and bodily action. This might be thought to already constitute an argument for 
Independence, since bodily awareness comes under the rubric of perception. It is a form of 
perceptual awareness of one‘s body and its parts.
25 Thus S would see and touch and feel 
‗from the inside‘ a body, P, but strive with a different body, V. It is best, however, to 
proceed here with caution. We need an argument specific to bodily awareness and action so 
that the focus is squarely on the relation that we are investigating in this thesis.  
The imagined scenario would be one where a subject is volitionally embodied in one 
body, but is aware of the state of a distinct body ‗from the inside‘. The scenario we need to 
imagine is one where a subject (the Independent), I, can directly act only with body D yet 
feels a second, distinct body F ‗from the inside‘. If this is a coherent scenario, then we 
appear to have a situation where a subject is aware of one body ‗from the inside‘ yet acts 
directly with a distinct body. A consequence of this is that there is no unique body that 
occupies a causally central position in that subject‘s sensorimotor transactions pertaining to 
bodily  awareness  and  bodily  action,  but  rather  two  distinct  bodies  that  the  subject  I‘s 
sensorimotor transactions depend on. The distinctive role of body F in bodily sensation and 
awareness need have no connection to the distinctive role of body D in his actions. He can 
strive with D and can feel F ‗from the inside‘. If this is possible, then there need is no 
necessary connection between feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and being able to strive 
with it, since our subject can strive with D and not F but feels F from the inside and not D. 
This would appear to establish the thesis of Independence. 
Perhaps the reader will object that applying Strawson‘s procedure to sensorimotor 
transactions based on exploiting Shoemaker‘s two criteria of embodiment is illicit. After all, 
neither  Shoemaker  nor  Foster  discusses  the  possibility  of  such  a  dissociation,  and  their 
discussions  of  embodiment  are  to  some  extent  aimed  at  trying  to  be  faithful  to  the 
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phenomenology  of  bodily  awareness  and  agency.
26 The proponent of Independence will 
agree with the objector that the situation of our subject, the Independent, is surreal, but will 
insist that given the materials we have gathered, the situation represents a real possibility, and 
thus reflects the lack of a necessary connexion between sensation and direct control. The 
Foster/Shoemaker theory simply makes it clear how sensory and volitional embodiment can 
come apart. 
One final remark: In arguing for Independence in the manner that we have sketched, 
the proponent of Independence need not be exploiting a general link between conceivability 
and possibility on which anything conceivable is thereby shown to be possible.
27 Rather, all 
he needs is to demonstrate that imagination is correctly picking up on possibility in the case 
at hand. Thus we can evaluate the case for Independence without taking a stance on the 
general link between conceivability and possibility. 
 
 
2.2.   Why Strawson is wrong about the role of one‘s body in perceptual experience 
 
So  far,  we  have  been  developing  an  argument  for  Independence.  Now  that  we  have 
articulated the thesis of Independence and have an argument for it, we will turn to consider 
why the argument is ineffective and Independence is unsatisfactory. We will do this by first 
considering why Strawson is wrong about the role of one‘s body in perceptual experience, 
since our argument for Independence draws on Strawson‘s procedure, which is the task of 
this section. Once we understand where Strawson errs, and why, we will be able to apply 
lessons learnt there to the case for Independence. 
I can identify two problems with Strawson‘s claim regarding the role of one‘s body in 
perceptual experience. The first problem is that Strawson‘s scenario is inconsistent with our 
                                                 
26 Shoemaker does not consider a case like the one we sketch, but discusses a thought experiment which is 
pretty bizarre as well. In his thought experiment, subjects have biological bodies which their brains reside in, 
but due to the impossibility (in that world) of brain transplants and the impaired state of biological bodies, the 
society makes duplicates of what subjects‘ pre-diseased bodies and there are high tech wireless devices that 
transmit signals from these duplicate bodies to the subjects‘ brains and vice versa. Shoemaker argues that these 
subjects would be functionally embodied in these duplicate bodies, since they are volitionally and sensorily 
embodied in them. Thus we might distinguish, in such a world, between one‘s biological body and one‘s 
functional body. Given that he thinks such a situation to be imaginable and thus possible, I don‘t think that my 
imaginary case is in any way against the spirit or the letter of his account. 
27 See the essays in Gendler and Hawthorne‘s Conceivability and Possibility (2002) for discussion of the general link 
between conceivability and possibility. 45 
 
concept  of  vision.  In  Strawson‘s  scenario,  the  visual  experience  of  a  subject  S  causally 
depends in three different ways on three different bodies: on whether the eyelids of one 
body are open, on how the eyes of a different body are oriented, and on the location of yet 
another body. Each of the three bodies is responsible for one set of causal dependencies and 
is irrelevant to the other two sets of causal dependencies. E.g. It does not matter to whether 
and what S sees that the eyelids of the body responsible for the orientation of the eyes, B, are 
open and on where B is located. Given a possible field of vision determined by body C and 
the  opening  of  body  A‘s  eyelids,  the  orientation  of  B‘s  eyes  determines  which  view  is 
presented to the subject S. This inconsistency with our understanding of vision divides into a 
number of smaller doubts: Is Strawson‘s scenario consistent the way we understand how 
seeing relates to the space seen? In particular, is it consistent with our notion of seeing from 
a certain point of view? And is it consistent with the way we think of the causal structure of 
seeing? 
There is no doubt that vision involves various mechanisms, and that we may isolate 
different causal factors that are crucial to it. However, Strawson‘s thought seems to be that 
our concept of vision just is that of a series of mechanisms resulting in an experiential effect; 
there is a series of mechanisms through which information about ambient light is shunted 
and visual experience is the upshot of this. This is implicit in his treatment of perceptual 
experience and its relation to underlying mechanisms. We can see what is erroneous about 
this picture of visual experience when we run an analogous case where three independent 
mechanisms come together to determine some effect and see how this is different from 
vision.  
Imagine some kind of art installation, where there are three cameras that together 
determine one image. The three cameras are located at different places, and they are linked 
to a computer which puts together information from the cameras into an image. From the 
first camera we extract information about the level of brightness, from the second camera 
we extract information about visual form, and from the third camera we extract information 
about colour. The computer puts the information together into a single image that can be 
viewed on the computer‘s monitor. Our concept of vision is not that of such a series of 
mechanisms resulting in some sort of experiential upshot. Vision is not just a mechanism 
processing information about ambient light, not just an experiential effect that is the joint 
upshot of various causal factors. Rather, vision provides us with a way of relating to objects 46 
 
in  the  world.  At  best,  Strawson‘s  multi-bodied  ‗visual  system‘  can  be  a  mechanism  for 
transmitting and processing information about the ambient light at three different locations, 
and transducing this information into some experiential effect. This experiential effect will 
not amount to vision, because it does not provide for visual contact with particular objects 
in the world.
28  
This leads us to the second problem with Strawson‘s scenario. It is unclear whether 
Strawson‘s scenario can succeed on its own terms even if we set aside our complaint that it is 
unfaithful to how we understand vision. Given what we know about the operation of the 
visual  system, it would  seem that Strawson‘s description of the scenario  is problematic. 
Remember that each of the three bodies is responsible for one set of causal dependencies 
and is irrelevant to the other two sets of causal dependencies. Thus, in Strawson‘s scenario, it 
does not matter to whether and what S sees that the eyelids of the body responsible for the 
orientation of the eyes, B, are open and on where B is located. Given a possible field of 
vision determined by body C and the opening of body A‘s eyelids, the orientation of B‘s eyes 
determines which view is presented to the subject S. Whether S sees depends on whether 
A‘s eyelids are open, and we are told that whether B‘s or C‘s eyelids are open is irrelevant. 
However, what S sees is dependent on the location of C and the orientation of B‘s eyes. 
Now, if B and C don‘t have their eyelids open, how can the parts of S‘s visual system which 
are located in B and C even receive any information about the ambient light? Perhaps we can 
stipulate that the workings of S‘s visual system involves an implementation of an algorithm 
where there is a conditional clause stating that S‘s visual experience is conditional on A‘s 
eyelids being open, but surely at least C‘s eyelids need to be open so that, given information 
about the orientation of B‘s eyes, we can compute what visual effect will result. But if body 
C is anything like normal bodies, it will have eyes that have a certain visual extent, roughly a 
conical volume in front of C. It will not have visual information pertaining to the complete 
possible field of vision given its position. We can only make sense of Strawson‘s scenario if 
                                                 
28 One might ask: if Strawson‘s scenario is inconsistent with our conception of vision, what is our conception 
of  vision?  E.g.,  is  our  concept  of  vision  primitive?  This  raises  difficult  and  interesting  issues  that  have 
ramifications  for  our  understanding  of  the  relation  between  underlying  mechanisms  and  personal  level 
explanations and also disjunctivism about perception. I cannot begin to address these issues here as they would 
take us away from the argument of the thesis. For the purposes of our argument against Strawson, it will be 
enough if we show that his scenario is inconsistent with our understanding of vision, and I think we can 
succeed in this task without first articulating what our concept of vision is. Furthermore, we can often tell that 
an explication of a concept X is inconsistent with our actual concept X without yet being able to articulate what 
our concept of X is. 47 
 
we  understand  it  not  as  providing  for  a  way  of  seeing,  but  as  a  mechanism  for  the 
transduction of information about the ambient light around three bodies that results in an 
experiential effect in a subject – in which case the scenario is more akin to our art installation 
than any case of seeing. Strawson‘s scenario is inconsistent with the simplest facts we know 
about the causal structure of vision.
29 
Naturally if I am right then in order to be faithful to the phenomenology of lived 
experience as it actually is (rather than what it might b e like), Strawson needs to ‗save the 
appearances‘ in some way. Thus he attempts to have his cake and eat it too. After discussing 
the special position of one‘s body in touch, he summarises the argument of the section so 
far: 
 
Such points illustrate some of the ways in which each person‘s body occupies a special 
position in relation to that person‘s perceptual experience. We may summarise such facts by 
saying that for each person there is one body which occupies a certain causal position in 
relation to that person‘s perceptual experience, a causal position which in various ways is 
unique in relation to each of the various kinds of perceptual experience he has; and—as a 
further consequence—that this body is also unique for him as an object of the various kinds 
of perceptual experience which he has. We also noted that this complex uniqueness of the 
single body appeared to be a contingent matter, or rather a cluster of contingent matters; for 
it seems that we can imagine many peculiar combinations of dependence and independence 
of aspects of our perceptual experience on facts about different bodies. (p. 92) 
 
But, as we have seen, being able to isolate different causal factors that contribute to the 
unique role of one‘s body in visual experience is not to say that these causal factors can be 
divided across multiple bodies which can then come together to function as a single visual 
system  (in  some  sense).  Rather  what  we  have  is  multiple  factors  contributing  to  the 
functioning of a single system embodied in one body. It is not that these multiple factors are 
not separable, as is clearly seen in pathological cases, but that the proper functioning of the 
system as a whole requires that it be associated with a single body. Otherwise the product 
                                                 
29 There is a question concerning the consistency of the scenarios that Strawson claims to be possible with his 
own views regarding our concept of persons and about the identification and re-identification of material 
objects. It seems to me that there is some tension between his views on the latter issues and his claim of 
contingency regarding the uniqueness of one‘s body, but I will not pursue these issues here because they are 
not directly related to my current line of argument. 48 
 
will be alien to the way we understand perception – as a way of experientially relating us to 
objects in the world. In this section, we have seen that Strawson‘s general procedure is 
problematic, but do the problems here affect the argument for Independence? 
 
 
2.3.   Why Independence is unsatisfactory 
 
In arguing for Independence, we imagined a scenario where a subject (the Independent), I, is 
volitionally embodied in one body, D, but is aware of the state of a distinct body, F, ‗from 
the inside‘ – where D and F are different bodies. Insofar as this is possible, then we have a 
situation where a subject I can strive with a certain body D, yet cannot feel it ‗from the 
inside‘; and he can feel a certain body F ‗from the inside‘, yet cannot strive with it. What are 
the consequences of such a dissociation? (One) There is no unique body that occupies a 
causally  central  position,  but  two  distinct  bodies  that  the  subject  I‘s  sensorimotor 
transactions depend on. He has direct control over D and feels F. Thus, the distinctive role 
of  body  F  in  bodily  sensation  and  bodily  awareness  need  have  no  connection  to  the 
distinctive role of body D in his actions. He can strive with D and can feel F ‗from the 
inside‘.  If  the  scenario  adumbrated  is  possible,  then  there  is  no  necessary  connection 
between feeling one‘s body ‗from the  inside‘ and being able to strive with it, since  our 
subject can strive with D and not F but feels F from the inside and not D. (Two) Because 
there is no single, unique body that has a distinctive role in bodily awareness and agency, this 
allows for situations where the explanation for Direct Control need not implicate Feeling, 
and the explanation for Feeling need not implicate Direct Control. This would appear to 
establish the thesis of Independence. 
Is Independence really tenable? I think there are really two questions at this point. 
One is whether Independence is plausible as a position. The other is whether our argument 
above establishes Independence. Let us consider these two questions in turn. 
There are a number of different problems with Independence. In lived experience, 
perception provides a rich source of reasons for action. For example, it is because I see the 
coffee mug to my right that I reach to where it is in order to get some stimulation. It is 
because I feel my arm at the location that it is at and in the posture that it is in that I move it 
in this particular way to pick up the apple which I see. More specifically, it is plausible to 49 
 
think that there is a rational connexion between perceptual experience and action. Often 
perception is what jolts the agent into action, but beyond that it provides the objects that 
one‘s action is directed at, and provides a source of feedback regarding whether one‘s actions 
are  successful.  Independence  must  reject  this  rational  connexion  between  perceptual 
experience and action – more specifically, between bodily awareness and action. We can see 
why this is so if we consider how a rational connexion between perception and action might 
be implemented for our subject (the Independent), I. Let us consider two different scenarios, 
a more ‗ecologically valid‘ scenario involving exteroception and action on the basis of that, 
and also one more specifically pertaining to bodily awareness and action with the felt limb.  
First let us consider the scenario where bodily awareness is implicated in control in 
an action with a limb on an external object which is seen. We shall assume that our subject I 
visually perceives with the same body (F) that he feels ‗from the inside‘. He strives with a 
distinct body D. F and D are two different bodies that may be in vastly different locations, 
for all we know; nothing rules that out. If I sees a coffee mug to his – or rather F‘s – right, 
does it make sense for him to reach there for the mug? In order to reach for the mug, I must 
act with body D. But I is not sensorily embodied in D, but only volitionally embodied in it, 
so I cannot exploit the egocentric (or rather F-centric) character of his perception to guide 
his actions. As this is not a purely ballistic action, in order for our subject to grab the mug, it 
is plausible to think that he needs some sense of how to reach toward the mug which is 
partly based on the state of his effectors; thus he needs some awareness of the position and 
state of his arm and some sense, however inarticulate, of the possible trajectories that his 
arm can take towards the mug. All this information about the state and position of his arm 
will be coming from F – but the subject needs to exploit this to act with D, a distinct body. 
How is he to do this? His perceptions inform him about the sensory state of F; in order to 
act on this he needs to compute where D is in relation to F and the state and position of the 
relevant effectors on D and then subsequently make a computation as to how D can act on 
the mug. However, I is not sensorily embodied in D, so it is not obvious how I can always 
gather the requisite information about D except through F. The subject certainly cannot feel 
D ‗from the inside‘, so he will have no sense of the state and position of D‘s limbs except 
through exteroception. What if F cannot perceive D at all, because D is too far away? But, 
more importantly, why should the states of F reflect those of D? What grounds does the 
agent have to think that the states of F will reflect those of D since they are distinct bodies? 50 
 
Let us turn now to consider a situation pertaining specifically to bodily awareness 
and action with the felt limb. Our subject wishes to rub his itchy eyes. To be precise, the 
eyes that itch are the eyes belong to body F, which the subject has sensation in. He has to 
rub these eyes with the fingers on D. In order to rub his eyes, he will need to reach for them. 
Let us assume that in this case, we are not dealing with a sudden acute itch with a fast 
reaching reaction to rub the itch, so that we have a fast, unthinking response, but rather a 
considered action in response to eyes that have been itching for awhile. The subject will have 
to have some sense of where his hands are, so that he can bring them to his eyes and rub his 
eyes with his fingers. But the sense of position of the arms that I will have will be of body F, 
which is also the body that has the itchy eyes, yet he needs to use body D to rub those eyes. 
He has no sense of the state and position of D‘s limbs. If it is correct to say that in some 
instances we need to know the state and position of one‘s limbs in order to act on them, 
how does knowing the state and position of F‘s limbs help I with acting with D‘s limbs? It 
clearly doesn‘t. All the agent can do is try with D, and adopt an attitude of wait-and-see. 
Perhaps the itch will be alleviated, he feels the eyes rubbed, or perhaps nothing will happen. 
Thus if Independence were correct, we would have no way of sustaining a rational 
connection between perception and action. But this rational connexion is surely something 
that we don‘t want to deny, short of emptying the purposive character of intentional actions 
based on experience of any content.  
A complaint that we might level at this style of argument is that it does not really 
establish  Independence.  Rather  all  it  establishes  is  that  the  special  connections  we  are 
interested in between bodily awareness and agency can be distributed over several bodies. So 
rather than putting the presence of a connection into doubt, it raises the question of whether 
the appropriate connection, if there is indeed one, requires that the bodies involved in Direct 
Control and Feeling are identical; i.e. that there be a single body involved in Direct Control 
and Feeling. In defence of the style of argument we have employed, we can point out that 
neither action nor perception can play certain of their crucial functional roles short of there 
being some kind of grand coincidence – along the lines of Leibniz‘s pre-established harmony 
– where there are distinct bodies moving around which mirror each other‘s states if we have 
the sort of situation envisaged. Perhaps on that situation there would be some grounds for 
the agent to act on the basis of his bodily awareness, since the state of one mirrors the state 
of the other – but other difficulties abound to do with exteroception, which are inevitable, 51 
 
since the bodies are distinct and in different locations. Given that there are no constraints on 
the  relation  between  the  two  bodies,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  have  to  exhibit  the 
complementary relation we observe in normal life between perception and action. There is 
also  a  second  and  perhaps  deeper  difficulty.  The  phenomenology  of  agency  in  such  a 
situation would be one where one has to be an observer even to one‘s direct actions. It is 
unclear how I can take himself to just know what he is doing even in cases of ordinary bodily 
actions since he is sensorily embodied in F but volitionally embodied in D. Thus, beyond 
knowledge of the efferent signal (i.e. an attempt at doing something), he can only know 
about D‘s state through perceiving D with F. In such a scenario, all I can do is try to act with 
D, after which he can only take an attitude of waiting to see what happens with F. In such a 
scenario, the subject would be alienated from his own actions.
30 This is inaccurate as to the 
phenomenology of ordinary bodily agency. 
It is clear that the scenario we have described in arguing for Independence is not one 
that is really coherent and does not present a possibility where Feeling and Dire ct Control 
are independent. However, a proponent of Independence may respond that all we have done 
is rebut  one  way  of  arguing  for  Independence.  There  may  well  be  ways  to  argue  for 
Independence  that  do  not  employ  Strawson‘s  procedure.  After  all,  haven‘t  we  shown 
Strawson‘s procedure to be problematic in the case of visual perception? And if so shouldn‘t 
we be sceptical of applying Strawson‘s procedure to other phenomena? He may well deny 
that we should countenance the kind of extreme imaginary scenario that the argument for 
Independence we gave above involved, instead relying on two simple thoughts to argue for 
the position: (One) He may press on the claim that there needs to be a rational connexion 
between perception and action. His thought here would be that perception is basically a sort 
of causal process inward whilst action is a causal process outward, and as long as we have 
the requisite causal mechanisms in place so that the causal processes going outward are 
causally  sensitive  to  those  coming  in,  it  is  unclear  why  there  is  a  need  for  a  further 
connexion. (Two) He may argue that we already have an argument for Independence that 
does not rely on Strawson‘s procedure. Haven‘t we observed that, on the one hand, there are 
deafferented agents and, on the other hand, there are paralysed agents? Doesn‘t that already 
show that volitional embodiment and sensory embodiment can come apart? 
                                                 
30 For further discussion of this point, see O‘Shaughnessy 1980, vol. 2, chapter 8, ‗Observation and the will‘. 52 
 
This response brings a number of crucial issues to the fore. In order to provide a 
satisfactory reply to a proponent of Independence employing this strategy, we will need to 
clear about certain fundamental assumptions about action that have so far been left implicit. 
At this juncture, it will be useful to spell these out because they will frame the rest of our 
discussion in this dissertation. I will begin by reviewing three contrasts that are crucial for 
understanding action in the following sub-section. This will lead in to discussions of a lesson 
about  action  from  the  pathologies  of  blindsight and  numbsense,  and  finally we  turn  to 
consider the significance of pathological cases in our inquiry. Once we have these materials 
in hand we will be in a position to see what is flawed in the response from the proponent of 
Independence.  
 
 
2.3.1.   Three contrasts concerning action    
 
In this sub-section, I will consider three contrasts that pertain to the general nature of action. 
They are: (1) actions vs. reflexes, (2) action vs. intentional action, and (3) endogenous vs. 
sensorimotor action. Though these three contrasts may not seem at first sight to be directly 
relevant to the question of this dissertation, they all have deep ramifications for a proper 
articulation of the relation between bodily awareness and bodily action.  
(1) Action vs. reflex. The first contrast, and in many ways what I take to be the most 
fundamental one for understanding action, is that between an agent‘s activity – or what an 
agent (actively) does – and what merely happens to the agent. The key contrasting category 
for teasing out the importance of the distinction between what an agent does and what 
merely happens to an agent in understanding agency is the category of reflexes, such as the 
knee jerk reflex. I highlight the reflex because it has been thought that reflexes look very 
much like actions in that there is some movement of a body part – just think of a knee jerk 
elicited by a doctor‘s tap on your knee and compare your kicking out your calf while perched 
on a chair. There are a number of differences that we might point to between the two 
categories,  including  a difference  in  the  kinematic profile of these  movements.  The key 
difference  is  what  we  might  call  the  means-ends  flexibility  or  robustness  of  actions  as 
opposed to the rigidity of reflexes. By this, I mean that agents in acting can achieve the 
desired goal state in a very large number of ways. For example, if one is reaching for the salt 53 
 
and there are obstacles blocking a direct approach to the salt, one can reach around them. 
Or think of how one can flick a light switch in very many different ways, exploiting different 
body parts and moving them with different trajectories to the switch. 
(2) Action vs. intentional action. The second issue is that what an agent does can be an 
action even though it is not intentional. O‘Shaughnessy has pointed out that some of our 
actions, such as the tapping of one‘s feet while writing a paper, or the way we constantly 
move our tongues in our mouths even when we are not speaking or swallowing, are not 
intentional  under  any  description.
31 There may be (and probably is) a sense in which 
intentional action is primary in our understanding of the category of action, since intentional 
action involves in some sense  knowingly taking certain means toward an end, which in its 
cognitive character brings out the robust means-ends nature of action that we discussed 
above.
32 But this is not to say that all actions are intentional under some description. 
(Furthermore, to say that intentional action is primary in the ‗order of understanding‘ is not 
to deny that action may be primary in the ‗order of metaphysics‘.) 
(3) Endogenous action vs. sensorimotor action. The third contrast is between what we might 
call, for lack of a better term, endogenous action as opposed to sensorimotor action. This is 
a contrast that is of tremendous importance in psychological and neuroscientific work on 
action and motor control, but has received little attention in philosophy.
33 The contrast in 
some form dates back to debates at the conception of psychology as a discipline betwee n 
Lotze and James. Intuitively, sensorimotor actions are those actions which are triggered by 
sensory stimuli, whereas endogenous actions are purely self-generated according to the goals 
                                                 
31 See  O‘Shaughnessy  1980,  vol.  2,  chapter  10,  ‗The  sub-intentional  act‘.  For  a  recent  discussion  of  sub-
intentional actions, see Steward (2008). 
32 Here I am endorsing the claim that conscious experience rationalises action, in part, by providing agents with 
awareness of the means by which to execute t he action. On this point I am in agreement with Jeannerod and 
Marcel. John Campbell (2003) rejects this. His alternative proposal is that awareness of the categorical 
properties of objects of experience provides the subject with a grip on why what he is do ing is right. This is an 
issue of considerable interest and deserves extended study; however, the debate would take us away from the 
central argument of this thesis, so I will not discuss it further in this thesis. 
33 There is considerable variation between   the exact meanings of the contrasts that individual researchers 
employ, since the contrast is put to different uses. In employing this contrast I only commit myself to the brief 
explication given in the text, which I think captures the core of the contras t as it is employed in the literature.  
There are numerous examples we can draw from the extensive literature. The contrast between what Wolfgang 
Prinz  calls  the  ‗ideomotor‘  –  which  roughly  corresponds  to  our  notion  of  endogenous  actions  –  and 
sensorimotor approaches to action is crucial to the theoretical framework that his common-coding approach to 
perception and action is founded on (Prinz 2003). Jahanshahi and Frith (1998) distinguish between willed as 
opposed to sensorimotor intentions and Haggard (2008) contrasts voluntary actions with stimulus-driven ones. 
The contrast between the two kinds of actions is also a crucial but unstated assumption of Libet‘s celebrated 
experiments on the timing of conscious intention (Libet 1985). 54 
 
of the agent rather than being set off by sensory stimuli. But the contrast is somewhat 
slippery and we will approach it indirectly. 
The human being finds himself in a situation where survival demands that he must 
be an acting subject (or a perceiving agent). The acting human subject must know of the 
ambient things, creatures and goings-on in order to intervene to satisfy his needs. Thus, 
action is at its genetic root a kind of sensorimotor process, i.e. it is crucially sensitive to and 
responsive to environmental (and also bodily) changes – yet it is also autonomous in its own 
right. By this I mean that action can be entirely self-generated and freed from the fetters of 
sensory awareness – which explains my choice of the label ‗endogenous‘. Thus the agent may 
act because of internal motivation or even for no reason in particular – he may just act. The 
agent may just run, he need not run only when he sees a potential mate or prey or predator. 
(He  may  run  for  pleasure,  for  example.)  The  act  is  self-generated  and  not  any  kind  of 
response to environmental events. But when sensory awareness is in play it is not, as a 
superficial reading of this contrast might suggest, a tyrant that shackles the action but is 
rather a handmaiden to action. Given the aims of the agent, perception helps him to achieve 
it in two ways: it provides the agent with the object of his action and allows him to track the 
success of his action as it unfolds. (Providing the agent with the object of his action need not 
be seen as a merely a passive response on the part of the agent, so we need not think of 
sensorimotor  action  as  merely  a  kind  of  rational  response,  since  the  agent‘s  perceptual 
activity is put at the service of his aims – he wants a mate and is thus looking around for 
one.) The endogenous character of action is in play even in sensorimotor transactions, since 
the agent is (often) not at the mercy of the sensory stimulus – he may decide not to run after 
the potential mate – unlike, e.g., in the case of reflexes where the agent has no voluntary 
control. The stimulus in sensorimotor action is not like a very bright light that is shone 
directly at the agent‘s eyes whereupon his eyes must go shut. Having distinguished these two 
aspects of the character of actions – their endogenous aspect and their sensorimotor aspect 
– and how actions can have more of one aspect than the other, I want to emphasise that 
endogenous actions cannot be released from their sensorimotor moorings. This is not just 
due  to  genetic  reasons,  but  rather  that  almost  any  action,  however  simple,  will  involve 
elements of control where perception will figure unless it is entirely ballistic – as when a limb 
is just flung in a certain direction – which is rare. 55 
 
Given these preliminaries about the nature of action in general we are now in a 
position  to  consider  a  second  group  of  issues,  which  pertain  more  specifically  to  our 
problem of articulating the connexion between bodily awareness and bodily action. This 
group of issues is driven by the attempt to understand the phenomena of blindsight and 
numbsense and their implications for sensorimotor action. Our goal will be to elicit a moral 
of blindsight and numbsense concerning action in the light of our discussion of the general 
nature of action.  
 
 
2.3.2.   A moral of blindsight and numbsense 
 
Let us remind ourselves of the first challenge posed by the proponent of Independence. He 
is sceptical about the need for a rational connexion between perception and action. His 
thought is that perception is basically a sort of causal process inward whilst action is a causal 
process outward. All action requires is that the requisite causal mechanisms are in place so 
that the causal processes going outward are causally sensitive to those flowing inward; any 
rational connexion is superfluous. 
One way to see why the Independence theorist is mistaken and to tease out the 
rational commitments of our ordinary picture of the connexion between perception and 
action is by examining the phenomena of blindsight and numbsense (which is also known as 
blindtouch). Blindsighted patients are ‗functionally blind‘ in certain areas of their visual field 
due to damage to the visual cortex. These patients do not respond spontaneously either in 
action or judgement to stimuli presented in their blind field. However, when pressed by 
experimenters, they are able to guess (for a certain range of properties) what is presented in 
these blind areas with some accuracy – despite denying that they have any visual experience 
of the properties they are making guesses about (Weiskrantz 1986). Blindsighted patients 
have also been shown to be capable of acting on objects in their blind field. Amazingly, 
patients  are  able  to  accomplish  these  pointing  and  grasping  tasks,  when  compelled  by 
experimenters  to  do  so,  with  remarkable  accuracy  whilst  denying  that  they  have  any 
experience of things in their blind field. 56 
 
Closer to home  is the  pathology of ‗blindtouch‘, the  somatosensory analogue to 
blindsight (Paillard 1999, Rossetti et al. 2001).
34  This is a lesser known phenomena first 
documented by Paillard and colleagues (Paillard  et al. 1983) and more recently studied by 
Rossetti  and  colleagues  (Rossetti  et al.  1995,  2001).  Rossetti‘s  patient  had  a  left  parietal 
thalamo-subcortical lesion and was unaware of any tactile stimulation to the skin of his right 
(centrally) deafferented arm. The patient was blindfolded during the experiments and his 
motor  and  verbal  responses  to  stimuli  were  compared.  He  failed  to  show  significant 
performance when induced to verbally guess where stimulation was applied or when asked 
to indicate the stimulus location on a drawing of an arm. However, he performed above 
chance when pointing at stimulus locations on his arm. Interestingly, the patient was unable 
to verbally report the position of his right index finger when it was positioned passively on a 
horizontal plane, but could accurately point to this finger with his left hand. Thus the kind of 
dissociation that we see in blindtouch also seems to be possible for proprioception. 
In both blindsight and blindtouch we have subjects who have the ability to localise 
targets of action and act whilst seeming to lack any sensory experience. Our bewilderment – 
also shared by the patients – point to our commitment to experience rationalising one‘s 
actions. Paillard‘s blindtouch patient, e.g., interrupted the experiment on her own to express 
her astonishment: ―But, I don‘t understand that. You put something there; I do not feel 
anything and yet I got there with my finger. How does that happen?‖ (Paillard 1999). In both 
pathologies, though the agent is able to acquire information about the location of his targets 
and  the  development  of  his  actions  through  his  sense  organs,  this  information  is  not 
presented to the agent in a way where it might be exploited to allow for conscious guidance 
of action. Rather, the role that perceptual information plays in these pathological cases is 
‗brutely causal‘. Perhaps this also is manifest in the blindsighted patients‘ behaviour where 
action and judgement are not spontaneous but elicited by compulsion on the experimenter‘s 
part. This makes sense from the blindsighted agent‘s point of view: for if he is not presented 
with anything in his blind field then a fortiori he is not presented with anything affording 
                                                 
34 Often blindsight is marshalled as part of the evidence for the dual visual systems hypothesis first proposed 
on anatomical grounds by Ungerleider and Miskin (1982) and later developed by Milner and Goodale (1995). 
We will discuss the dual visual systems hypothesis in chapter 5. It is little noted that anatomical evidence also 
exists for a dissociation of sensory systems for pragmatic (i.e. action) versus semantic purposes for touch in 
monkeys, see Murray and Miskin (1984).  57 
 
action in his blind field. Thus there is no reason for him to spontaneously make judgements 
or act, for it would strike him as manifestly irrational.
35 
What is the moral that we want to draw from our discussion of blindsight and 
numbsense for understanding sensorimotor action? I take it that what we have shown is that 
there is a need to articulate a rational connexion between sensory awareness of the objects 
one is acting on and one‘s action. Blindsight and numbsense bring this out negatively by 
eliciting our puzzlement about how action is possible in these pathological cases. But this is 
something that is already present in mundane actions that we perform all the time: I reach 
for the glass because I see it there, if it had been elsewhere I would have reached for the 
glass where I saw it, and if I hadn‘t seen it at all, I would not have reached for it at all. I 
scratch the itch here because that is where I feel it to be, if it moves down my back then my 
scratching follows it. If I hadn‘t felt that itch, I wouldn‘t have scratched at all. Thus our 
common sense picture of the link between experience and action is committed to the idea 
that experience plays some role in guiding one‘s action. 
 
 
2.3.2.1.   Causation vs. rationalisation 
 
I put the moral that we drew from blindsight and numbsense for sensorimotor action in 
terms of the requirement of a rational connexion between sensory awareness of the objects 
one is acting on and one‘s action. This remark was followed by a bolder statement that 
blindsight and numbsense bring this out negatively by eliciting our puzzlement about how 
action is possible in these pathological cases. 
There are two ways to bring out a worry that one might have concerning this way of 
reading the moral we drew. One way to put it is to ask if the debate here is one concerning 
rational  agency  or  agency.  After  all,  I  have  (even)  acknowledged  the  existence  of  sub-
intentional  actions –  so what entitles me  to draw a conclusion  about the  conditions of 
possibility of actions from an observation concerning the need for a rational connexion 
                                                 
35 This point does not apply to blindtouch, as patients studied appear to point at stimulus locations on their 
deafferented limb on their own. This is especially clear in the case of Paillard‘s patient RS (Paillard et al. 1983, 
Paillard 1999) whose remark we quoted earlier. However, the general point that I make is evident in her case as 
well, since she finds her actions hard to make sense of. For a comparison of blindsight and numbsense, see 
Rossetti et al. 2001, pp. 282-286. 58 
 
between sensory awareness of the objects one is acting on and one‘s action. Actions can 
flout the rationality requirement, but these will still be actions. So there is no problem as yet 
about the  conditions of possibility  of  action (as opposed  to  rational action) raised by my 
discussion of blindsight and numbsense. Another way to express the worry is that I have 
confused  the  notions  of  causation  and  rationalisation.  Does  bodily  action  need  to  be 
rationalised in order that it qualifies as bodily action? In the discussion of blindsight and 
numbsense, we were exercised by the absence of appropriate reasons to rationalise bodily 
action if we gave up the need for awareness. But this invites the comment that our problem 
is about conditions on bodily action, not conditions on the rationalisation of bodily action; it is 
not the possibility of the rationalisation of action that is in question – it is supposed to be the 
possibility of action itself. After all, it is not that the ‗numbsensed‘ agent cannot act directly 
with his limb – he can act in a way that is sensitive to the stimulus in his ‗numb‘ field despite 
not being consciously aware of it – and this is what raises the puzzle of numbsense. 
This worry goes to the heart of the general issue about awareness and agency. This is 
an issue we have to confront simultaneously at two levels: at the level of perception and its 
relation  to  action  generally,  and  also  for  the  individual  modality  in  question  and  bodily 
action. We need to consider the latter apart from the former, since the conclusions for the 
general level may just be that we need some sensory awareness in some modality and this 
will not vouchsafe the need for the necessity of any particular modality.  
Let me make two remarks on the issue of awareness and agency generally. Firstly, we 
ought to be sceptical of a notion of action that is entirely divorced from any intentional or 
rational aspect. As we noted earlier, actions – unlike reflexes, e.g. – are robust in that they 
involve a kind of means-ends flexibility. Agents in acting can achieve the desired goal state in 
a very large number of ways. (E.g., there are ways and ways how one can flick a light switch, 
and if obstacles come in between one and the switch in the meantime, one can reach around 
them.) This kind of means-ends flexibility requires that actions are activities that are sensitive 
(in some way) to means-ends rationality. This is not to say that all actions are intentional; it is 
clear  that  there  are  sub-intentional  actions,  actions  that  are  not  intentional  under  any 
description. Yet even these exhibit means-ends flexibility – obstacles are fluidly dealt with – 
despite  not  being  products  of  means-ends  reasoning.  If  we  do  not  want  to  completely 
divorce action from its intentional or rational aspect, then conditions on intentional action 
will have some connection with conditions on action. After all, bodily action is not just a 59 
 
causal mechanism for the production of effects in the ‗outward‘ direction; it is not like 
sweating or one‘s knee jerking in response to a tap (or conditioned responses). 
Secondly, insofar as we are faced with an instance of sensorimotor action – the norm 
– as opposed to a case of purely endogenous action, then the action must be sensitive to 
incoming perceptual information. The question then arises as to the relation between the 
perceptual awareness (which is a function of incoming perceptual information) involved in 
the action and the bodily action. If we are to deny that any rational connexion is required in 
sensorimotor  transactions,  then  the  only  relation  that  there  can  be  between  an  acting 
subject‘s sensory awareness and his bodily striving, is one of causal sensitivity. This is to say 
that the agent can pick up the affordances of objects but cannot grasp these affordances.  
We can tease out the importance of the agent grasping and not just being causally 
sensitive to the affordances of objects by considering Ned Block‘s imaginary case of super 
blindsight  (Block  1995).  The  picture  the  Independence  theorist  has  is  one  of  an  agent 
sandwiched between his perceptions and his actions, where their relation is merely causal. 
The agent is seen as a splendid  transducer transforming  perceptual input into volitional 
output. The absence of a grasp of the affordances of objects despite causal sensitivity to 
them leaves our agent in a position akin to Block‘s super blindsighter. Unlike an actual 
blindsighter, a super blindsighter does not require the prompting of an experimenter to 
guess what is presented in his blind field. He spontaneously makes judgements about what is 
presented in his blind field. These thoughts simply appear in his mind, Block tells us, in the 
same way that solutions to problems we have been thinking about ―pop into our thoughts‖ 
or  as  certain  people  just  know  which  direction  is  north  without  having  any  associated 
perceptual experience of it. Block only discusses how such an agent makes judgements about 
what is presented in his blind field. If we want to bring the case of the super blindsighter to 
bear on sensorimotor action, we will need to extend Block‘s case to cover the bodily actions. 
Let us imagine that the super blindsighter is thirsty and is looking for a drink. In such 
situations,  the  super  blindsighter  discovers  that  despite  not  having  conscious  visual 
experience in his blind field, he sometimes finds himself performing reaching or grasping 
actions directed at an area within his blind field and reporting that it just occurred to him 
that a cup was there.
36 
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There  are  two  dissimilarities  with  normal  agents  that  bring  out  the  super 
blindsighter‘s deficiency. First, it is hard to see how the super blindsighter will be able to 
exploit his actions for the purposes of fulfilling his aims or goals. He is causally sensitive to 
objects in that he is able to pick up their affordances and act on them, but this is not due to a 
grasp of the affordances of the objects. At anytime there will be typically be a number of 
different objects that an agent can act on in order to fulfil some goal of his, for example, at a 
reception there are many glasses of wine around – where is he to reach, though? He is 
unable to answer that question short of just reaching somewhere and seeing what happens. 
He is often successful, but he will lack a crucial kind of perspective on his own bodily 
activity that makes sense of it in the light of his own aims and what is ‗coming into view‘ in 
the world (including his own body). It is also hard to see how he could put his actions to 
work in the service of his aims, for he has no conscious awareness of the world around him, 
being a blindsighter. He wants to have a glass of wine, but does not know whether he is in 
the vicinity of such a drink (unless someone tells him), and it would be a very odd expression 
of wishful thinking to just reach out and see if he could grab a glass of wine. Thus, it is hard 
to see how bodily action of the sort that normal agents have where this is in the service of 
their general aims is open to the super blindsighter. 
This, however, our opponent will protest, will not be our position even if the relation 
between awareness and agency is a merely causal one, since the super blindsighter has no 
conscious perception and we do. If we turn to imagine such a scenario for normal agents, it 
will be one where they have an ability to perceive objects and have conscious awareness of 
these objects, but this is dissociated from an ability to act on them because one is consciously 
aware  of  them.  One  gathers  information  about  the  world  through  perception  and  then 
launches one‘s actions. The two are independent and we merely have patterns of causal 
sensitivity. This is not the position we find ourselves in; if we are to faithfully capture the 
phenomenology of ordinary sensorimotor agency, where conscious feedback plays some role 
and one acts on the objects because one sees them, using our perceptual capabilities to 
monitor and guide our actions as well. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that conscious experience has a explanatory role to play in action and that this is brought out by thinking about 
blindsight, by teasing apart two notions of consciousness, what he calls ‗access consciousness‘ and ‗phenomenal 
consciousness‘. Block‘s idea is that in the case of super blindsight we have a case of access consciousness 
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If we are indeed faced with an instance of purely endogenous action, then inasmuch 
as endogenous action is rooted in the sensorimotor nature of action more generally, we 
would  still  need  some  rational  connexion  between  awareness  and  agency  in  order  to 
understand the conditions of possibility of bodily action as a kind. After all, we are interested 
in articulating the relation between bodily awareness and bodily agency at large. It may be 
that  we  cannot  make  any  such  claim  for  each  instance  of  that  kind,  but  that  the 
generalisation holds for the kind (at large). Thus not every process that is a bodily action will 
have a connexion with some perceptual awareness, but the conditions of possibility of the 
class of bodily action requires perceptual awareness, and requires that there be a general 
rational connexion between awareness and agency. 
I take the force of these remarks to suggest that an account on which perception and 
action are independent is untenable as an account of ordinary action. But even with these 
remarks in place, we are not yet entitled to claim that there has to be a rational connexion 
between awareness and agency, and much less that there has to be one in the case of bodily 
awareness  and  bodily  action.  This  is  because  we  are  attempting  to  establish  a  sort  of 
constitutive  connexion  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency,  and  there  are 
pathological cases that look like they would be counterexamples to an unrestricted claim 
concerning awareness and agency, and also bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
 
 
2.3.3.   The significance of pathological cases for our inquiry 
 
We now turn to the second challenge posed by the Independence theorist. His claim was 
that there can be no constitutive connexion between perception and action at large, and 
bodily awareness and bodily agency in particular, since we have actual cases where volitional 
embodiment and sensory embodiment come apart. There are deafferented agents who don‘t 
feel certain parts of their body ‗from the inside‘ but are able to act directly with these body 
parts. Conversely, there are paralysed subjects who are unable to act with certain parts of 
their body yet are able to feel these ‗from the inside‘. 
Answering  this  challenge  requires  that  we  clarify  the  significance  of  pathological 
cases  for  our  inquiry.  The  project  that  we  are  engaged  in  is  an  attempt  to  discern  the 
relationship between bodily awareness and bodily agency. In agency as we know it, bodily 62 
 
awareness seems to play a crucial role in the control of actions, but there are a range of cases 
from psychology and neuroscience that put pressure on the idea that there is some intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. In standard philosophical parlance, 
if some X is claimed to be constitutive of Y, then finding a case of Y without X scotches the 
constitutive claim. Similarly, if X is said to be necessary for Y, then finding a case of Y 
without X defeats the claim of necessity. Since there are actual cases of different sorts of 
deficiencies, such as deafferented agents and paralysed subjects, in what sense can we still 
make a claim of a necessary connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency?  
The answer is that the task is to unearth the proper articulation of the relation that 
underlies the phenomenology of ordinary bodily agency, using various pathological cases and 
dissociations in normals as tools to excavate the nucleus of the relation in the case of normal 
agents. However, we need to tread carefully here: first, we don‘t want to be seen as evading 
counterexamples and, second, we want to be actually teasing out a connexion that is a deep 
one – in what sense can there be such a connexion just in the normal case? Perhaps it is best 
to  characterise  our  project  as  an  attempt  to  isolate  substantial  dependencies  between 
perception and action. It is clear that there is an explanatory project concerning substantial 
dependency relations required for understanding the agency of normal agents even if the 
nature of the relation doesn‘t quite fit the traditional philosophical classifications such as 
constitutive or necessary relations (eliciting questions like – what is the modal force of the 
claim  here?).  Ultimately,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  particular  situation  and  we  want  to 
understand it. Our situation – as normal agents – is different from those of blindsighters, 
numbsensers, paralysed subjects and deafferented agents, and also different from that of 
non-human animals. The dependencies which carve the joints of understanding need not be 
the same in each case. What it is like to act for the celebrated deafferented agent, IW, is very 
different from what it is like to act for us. The sheer presence of actual cases where sensory 
and volitional embodiment come apart does not demonstrate the truth of Independence in 
the case of normal agents. These cases do not challenge the claim that the body has a unique 
role to play in sensorimotor transactions, but rather show that certain kinds of breakdowns 
are possible in the extent to which a subject‘s body can sustain various aspects of a subject‘s 
life, such as his experiences of his own body and his surroundings, and his ability to act. 
Rather, the existence of a substantial dependency relation between perception and agency 63 
 
explains why in cases where agents satisfy one or both of the criteria to a lesser extent, this 
adversely affects their capacity to act. 
 
 
2.4.   Bodily awareness and bodily agency 
 
To bring home how we are committed to the thesis in the specific case that we are interested 
in – a substantial dependency between bodily awareness and bodily action for normal agents 
– let us consider Anscombe‘s view on bodily sensations. She famously denied that there is 
such a thing as kinaesthesia or genuine felt location of sensation.
37 Her account is revisionist 
and denies that bodily sensations actually have felt location. Her suggestion is that although 
we ―do obviously have bodily sensations, they do not themselves involve perception of 
posture  and  movement  (partly  because  they  cannot  provide  sufficiently  fine-grained 
information)‖.
38Anscombe claims that we do not feel bodily sensations as at particular bodily 
locations,  but  rather  the  ‗bodily  sensation‘  should  be  analysed  as  a  unit  consisting  of  a 
sensation and a propensity to act towards a particular body part – e.g., to scratch behind my 
left ear if it itches there. 
Anscombe‘s account fails to accommodate the idea that when I feel an itch behind 
my left ear, the appropriateness of my action – my reaching out to scratch there – is ―written 
into the very nature of the experience itself‖. By this, I mean that there are complex rational 
links between the nature of the bodily experiences and the actions we take in response to 
them.  Anscombe‘s  account  seems  to  amount  to  no  more  than  that  there  is  some  brute 
propensity  –  perhaps  due  to  learnt  association,  perhaps  not  –  to  act  on  the  sensation. 
Anscombe  might  respond  that  these  ―immediate  convictions‖  that  we  have  regarding 
location  of  sensation  are  based  on  subpersonal  information  processing  done  by 
proprioceptive  systems;  thus,  they  can  not  only  be  automatic,  but  also  accurate  (if  the 
subpersonal information processing systems are reliable). But this is to miss the point that 
the appropriateness of the action resides not only in its effectiveness (in the light of its being 
automatic and accurate), because one can exhibit brute dispositionality to certain stimuli 
without  such  behavioural  responses  seeming  at  all  appropriate—that  is,  rationally 
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appropriate—to the stimuli. Michael Martin provides the examples of both basic reflexes 
and conditioned responses; ―it is not as if one‘s knee jerk appears to be the right thing to do 
in response to a hammer tap, it simply happens‖. As such, Anscombe‘s account of location 
of sensation in terms of brute propensity to act on those locations cannot discern between 
cases of basic reflexes and conditioned responses versus far more complex cases of action in 
response to multifarious bodily experiences.
39 What‘s important to stress for our purposes is 
that the heart of Anscombe‘s troubles lie in the failure of her account to make sense of the 
complex rational links between the bodily experiences and the actions that they lead to. 
Rather, what the experience is like plays a crucial role in controlling action, by providing 
reasons for acting one way rather than another and thereby guiding my action. 
 
 
2.5.   Summary and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we examined the simplest response to our main question: that Feeling and 
Direct  Control  are  independent.  We  developed  an  argument  for  Independence  through 
exploiting a procedure of Strawson‘s for arguing that it is a contingent fact that one‘s body 
plays a unique role in perceptual experience and applying it to sensorimotor transactions. 
With the help of Shoemaker‘s theory of embodiment, we attempted to imagine a case where 
a subject was sensorily embodied in one body but volitionally embodied in a different body. 
If this case is a real possibility, then feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and direct control of 
one‘s body are independent of each other and there can be no intimate connexion between 
bodily awareness and bodily agency. We then turned to examining why Independence is 
unsatisfactory by first analysing Strawson‘s case for vision and then applying lessons learnt 
there to Independence. There we met with a powerful response from the Independence 
theorist who provided an alternative argument drawing on (one) a picture of the relations 
between  perception  and  action  as  merely  causal  and  (two)  actual  cases  of  dissociations 
between  sensory  and  volitional  embodiment.  In  order  to  answer  his  first  point,  we 
considered  the  pathologies of blindsight and numbsense  in  the  light of  three important 
contrasts regarding the general nature of action. The moral we drew there was that in order 
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to make sense of action as a rational response to experience, there has to be some substantial 
dependency relation between perception and action. Finally, we clarified the significance of 
pathological cases in our inquiry in response to the Independence theorist‘s second point. 
Finding Independence unsatisfactory is the force of the intuition toward some kind 
of intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. Our argument here goes 
beyond the initial reflections (in the introductory chapter) on the phenomenology of bodily 
agency that motivated us to search for an intimate connexion between bodily awareness and 
bodily  action.  The  failure  of  Independence  indicates  that  there  has  to  be  some  deep 
connexion  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency.  Our  concern  in  the  following 
chapters is to articulate the connexion. 66 
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In  the  previous  chapter  we  discussed  and  rejected  the  position  that  Feeling  and  Direct 
Control are independent. Finding Independence unsatisfactory is the force of the intuition 
toward some kind of intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. The 
failure of Independence indicates that there has to be some deep connexion between bodily 
awareness and bodily agency.  
In this chapter we will explore one way of how the connexion might be understood. 
Enaction is the view that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ because one has direct 
power over it. We will consider the converse thesis, that one can directly act with one‘s body 
because one can feel it ‗from the inside‘, in the next chapter. Although there are a number of 
accounts that claim that perception is constitutively dependent on agency, very few theorists 
have  developed  the  claim  with  respect  to  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency.  Often 67 
 
theorists argue for their claims with specific reference to vision and touch and assume that 
their arguments can be generalised to other perceptual modalities. We should be wary of 
such moves. Thus our approach in this chapter will be first to examine the motivations 
behind the idea that perception is constitutively dependent on agency. We shall dub the 
general  dependency  claim  Enactivism,  retaining  the  label  Enaction  for  the  specific  view 
concerning bodily awareness and bodily agency.  
We will begin by considering three motivations for Enactivism: the first is the idea 
that tactile discrimination is superior under active touch; the second is the idea that efferent 
information has to be a condition on the perception of self-moving agents because they 
would otherwise be unable to distinguish between the sensory effects of self-movement and 
movement  of  the  environment;  and  the  third  is  some  recent  experimental  work  from 
cognitive  neuropsychology  showing  that  modulating  a  subject‘s  action  modulates  his 
perceptual  experiences.  This  leads  us  to  explore  various  ways  of  formulating  a  general 
dependency thesis, and the difficulty this involves. At this point we shall turn to examine 
Hampshire‘s claim that agency is a condition on the objectivity of perception. Unfortunately, 
Hampshire‘s argument is beset by various problems. There are numerous other ways to 
formulate  a  general  dependency  thesis  of  perception  on  action,  but  there  are  empirical 
obstacles against any such thesis for vision: optic ataxia. This raises doubts about the viability 
of any general dependency thesis of perception on action. In any case, there is the question 
of  whether  Enaction  already  follows  from  the  general  arguments  for  Enactivism  or  if 
Enaction needs to be developed independently. We will attempt to evaluate Enaction about 
bodily awareness and bodily agency by (one) trying to develop Enaction from Hampshire‘s 
general  line,  (two)  considering  Evans‘s  idea  of  a  behavioural  space,  which  will  yield  a 
dispositional  formulation  of  the  thesis,  and  (three)  exploring  a  claim  from  Brewer  and 
O‘Shaughnessy that some of the content of bodily awareness is best expressed in terms of 
practical knowledge (i.e. knowledge of action in connection with the body part in question). 
Finally, we will argue that double dissociations between bodily awareness and bodily agency 
from neuropsychological work present an obstacle for any account that claims that bodily 
action is a condition on bodily awareness. 
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3.1. Action as a condition on perception 
 
This  first  section  paves  the  way  for  consideration  of  detailed  theses  concerning  the 
dependency  of  perception  on  action.  To  that  end,  we  shall  begin  by  identifying  and 
discussing some of the motivations behind the dependency claim, and then move on to 
consider different ways of formulating the dependency thesis. Finally, we will introduce a 
distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental dependence of perception on action 
that helps to clarify the nature of the dependency thesis and the kind of evidence that would 
support it. 
The most striking aspect of the family of views under consideration is the direction 
of  the  constitutive  dependency  claimed  between  perception  and  action:  a  subject‘s 
perception  is claimed to be constitutively dependent (in some way) on his agency. This 
seems like a case of the tail wagging the dog. Intuitively, agents are able to act on objects 
because they can, prior to acting on the objects, perceive them – I flag the bus when I see it. 
This  is  opposite  from  the  direction  of  dependency  that  Enactivism  claims.  Given  its 
counterintuitive character, it will be useful to reflect on the motivations behind Enactivism. 
 
 
3.1.1.   Motivations 
 
The  motivations  behind  the  family  of  views  that  claim  that  action  is  a  condition  on 
perception are various. An important influence is J. J. Gibson‘s (1962, 1966) insistence on 
the significance of active touch in tactile perception. Gibson saw himself as combating the 
atomism associated with tactile psychology at that time, where research was largely limited to 
experimenters  probing  the  skin  of  a  passive  subject.  He  objected  to  their  methodology 
because (one) he thought that the natural manifestation of touch was when subjects were 
allowed to actively explore objects and (two) he contended that the process of touch was 
transformed  when  the  subject  has  control  over  the  sensing  process.  When  the  subject 
actively explores, he does not attend to the fleeting tactile sensations associated with his 
probing but rather strives to discover the invariances in the stimulation that characterise the 
objected he is exploring. Enactivists have suggested that we take Gibson‘s lessons about 
touch and apply them to vision (e.g. Noë 2004). 69 
 
An  important  ground  of  Gibson‘s  claim  is  that  tactile  discrimination  of  two-
dimensional shape appears to be enhanced when active rather than passive touch is involved. 
In  Gibson‘s  (1962)  experiment  subjects  were  set  the  task  of  recognising  simple  two-
dimensional shapes (cookie cutters which had a mean diameter of 2.5 cm) by touch. There 
were three kinds of trials: passive static, passive moving, and active. In the passive static 
trials, the cookie cutter forms were pressed into the subjects‘ palms and were not moved. In 
the passive moving trials, the forms were rotated back and forth while they were pressed into 
the subjects‘ palms. In the active touch trials, subjects were allowed to probe the forms with 
their fingers in any way they wanted. Recognition accuracy was 95% for the active trials, 
72% for the passive moving trials, and 49% for the passive static trials. 
The second line of thought is that efferent information has to be a condition on the 
perception of self-moving agents, such as ourselves, because we would otherwise be unable 
to distinguish between the sensory effects of our own movement and movement of the 
environment in perceptual experience. Consider how the visual scene around one whilst 
writing a paper in a caf￩ appears to be stable despite one‘s eyeballs darting about when one is 
surveying the scene. The visual system is only able to cancel out the movement of one‘s 
eyeballs so that the visual scene appears stable under saccadic movement if it has access to 
information about efferent outflow. Helmholtz had a simple demonstration of this point: if 
one uses one‘s finger to push one‘s eyeball to one side, the world appears to move; however, 
the world appears stable when one moves one‘s eyeball to a similar extent. A related point 
concerns perceptual self-location for self-moving agents like us.
40 Our situation is one of 
perceiving agents who are capable of locomotion within a changing environment. In order to 
keep track of our own location in perception, we need to be able to distinguish the sensory 
effects brought about by our own movement from other changes in the environment. The 
thought is then that it is only by drawing on efferent information that we can do this. 
Finally, there are now a numbe r of experiments which show that  modulating a 
subject‘s agency modulates his perceptual experience (Tsarkiris and Haggard 2005). In these 
experiments, efference is manipulated whilst afference is maintained constant. The results of 
these experiments suggest that efference has a distinctive contribution to bodily awareness. 
A nice demonstration of this point comes from an experiment done by Blakemore and 
colleagues (1999) to investigate why we can‘t tickle ourselves. Subjects were requested to rate 
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the sensation of a tactile stimulus on their right palm under several different conditions. 
Tactile stimulation was applied to the experimental subject‘s right hand with a piece of foam 
attached to a robot arm. The stimulus was either produced by the subject with her left hand 
or externally generated. In the self-generated condition, the subject applied tactile stimulation 
to her right palm by controlling the robot arm with her left hand. In the externally generated 
condition, the stimulus was generated by a robot and unrelated to any movement the subject 
made. The mediation of the robot arm in applying the stimulus allowed the experimenters to 
introduce (1) temporal delays of 100 ms, 200 ms or 300 ms between the movement of the 
left hand and tactile stimulation of the right palm and (2) trajectory rotations of 30˚, 60˚ or 
90˚ between the direction of left hand movement and that of tactile stimulation on the right 
palm. Subjects rated the tactile stimulus they produced as significantly less ticklish, intense 
and pleasant than an identical stimulus produced by the robot. There was also a progressive 
increase in how ticklish the tactile stimulus felt when the temporal delays were increased 
from 0 ms to 200 ms and when the trajectory rotation was increased from 0˚ to 90˚. These 
results suggest that there is sensory suppression of the somatosensory effects of our own 
actions, since identical somatosensory inputs produced externally were perceived to be more 
ticklish.  Thus  we  have  an  example  of  how  somatosensory  experience  differs  when  the 
stimulus is identical but the efference is manipulated.
41 
In this sub-section we have considered three reasons for thinking that action is a 
condition on perception: the first derives from Gibson‘s work on active touch, the second 
concerns the crucial role of efferent information in perception of the environment, and the 
third is that there are scenarios where modulating efference while afference remains constant 
modulates perceptual experience. 
 
 
3.1.2.   Formulating the dependency thesis 
 
Now that we have some sense of the motivations behind Enactivism, let us turn to the issue 
of formulating the dependency thesis. The idea behind Enactivism is, very crudely, that 
perception is constitutively dependent on agency. Enactivism comes in many varieties, at 
                                                 
41 For a fuller discussion of theoretical issues, especially on the role of internal forward models in sensory 
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least as many varieties as there are readings of the force of the dependency relation and also 
what  aspect  of  agency  is  involved.  The  view  has  been  characterised  by  Andy  Clark  as 
claiming that ―we enact (that is, by acting bring into being) perceptual experience‖.
42 Clark‘s 
succinct statement of the view is vague but gives a flavour of the reactionary character of the 
position. However, it does not appear to apply to a subset of views which arguably fall under 
the Enactivist umbrella. 
I can think of three basic ways to formulate the dependency claim. The first way 
claims that action is a condition on perception. We might also put this by saying that action 
is necessary for perception. Examples of adherents of this include Hampshire (1959) and 
Baldwin (1995, 2003). Clark‘s statement does not appear to apply to this form of Enactivism 
as the claim is not that acting thereby generates perceptual experience, but that there could 
not  be  perception  without  action.  The  second  way  claims  that  action  is  in  some  sense 
constitutive of perception. So someone might claim that when you can act with or on a thing 
then you can thereby perceive it. The third way represents a retreat from the bald second 
route. Rather than claim that action is in some way constitutive of perception, one might 
claim that something action related is constitutive of perception. One example of such a 
view is Noë‘s (2004) claim that knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is constitutive of 
visual perception – knowledge of how one‘s view of a thing will change as one moves with 
respect to it is constitutive of one‘s visual perception of it.
43 
Obviously  there  can  be  much  more  variation  than  these  three  basic  ways  of 
formulating the dependency. Theses can be specific to a particular perceptual modality, say 
that  of  Gibson‘s  claims  about  touch,  or  cross-modal.  The  action  component  can  be 
concerned  with  actual  action,  past  action,  future  action,  the  capacity  to  act  or  even 
knowledge  of  the  sensory  consequences  of  action.  And  the  perception  component  can 
concern individual perceptual episodes or perception in a specific modality or perception in 
general. Now that we have a sense of the possible variations on Enactivist themes, let us we 
turn to consider  the  nature  of the  dependency  relation posited between perception  and 
action. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Clark 2006, p. 45. 
43 A nice question here is whether it is possible to hold a dependency thesis of the first sort, where action is a 
condition on perception, alongside a thesis claiming that perception is necessary for the control of action. 72 
 
3.1.3. Instrumental vs. non-instrumental dependence of perception on action 
 
To bring our discussion of preliminaries to a close, I want to draw attention to a useful 
distinction that Susan Hurley makes between instrumental and non-instrumental dependence 
of perception on action (1998, pp. 362-366). This will help us get clearer on the nature of the 
dependence claimed and also on what would count as evidence for the claims in question. 
The dependence of perception on action is instrumental when action is seen as just a 
means toward acquiring different perceptions. For example, in tactile perception, we need to 
reach toward an object so that we can touch it, or we need to move our hands to touch a 
different part of an object; and in visual perception, we need to move our eyes or head in 
order to see a different part of the object or to see some other objects.
44  
The dependence of perception on action is  non-instrumental when modulating action 
modulates a subject‘s perceptual experiences in a way that modulating a subject‘s passive 
movements  through  similar  trajectories  of  movement  doesn‘t.  Here  action  makes  a 
distinctive contribution to perception and goes beyond being just a means toward acquiring 
different perceptions, as in the case of merely instrumental dependence. As Hurley puts it 
(1998, p. 363): ―If perceptual content varies with output although input is constant, output 
cannot  merely  be  playing  the  role  of  a  means  to  changes  in  input.  The  dependence  of 
perceptual invariants on output is non-instrumental when active movement makes invariants 
available  in  perception  that  similar  passive  movement  and  associated  afference  from 
movement do not make available.‖ 
There  is  no  question  that  instrumental  dependence  of  perception  on  action  is 
pervasive: the examples given above concerning moving in order to see or touch different 
things are banal and familiar. However, it is controversial whether there are any cases of 
non-instrumental dependence of perception on action. Obviously the truth of Enactivism 
depends  on  there  being  such  cases.  We  will  consider  whether  there  are  cases  of  non-
instrumental dependence of perception on action in the subsequent sections. For now, our 
focus is on using Hurley‘s distinction to help us make our project in this chapter absolutely 
clear:  in  articulating  Enaction  we  are  interested  in  a  claim  about  the  non-instrumental 
dependence of perception on action and not just instrumental dependence. It is crucial that 
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we keep Hurley‘s distinction in mind so as to make sure we keep the dialectic straight: 
importantly, if we establish an instrumental dependence of perception on action this does 
not thereby allow us to claim a constitutive dependence of perception on action.
45 
We began this section by discussing some motivations behind Enactivism and then 
exploring various ways of formulating the dependency claim. We are now ready to examine 
detailed  theses  concerning  the  dependency  of  perception  on  action.  We  begin  with 
Hampshire‘s attempt. 
  
 
3.2.   Agency as a condition on the objectivity of perception: Hampshire 
 
In  Thought and Action (1959),  Stuart Hampshire argues that agency  is a condition on the 
objectivity of perception. We may reconstruct his argument for this claim by attending to 
several crucial passages. The first passage states a requirement that objects of perception 
must be re-identifiable: 
 
Whatever description we give of something perceived, the thing must be in principle 
identifiable from more than one point of view. It must make sense to compare the 
look of it (or sound or feel) from one place or at one time with the look of it (or 
sound or feel) from another place or at another time. If the object of perception is 
not in principle identifiable from more than one point of view, it is possible only to 
produce the appropriate description of the sight (or sound or touch). The impression 
appears and disappears, and in the period of its duration may be compared with 
similar impressions,  and  by this comparison it earns one  description or another. 
There  is  then  no  contrast  between  the  momentary  appearance  of  the  thing,  as 
perceived at one moment and from one point of view, and its real, or enduring, 
properties. Without this contrast any error made in the description of something 
perceived must be like an error made in the description of an organic, or inner, 
sensation. … The word ‗object‘ becomes out of place; the perception coincides with 
that which is perceived, as a bodily feeling coincides with that which is felt. (1959, p. 
42) 
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Hampshire‘s basic line is that the objectivity of perception – that is, in order that perceptual 
experience is of the external, mind-independent world – requires that objects of perception 
must be identifiable from different points of view, and also across different times. Call this 
the re-identification requirement. His argument for the re-identification requirement on objects of 
perception is simply that if we could not, in principle, re-identify objects of perception, then 
there is no way subjects can capture the distinction between mere sensations, which are 
mind-dependent, and mind-independent objects. The thought is that in order to properly 
capture the mind-independence of objects in the external world, objects must be such that 
they cannot be exhausted by the appearances that they present on any one occasion. There is 
more to an object than the appearance it presents at any time to a perceiver. Think, for 
example, of how one only sees those sides of objects that one faces and has to either turn 
the object around or circumnavigate the object to see its other sides. This is in contrast to 
mere sensations, which are exhausted by the qualities they present to the perceiver on any 
one occasion.
46 Since the distinction between mere sensation and mind-independent objects 
is an indispensable feature of our conceptual scheme, we must embrace the re -identification 
requirement.  
The question now arises as to what the re -identification requirement imposes on 
perceiving subjects. Hampshire‘s answer is that it requires that perceiving subjects are agents 
capable of self-induced movement: 
 
Perceiving is necessarily perceiving something external to the perceiver, and ‗external‘ would 
have no sense if the perceiver did not have a situation and a point of view, if the perceiver is 
not thought of as a self-moving object among other objects. (1959, p. 41) 
 
The line we draw between ‗inner sensations‘ and features of the external world depends 
upon the distinction between the active subject, who is a body among bodies, and who from 
time to time changes his own point of view, and the common object observed from many 
points of view. (1959, p. 46) 
 
                                                 
46 The contrast can be weakened so that sensations are thought to be mind-dependent, whilst objects are mind-
independent, without claiming that sensations are exhausted by the qualities they present to the subject on any 
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Hampshire‘s thought here is that the perceiving subject must be able to act so as to be 
capable of identifying the same objects from different points of view, and it is this that 
discharges the re-identification requirement on objects. 
We can combine Hampshire‘s two steps to see what his line of argument is. The first 
step  claims  that  in  order  to  distinguish  between  mere  sensations  and  mind-independent 
objects, we must accept that objects must be re-identifiable from different points of view 
and  at  different  times.  The  re-identification  requirement  must  be  met  in  order  that 
perception  can  be  objective.  The  second  step  claims  that  in  order  to  meet  the  re-
identification requirement subjects must be capable of acting so as to take up different 
points of view on objects perceived. Since the re-identification requirement is a constitutive 
element  of  perception,  and  action  is  a  condition  on  meeting  the  re-identification 
requirement, action is thus a condition on the objectivity of perception. Being able to act on 
objects – to move around them, for example – is a condition of being able to perceive them 
– as opposed to merely having sensations associated with them. 
Though it may be read as betraying verificationist sympathies on Hampshire‘s part, 
his criterion need not be interpreted in that way. We need not claim that something can 
qualify as an ‗object‘ in the mind-independent world only if we can verify or check that it is 
the  same  object  from different  points of view.  Rather, the  requirement  stems from the 
contrast  between  mere  sensations  and  mind-independent  objects:  the  latter  are  not 
exhausted by the appearance they present to the perceiver on any single occasion. 
There are several points of unclarity in Hampshire‘s discussion. First, it is not entirely 
clear what would be required for a re-identification of an object. Is it sufficient that the 
subject be able to identify the same object with different sensory modalities at the same time 
– if I can both see and smell the cheese now from this location – since this would present a 
different ‗point of view‘ on the object – a visual versus an olfactory one? Or does an object 
have to be re-identifiable in a single sense modality over different times?  
Second,  Hampshire‘s  notion  of  the  objectivity  of  perception  is  obscure.  I  have 
interpreted it as meaning that perceptual experience is of the external, mind-independent world. 
I see Hampshire‘s key contrast between mere sensation and objects of perception as staked 
on the modal status of what the subject is aware of. Hampshire himself emphasises the 
‗external‘ character of perceptions: that they are of an ‗external world‘. It is not entirely clear 
what this means. On a natural reading of ‗external‘, objects like cups, cellos, skirts, and pubs 76 
 
are external objects, but a subject‘s limbs are not. ‗External‘ thus comes to something like 
‗external  to  the  subject‘s  body‘.  But  this  would  leave  us  unable  to  acknowledge  the 
objectivity of bodily awareness – after all bodily awareness is a mode of perceiving one‘s own 
body and its parts ‗from the inside‘.
47 It is unclear, however, that one can take a distinct point 
of view from that which one possesses on one‘s body through bodily awareness, though one 
may see, smell, hear, and touch it as well.
48 This point will be important as we consider 
whether  we  can  derive  Enaction  from  a  more  general  Enactivism  about  perceptual 
experience. 
Third,  wh atever  Hampshire‘s  notions  of  re-identification  and  objectivity  of 
perception are, on any natural understanding of these two notions, re-identification seems to 
be too sophisticated a skill to require as a condition on the objectivity of perception – unless 
the objectivity of perception already implicates conceptual tracking capacities on the part of 
subjects.  At  the  core  of  Hampshire‘s  re-identification  requirement  is  the  idea  that  the 
contrast  between  mere  sensations  and  objects  must  be  salient  for  the  subject.  But  it  is 
unclear why this distinction cannot be salient in a subject‘s cognitive economy even if they 
lack the capacity for re-identifying objects. It is plausible to think that object constancy – an 
aspect of the sensation/object contrast – is a feature of the perceptions of more primitive 
subjects that are unable to re-identify objects. Thus a primitive creature may be able to circle 
round an object and recognise it as one object through changes of illumination and viewing 
angle, – which does not involve re-identifying the object – but not be able to recognise it 
either as the same particular or even as similar to a previously encountered kind of object on 
                                                 
47 Hampshire vacillates between understanding bodily awareness, including pain, as objective and as merely a 
form of sensation. His struggle is evident in the following passage: ―In sane and waking life I may be deceived 
to some degree, for one of many possible reasons misidentifying the objects around me, including perhaps 
even some parts of my own body. But, sane and awake, I always have some direct and more or less precise 
knowledge of the position of some of my limbs and of some of the movements of my body, and these are as 
much parts and features of the ‗external‘ world as is the distant clock and its movements. The mind animates, 
and enters into, the movements and reactions of a body that is in a sense one of these ‗external‘ objects and in 
a sense is not ‗external‘; for this reason the use of the phrase ‗the external world‘, in the philosophy of Russell 
and his successors, can be misleading. The pain that I feel, when an intentional movement of my arm brings me 
into violent contact with another object, is ‗internal‘ in the sense that, unlike the movement of my arm, it is not 
something that is observed, and therefore not something that can be observed by different observers from 
different points of view. It is ‗external‘, in the sense that it is localised in my arm together with the ‗feel‘ of the 
object. The pain, no less than the feel or the look of the object, informs me of the object‘s existence in a 
particular  space,  as  an  obstruction  to  my  movements.‖  (1959,  p.  79).  We  will  return  to  discuss  whether 
Hampshire‘s approach can be applied to bodily awareness in section 3.4.1. 
48 Amongst the perceptual modalities, this feature is present only in bodily awareness. It is no t a superficial 
quirk but reflects a deep difference between bodily awareness and other perceptual modalities. I discuss this 
feature and its significance for the role of bodily awareness in the control of action in chapters 5 and 6. 77 
 
a later occasion. Furthermore, a weaker requirement, such as the claim that objects must be 
re-encounterable, would similarly provide for a contrast between mere sensation and mind-
independent objects. A creature may be able to think that this is an object that he can meet 
with again without having the capacity to re-identify it.
49 
A fourth unclarity is more serious. In Hampshire‘s argument, it is claimed that the 
subject  must be capable of acting so as to take  up different  points of  view on objects 
perceived in order to meet the re-identification requirement. However, it is unclear why the 
subject‘s changes in point of view have to be changes that are actively generated by him. Even if 
the subject is passively moved around, that would result in the subject changing his point of 
view vis-à-vis the objects he perceives (excepting the case of his body). Thus, absent further 
argument, it seems that the re-identification requirement can be met in the case of passive 
movement as well. After all, the requirement only claims that objects must be re-identifiable 
at different points of view and at different times, and a subject who is being passively moved 
around does change his point of view. Furthermore, in certain cases, such as with objects 
rotating at a fixed point or with objects that move across one‘s visual field, the movement of 
an object already provides a stationary observer with different views of it. In these cases, no 
movement at all seems necessary for meeting the re-identification requirement.
50 Thus there 
appears  to  be  a  lacuna  in  Hampshire‘s  argument  that  action  must  be  a  condition  on 
perception. 
One  response  here  is  that  we  need  to  distinguish  between  active  and  passive 
movement for independent reasons, and that active movement plays a privileged role with 
respect to perceptual experience. This is because we need to have information about our 
motor output (or efferent outflow) in order to distinguish between one‘s movement and 
                                                 
49 A possible diagnosis for why Hampshire imposes the overly strong re-identification requirement on object 
perception is that there are elements of his perceptual theory which resemble classical sense datum accounts. 
What one is presented with in perception seems to be in the first instance appearances, with objects coming 
into view only because (and only when?) multiple appearances are tied down to a single object; the tying down 
of  a  multitude  of  appearances  to  a  single  object  appears  to  be  a  cognitive  rather  than  merely  perceptual 
operation for Hampshire. This contrasts with a perceptual theory on which part of the phenomenology of 
perception – what perception is like for the subject – is that we are presented with mind-independent objects in 
perception. Thus, Hampshire, who misses this phenomenological aspect of perception and can only work with 
appearances, needs objects to be re-identifiable by the subject in order to make the contrast between mere 
sensations and objects. 
A  further  and  related  distinction,  between  appearance  and  reality,  is  also  of  importance  here. 
Hampshire alludes to this distinction in his discussion, but the distinction between mere sensations and mind-
independent objects is the key one for him. 
50 Thanks to Krisztina Orbán for these two examples. 78 
 
movement  of  the  world  in  our  perceptual  experience.  We  alluded  to  this  point  when 
discussing some of the motivations behind Enactivism earlier. The visual scene around one 
appears to be stable despite one‘s eyeballs darting about when one is scanning the scene. The 
visual system is only able to cancel out the movement of one‘s eyeballs so that the visual 
scene appears stable under saccadic movement if it has access to information about efferent 
outflow. 
But even after this concession, a problem remains: paralysed subjects.  There are 
paralysed subjects who are incapable of locomotion, but it is plausible to think that their 
perceptual experiences remain experiences of the external world, despite their inability to 
actively change their point of view on objects. We do not think that they can no longer 
distinguish between mind-independent objects and mere sensations just because they can no 
longer move. Hampshire has foreseen this criticism and attempts to pre-empt it: 
 
The most unavoidable feature of our consciousness is the initiation of change at will, the 
changing  of  position  and  therefore  of  our  relation  to  other  things.  Even  a  man  totally 
paralysed from birth would perhaps move his eyes and would form from his own experience 
some idea of the experience of moving at will. The idea of a thinking observer who could 
form from his experience no notion of making a movement, or, more generally, of doing 
something, is one that can scarcely be entertained, if one tries to follow its implications 
through  to  the  end.  For  instance,  he  would  have  no  reason  to  make  any  kind  of 
identification of himself with his body, as ‗his‘ body would only be for him one physical 
object among others. Yet his sense-organs are part of his body, and it must be presumed that 
he uses and directs them at will; or, if we suppose that he does not, observation loses its 
sense. (1959, pp. 69-70) 
 
Hampshire is making a number of moves in this passage that lead in different directions. 
First, he seems to be sceptical about the possibility of absolute paralysis.
51 Second, he retreats 
to the incoherence of the idea of a subject who has no experience of acting. Third, he backs 
up the claim of incoherence by arguing that the idea of a passive subject would result in the 
                                                 
51 Hampshire seems to think that moving one‘s eyes is amongst the most basic acts that an agent can perform. 
However, strictly speaking, one does not have to move one‘s eyes in order to focus one‘s visual attention on 
another part of one‘s visual field – one may shift one‘s visual attention around even while the fixation point of 
one‘s eyes remains unchanged (cf., e.g., Posner 1988) – and focusing one‘s visual attention in this manner 
seems to be an action, though it does not involve a movement of a body part. 79 
 
subject‘s body losing its special status and becoming just one physical object among others 
for the subject. It is unclear what Hampshire‘s point here is. Is it that such a phenomenology 
is impossible?
52 Or is it that since such a phenomenology would follow from the subject 
being absolutely passive, we must reject the conception of the passive subject as incoherent? 
Even if Hampshire is right, it is quite unclear what the ability of eye movement control – or, 
say, the ability to voluntarily blink – would do for his claims. Can such a minimal change in 
point of view sustain meet his re-identification requirement? I am not sure. In any case, this 
pushes us back to the question of what‘s required for the possibility of re-identification of 
objects.  
In this sub-section we have discussed Hampshire‘s claim that action is a condition on 
the  objectivity  of  perception.  Hampshire‘s  argument  is  suggestive,  but  ultimately 
unsatisfactory.  
 
 
3.3.   Problems for the general dependency thesis  
 
What does the failure of Hampshire‘s argument teach us about Enactivism? Even if we buy 
into the idea that movement is in some sense crucial for perception, Hampshire has trouble 
establishing that active movement is essential. In the final quote from Hampshire, he retreats 
to the simplest form of action – voluntary eye movements – he can think of in order to hold 
on to the claim that action in some sense in a condition on perception. This appears to be a 
desperate manoeuvre unless voluntary eye movements can be shown to be necessary for 
visual perception.  
Is  there  such  a  line  of  argument?  Our  nervous  systems  have  evolved  to  detect 
changes because of the rapidly changing environment that we inhabit. Motion in the visual 
field may signal the presence of a predator or a prey, whilst stationary objects tend to pose 
less of a threat. Neural adaptation mechanisms have developed in response to the specific 
kind  of  pressures  we  face.  These  mechanisms  govern  our  visual  system:  constant 
illumination generates weak neural responses whilst sudden changes in illumination across 
space and time elicit strong responses (Hubel and Wiesel 1965). Thus, in the absence of eye 
                                                 
52 Such a phenomenology is unusual, but not impossible  – evidence the reports from deafferented agents 
during the initial phase of their malaise (Cole 1991). There are also subjects who, because of brain damage, 
disown various parts of their body (e.g. the alien hand syndrome). For discussion, see de Vignemont 2007.  80 
 
movements, visual perception may fade out due to neural adaptation. Does this establish 
that voluntary eye movements are necessary for visual perception? No. The reason is that in 
order to counteract the effects of neural adaptation, even when one‘s gaze is fixed on a 
point, the eye is constantly moving. There are three kinds of eye movements during fixation 
in humans – tremors, drifts, and microsaccades – but these are involuntary (Martinez-Conde, 
Macknik and Hubel 2004). 
Can we draw on the motivations we discussed earlier to present an argument for 
Enactivism? The first motivation concerned the importance of active movements in touch. 
This was partly grounded on the enhanced discrimination of two-dimensional shape under 
conditions of active touch. However, as Loomis and Lederman (1986) have pointed out, in 
Gibson‘s original experiment it is unclear whether the superiority of active over passive 
touch is due to (1) the active element of control, (2) kinaesthetic information, which in his 
experiment was only available in the active condition, or (3) the fingers – which were used in 
the active condition – having a higher spatial resolution than the palms – which were used in 
the passive conditions. Schwartz, Perey, and Azulay (1975) repeated Gibson‘s experiment 
with  an  extra  condition,  a  tactile  sequential  mode,  where  the  cookie  cutter  forms  were 
moved sequentially under the subject‘s extended  and stationary finger. They found the same 
results for the conditions Gibson studied, but in the passive tactile sequential condition, they 
found that form recognition accuracy was 93% – compared to 94% in the active touch 
condition. However, in a series of experiments by Magee and Kennedy (1980) comparing the 
identification of raised line drawings of familiar objects under various active and passive 
conditions, passive subjects performed better. In general, experimental work suggests that 
contrary to Gibson‘s contention, active touch is not always superior. Active touch is superior 
in certain circumstances, but in others passive touch is superior and sometimes there is no 
significant difference between the two. 
Even  if  we  grant  that  there  are  situations  where  active  touch  enhances 
discrimination, it is unclear how this helps to bolster the Enactivist‘s position. A similar 
point applies to the third source of motivation we identified concerning experiments from 
neuropsychology that show that efference has a distinctive contribution to bodily awareness 
(Tsarkiris  and  Haggard  2005),  which  seem  to  qualify  for  Hurley‘s  category  of  non-
instrumental  dependence  of  perception  on  action.  All  that  these  cases  show  is  that 
modulating  efference  whilst  keeping  the  stimulus  constant  modulates  the  subject‘s 81 
 
perceptual experience. This is a point we should accept. But accepting this point does not 
commit  us  to  the  thesis  that  action  is  a  condition  on  perception,  since  accepting  that 
modulating agency modulates perception doesn‘t show that there can‘t be perception in the 
absence of efference.  
Beyond  the  points  that  we  have  discussed,  I  want  to  argue  that  there  are 
counterexamples that present barriers to any attempt to argue that action is at least partly 
constitutive of perception. I will consider two counterexamples here. The first is one that we 
have already met with a number of times, paralysis, and the second is the pathology known 
as optic ataxia. 
 
 
3.3.1.   Paralysed subjects 
 
It appears that subjects are capable of perceiving things even if they lose their capacity for 
locomotion. Despite their inability to actively change their point of view on objects, it is 
plausible to think that they still have perceptual experiences. In the case of vision, a case 
might  be  made  that  eye  movements  are  a  condition  on  visual  perception,  since  neural 
adaptation to a stationary object would result in that object fading from view. However, we 
saw that these eye movements during fixation are involuntary. Another eye-related action, 
blinking, functions to keep the eye moist, and is an enabling condition for visual perception 
but has little claim to be a constitutive condition on visual perception.  
The case is even clearer for other modalities, such as audition. There is the case of 
the late Jean-Dominique Bauby who suffered from ‗locked in‘ syndrome following a serious 
stroke.
53 He was mentally alert, but deprived of all movement and speech except the ability 
to blink his left eye and swivel his head. Using a peculiar method of dictation, where an 
assistant read the alphabet in the order of most frequently used letters and he  indicated his 
letter of choice by blinking, he managed to dictate his memoir  The Diving Bell and the Butterfly 
(1998). For this method to work, it is clear that he has to be able to comprehend speech, and 
he also describes hearing sounds around him, such as the bells tolling and also the television. 
 
 
                                                 
53 Thanks to Victor Gan for bringing this case to my attention. 82 
 
3.3.2.   Optic ataxia 
 
This problem targets the claim that visuomotor action is a condition on visual perception. In 
certain patients we have damage to the dorsal part of the visual system, which is responsible 
for online visuomotor action guidance, whilst the ventral part of the visual system remains 
intact. These patients are articulate at describing what they see and can describe solutions to 
visuomotor problems posed to them, such as how one must orient a card in order to post it 
through a slot. This provides us with evidence that they suffer from no deficit in conscious 
awareness of the objects. However, they are unable to act and implement the visuomotor 
strategies which they accurately describe. So here we have a case where we have perception 
without  action.  Against  Noë‘s  variant  that  knowledge  of  sensorimotor  contingencies  is 
constitutive of visual perception, in the case of optic ataxics we have perception without 
knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies, since the optic ataxic does not know how to 
post the card through the slot in the sense that he has no practical ability. 
The possibility of this sort of dissociation is underlain by the way the human and 
primate visual system is organised into at least two processing streams: a dorsal stream, 
which  is  responsible  for  broadly  pragmatic  processing,  a  low-level  system  remote  from 
consciousness that is responsible for fine tuning motor movements, and the ventral stream 
which  is  responsible  for  conscious  perceptual  awareness  for  identification  and 
reidentification (Ungerleider and Miskin 1982, Milner and Goodale 1995, Jeannerod 1997, 
2006). Damage to the dorsal stream can leave the ventral stream intact and vice versa.
54 The 
force of our point here can be extended beyond the visual modality since there appears to be 
good  evidence  for  similar  dissociations  between  representations  for  perception  and 
representations for action  in  other sense  modalities,  such as audition (Kubovy and Van 
Valkenburg  2001)  and  touch  (Dijkerman  and  de  Haan  2007).  Thus  the  prospects  of 
Enactivist theses appear to be poor. 
These counterexamples appear to present serious obstacles to a general dependency 
thesis of perception on action. What ramifications does this have for whether bodily action 
is a condition of bodily agency? 
 
 
                                                 
54 For more detailed discussion of the dual visual systems hypothesis, see chapter 5. 83 
 
3.4.   Bodily action as a condition on bodily awareness: developing a specific view 
 
Our primary interest in this chapter is examining whether the intimate connexion between 
bodily awareness and bodily agency should be understood as Enaction claims it to be. At the 
beginning of this chapter we noted that very few theorists have developed the claim with 
respect to bodily awareness and bodily agency in detail. Our strategy was to work through a 
general dependency thesis concerning perception on action to see if we can gather some 
materials to develop and better understand Enaction about bodily awareness. There are two 
broad ways in which we can approach the task of developing Enaction. We can either derive 
Enaction  from  a  general  Enactivism  about  perceptual  experience  or  we  can  develop 
Enaction based on specific aspects distinctive of bodily awareness and bodily action.  
We will begin by exploring the first route, turning to the second in the later parts of 
this sub-section. But, before that, a note of caution: the different sensory modalities have 
their own idiosyncrasies; thus we have to be careful when we extrapolate from cases in one 
sensory  modality  to  making  claims  about  other  sensory  modalities.  Beyond  this  caveat, 
bodily awareness has certain features that set it apart from all the other sensory modalities 
(the ‗exteroceptive‘ modalities) – for example, its sole object character. We will examine two 
attempts at developing Enaction: the first involves applying Hampshire‘s argument to bodily 
awareness and the second draws on the work of Evans. We will also consider two theorists 
who  have  made  some  claims  concerning  how  bodily  agency  is  a  condition  on  bodily 
awareness in  that the spatial content of bodily awareness is specified in practical terms: 
Brewer has claimed that the spatial content of bodily awareness is ―given indexically in terms 
of its implications for our direct action in connection with that location‖ (Brewer 1995, p. 
302) and O‘Shaughnessy (1980, pp. 225-226) has remarked that some aspects of the content 
of bodily awareness is typically expressed in terms of how to act with the body part that is 
felt ‗from the inside‘. 
 
 
3.4.1.   Hampshire  
 
Our  first  attempt  at  developing  Enaction  from  a  general  Enactivism  about  perceptual 
experience will exploit Hampshire‘s general strategy of argument, applying it to the case of 84 
 
bodily awareness. Leaving to one side whether Hampshire‘s argument for his claim that 
action is a condition on perception is correct, let us consider whether his approach might be 
applied to bodily awareness. 
In  our  earlier  discussion  of  Hampshire  (section  3.2.)  we  pointed  out  that 
Hampshire‘s argument is directed at the external character of perception and that his notion 
of external is unclear. His discussion is clearly directed primarily at the perception of external 
objects in the sense of other material objects and people, but he seems to vacillate between 
thinking of bodily awareness as merely sensations or as providing us with knowledge of our 
body and its parts.
55 Clearly, if we read ‗external‘ as roughly ‗external to the subject‘s body‘, 
then  Hampshire‘s strategy cannot be exploited in developing Enaction. This would  also 
leave us unable to acknowledge the objectivity of bodily awareness, which is unsatisfactory. 
However, what if we read ‗external‘ as something like ‗mind-independent‘ and reject the idea 
that  bodily  awareness  is  just  a  matter  of  mere  sensation?  Hampshire‘s  key  idea  is  that 
subjects must be capable of movement with respect to the objects of perception so that one 
can  have  different  points  of  view  on  the  objects  and  thus  meet  the  re-identification 
requirement. There are two problems with applying this strategy to bodily awareness. First, a 
subject cannot move with respect to one‘s body so as to identify it from different points of 
view. One‘s body always remains with one. A subject may move different parts of his body 
and probe one part of his body with other parts of his body in touch, or perceive his body 
through other sense modalities, but even so he will not be able to acquire a different point of 
view on his body through bodily awareness. Second, the subject is only able to take a single 
point of view on his body through bodily awareness and possesses no distinct point of view 
through bodily awareness on his body from that which he already has. Thus it is unclear that 
Hampshire‘s re-identification requirement can be met in this case. Furthermore, there is 
usually no question of identifying one‘s body when one is sensing it ‗from the inside‘ and 
thus no question of re-identifying one‘s body in this way (as opposed to trying to visually 
single out which limb is one‘s in a tangle of limbs if one is in close proximity to many other 
people and playing some complicated game involving criss-crossing one‘s limbs). But this 
does not impugn the mind-independent character of one‘s body.  
How might one respond to this problem? The obvious reply is that we are reading 
Hampshire‘s re-identification requirement too strictly. Given that we can use different sense 
                                                 
55 See the quote in footnote 8 of this chapter. 85 
 
modalities to have diverse points of view on one‘s body and its parts – one can see, touch, 
smell and feel one‘s body – beyond one‘s awareness of one‘s bodies ‗from the inside‘, this 
satisfies the requirement for diverse points of view of an object and removes the obstacle for 
bodily awareness counting as perception of one‘s body. Even if we grant this to Hampshire, 
we will still not have developed an argument for Enaction about bodily awareness since the 
problem of paralysed agents remains. Are there other ways to develop Enaction? 
 
 
3.4.2.   Evans, Brewer, and O‘Shaughnessy 
 
In this sub-section we shall consider two formulations of Enaction. We begin by considering 
another route to develop Enaction, due to Gareth Evans (1982) and Bill Brewer (1992), 
which will yield a dispositional formulation of the thesis, and then turn to a claim from 
Brewer (1995) and O‘Shaughnessy that some of the content of bodily awareness is best 
expressed in practical terms.  
  Both  Evans  (1982)  and  Brewer  (1992)  claim  that  action  is  a  condition  on  the 
egocentric character of perception. Evans‘s idea is that egocentric space is a behavioural 
space: 
 
[A]n  egocentric  space  can  exist  only  for  an  animal  in  which  a  complex  network  of 
connections exists between perceptual input and behavioural output. A perceptual input—
even if, in some loose sense, it encapsulates spatial information (because it belongs to a 
range of inputs which vary systematically with some spatial facts)—cannot have a spatial 
significance for an organism except in so far as it has a place in such a complex network of 
input-output connections. (Evans 1982, p. 154) 
 
On the following page, Evans provides an argument that behavioural dispositions are a 
condition on egocentric content: 
 
When we hear a sound as coming from a certain direction, we do not have to think or 
calculate which way to turn our heads in order to look for the source of the sound. If we did 
have to do so, then it ought to be possible for two people to hear a sound as coming from 
the same direction …, and yet to be disposed to do quite different things in reacting to the 86 
 
sound, because of differences in their calculations. Since this does not appear to make sense, 
we must say that having spatially significant perceptual information consists at least partly in 
being disposed to do various things (Evans 1982, p. 155)   
 
The basic idea here is that since it does not make sense to think that two subjects who hear a 
sound  as  coming  from  the  same  direction  might  be  disposed  to  do  different  things, 
egocentric  spatial  content  must  consist  at  least  partly  in  dispositions  toward  spatial 
behaviour. Evans also draws support for his thesis from Charles Taylor‘s remark about the 
nature of ‗up‘ and ‗down‘ in the visual field – they are neither defined by paradigm objects in 
the perceptual field nor by the body axis. Rather, ―up and down are related to how one 
would move and act in the field‖ (Taylor 1978-9, p. 154). Evans clearly intends his remarks 
to  cover  not  just  audition  but  the  other  sensory  modalities,  including  touch  and  bodily 
awareness (1982, p. 160).  
Both Evans‘s and Taylor‘s arguments are somewhat problematic. Evans‘s argument 
appears to be begging the question against the converse view. His opponent will point out 
that the uniformity of behavioural responses of the two subjects should be explained by 
references to the spatial content of their perceptions. It is because they hear the sound 
coming from the same direction that explains their being disposed to act toward the same 
location. The scenario does not support his contention that it is partly because subjects have 
dispositions toward spatial behaviour that their perceptions have egocentric spatial content. 
The issue concerning whether the location of a sound needs to be inferred is a red herring.  
In Taylor‘s case, the vestibular sense tracks a relational property of one‘s body – the body‘s 
relation  to  the  gravitational  field.  When  one  feels  upside  down,  this  is  because  the 
orientation of one‘s body is opposite from its natural orientation in the gravitational field, 
but ‗up‘ still remains the direction opposite to the gravitational pull. So it is unclear that 
Taylor‘s observation supports the claim that behavioural dispositions are a condition on 
egocentric content. Rather it seems that one is tracking the orientation of the gravitational 
field and one‘s relation to it, and this is what explains how one moves in situation one finds 
oneself in. 
Evans, however, attempts to provide a response to the problem of paralysed agents 
(1982, p. 161, fn. 33). He says that the ―behavioural connection still obtains even if the 87 
 
subject is paralysed‖, since the connection is to a behavioural disposition, and in the case of 
paralysis, it will become ―merely dispositional‖. 
Brewer‘s (1992) claim is that perceptual experience carries egocentric spatial content 
in virtue of the role of perception in the control and coordination of spatial action. Here is 
how he describes his claim: 
 
[P]erceptual contents are self-locating in virtue of their contribution to the subject‘s capacity 
for basic purposive action in the world. … It is therefore this role of experience in focusing 
and  guiding  world-directed  action  which  justifies  the  self-locating  spatial  structure  in 
perceptual contents. (1992, p. 26) 
 
Brewer‘s emphasis on justification in his description of his claim is awkward. A justification 
for ascribing egocentric spatial content is different from a justification for thinking that action 
has to be a condition on egocentric content. Thus, it may be plausible to think that we can 
only ascribe egocentric content in the face of behavioural evidence, but this does not entail 
the claim that action is a condition on egocentric content.
56 Only on an extreme behaviourist 
construal of Brewer‘s claim would a justification for ascription amount to a condition on 
egocentric content. Let us set this point aside for the moment and see if Brewer has an 
argument for his view. Here is the key passage providing support for his view: 
 
If perception alone is insufficient, how does acting help? The basic idea is that various 
perceptions  are  organized  and  integrated  into  a  representation  of  the  subject‘s  spatial 
environment  in  virtue  of  their  role  in  controlling  his  behavior  with  respect  to  that 
environment in accordance to his purposes. Egocentric spatial perception enables a subject 
to keep track of the changing spatial relations between himself and salient environmental 
                                                 
56 This confusion is perhaps a reason why Brewer cites Peacocke as an ally. At this juncture of his argument he 
cites two sources: Evans‘s famous discussion of egocentric content in the Varieties of Reference (§6.3) and the 
third chapter of Peacocke‘s Sense and Content (1983) entitled ―Spatial Contents and Constraints‖. Peacocke‘s 
argument is that the ascription of spatial contents to creatures requires there to be appropriate behavioural 
grounds. ―So a simplified general statement of the requirement of perceptual sensitivity would be this: if the 
subject moves from one place to another, his intentional web must be recentred on the place determined in 
normal  circumstances  by  the  change  in  the  sensational  properties  of  his  experience.  A  creature  with  the 
concepts of the Basic Case might never move, but it must be true that such a being would display perspectival 
sensitivity were he to move and to be capable of action. Perspectival sensitivity is literally a matter, in actual and 
counterfactual  circumstances,  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  subject‘s  intentional  actions  to  variations  in  his 
perspective on the world.‖ (1983, p. 69) This does not seem to me to provide any support for Brewer‘s view 
whatsoever. 88 
 
objects in precisely the way required appropriately to modulate his spatial behavior with 
respect to such objects. Perceptual experience mediates between a person‘s preferences and 
movements as implicitly governed by a sensitivity both to the continuous dependence of the 
nature of experience on where the subject is in relation to its objects and to the mechanical 
properties—dimensions, mass, organization, flexibility, jointing, etc.—of the physical thing 
which is his body. This anchors and unifies perception as the sensitive director of a single 
substantial locus of activity in the world. And the unification simultaneously directs the 
behavior onto the perceived world as purposive and provides a rationale for discriminating 
representation of the spatial relations between the subject and the things he perceives in his 
environment, in the nonconceptual content of his perceptual experience. Thus the world is 
perceived as the subject's environment as he is placed in it as a central, persisting element, 
moving  in  it  and  engaging  with  its  constituents  in  response  to  his  perceptions.  The 
interrelation  between  perception  and  action  constitutes  a  kind  of  triangulation  of  the 
subject's location in the single world of each. (1992, p. 27) 
 
This passage fails to provide any support for Brewer‘s position. All he has claimed is that 
egocentric spatial perception is required for action – and that is agreed by all hands – but 
how does that show that action is a condition on egocentric spatial perception? Let us turn 
to another paper of Brewer‘s where he focuses on the link between bodily awareness and 
agency. 
In a discussion of the spatial content of bodily awareness, Brewer (1995) argues for 
the  claim  that  bodily  action  is  a  condition  on  bodily  awareness.  In  rejecting  a  purely 
subjectivist account of bodily awareness, where bodily sensations are not experienced as 
directed at parts of one‘s body but are subjective signs that are associated with these parts, 
he remarks that ―it is impossible to erase the immediate inclination to act in connection with 
the particular location of bodily sensation from our conception of the epistemological given 
in bodily awareness … the appropriateness of action concerning these actual bodily locations 
is written into the very nature of the experience itself, rather than being somehow inferred 
from its prior, intrinsically nonspatial, qualitative essence‖ (p. 298). Brewer (1995, section 4) 
argues for Enaction by contrasting the spatial content of bodily sensation in the case of a 
deafferented agent, GL, and that in the case of normal subjects. GL is deafferented from 
below  her  nose,  and  has  no  proprioception,  kinaesthesia,  and  touch  below  her  nose. 
However, she has preserved thermal perception and sensitivity to deep pain in these areas. 89 
 
When a thermal stimulus is applied to a limb in the absence of vision, say GL‘s left arm, she 
is unable to use her right arm to point to the site of stimulation even though she is able to 
indicate where the site of stimulation is on a schematic body diagram or provide a verbal 
report of it (Cole and Paillard 1995, p. 254). GL has knowledge of the location of the bodily 
sensation that does not connect immediately with her ability to act on that location. This is 
in  contrast  to  our  own  case  where  the  spatial  content  of  bodily  awareness  is  ―given 
indexically in terms of its implications for our direct action in connection with that location‖ 
(Brewer 1995, p. 302). 
Brewer compares GL‘s situation to that of a pilot in her ship: she is unable to directly 
act on the location of the stimulus, but only has a disengaged grasp on it. In our own case, 
the  ―intrinsic  spatial  content  of  normal  bodily  awareness  is  given  directly  in  terms  of 
practical knowledge of how to act in connection with the bodily locations involved‖. His 
argument for Enaction is that if the spatial content of bodily awareness were specified in 
non-practical terms, then there would be an epistemic gap between sensing one‘s body in 
that way and how to act on the location of sensation. Such an epistemic gap would put us in 
the  position  of  a  deafferented  agent  like  GL,  who  needs  to  grope  for  the  location  of 
stimulation on her own arm by reference to a disengaged representation of it. But this is 
inaccurate as to the phenomenology of normal bodily sensation; there is no such gap in our 
case between feeling a bodily location ‗from the inside‘ and being able to directly act in 
connection  with  it.  So  the  spatial  content  of  bodily  sensation  ―cannot  normally  be 
characterised independently of the practical knowledge of how to act in connection with that 
location on the body part‖ (p. 302). 
Similarly, O‘Shaughnessy (1980, pp. 225-226) has remarked that some aspects of the 
content of bodily awareness is best expressed in terms of how to act with the body part in 
question, which we can articulate in employing action demonstratives. So in considering the 
exact location of one‘s arm, perhaps the best way to express it would be through moving it 
or pointing at it. The spatiality of current position and posture is best expressed practically, 
but this, O‘Shaughnessy claims, depends on a further piece of practical knowledge, which is 
long term.  To some extent, we know the spatial possibilities of our limbs, so that this 
constrains what we think of as the basic possibilities of action for our limbs. O‘Shaughnessy 
puts this by speaking of a ‗practical photograph‘ of one‘s hand that provides a sense of the 
boundaries and possibilities of one‘s hand. 90 
 
We  now  have  two  different  formulations  of  Enaction.  Evans‘s  view  is  that 
behavioural  dispositions  are  a  condition  on  the  egocentric  character  of  perception.  In 
particular, the spatial content of bodily awareness is specified in egocentric terms and this is 
in  part  due  to  its  connection  to  behavioural  dispositions  of  the  subject.  In  the  case  of 
paralysed  subjects,  then  the  behavioural  dispositions  will  be  merely  dispositional.  The 
second,  due  to  O‘Shaughnessy  and  Brewer,  claims  that  the  spatial  content  of  bodily 
awareness is expressed in terms of practical knowledge of how we can act in connection with 
the felt location. The second view may be read in at least two ways. In O‘Shaughnessy‘s 
weaker formulation, the claim is that some of the spatial content of bodily awareness is best 
expressed in practical terms. This does not commit him to the claim that the spatial content of 
bodily  awareness  holds  in  virtue  of  connections  to  behavior,  which  Evans  and  Brewer 
appear to be committed to. In Brewer‘s case his claim seems to be that the spatial content of 
bodily awareness is canonically expressed in practical terms because the spatial content holds 
in  virtue  of  connections  with  action.  In  the  following  section  we  will  examine  possible 
problems for Enaction. 
  
 
3.5. Problems for Enaction about bodily awareness 
 
In this final section, we shall pose a series of challenges for any view that claims that bodily 
agency is a condition on bodily awareness. We will discuss two points derive from familiar 
facts  about  our  bodily  awareness  and  agency,  and  another  one  that  comes  from 
neuropsychological studies. 
 
 
3.5.1.   Paralysis 
 
A last stab might be made to defend Enaction about bodily awareness by noting that action 
plays an important role in updating postural information, and that proprioceptive signals 
weaken when one‘s limbs are at rest. Thus we might concur with Schilder (1935, p. 112), an 
early Enactionist, when he says that ―[w]e do not know much about the body unless we 
move it‖. The import of this point is unclear, since it does not get us off the hook with 91 
 
respect to the problem of paralysed subjects. Even if proprioceptive signals are weak in the 
case of a paralysed subject, and his sense of his body ‗from the inside‘ may be attenuated, 
this does not show that he no longer feels his body ‗from the inside‘. Furthermore there are 
other sensory phenomena associated with one‘s body that need not concern the position or 
movement of body parts, such as pain. It is plausible to think that pain in various body parts 
of a paralysed subject need not be attenuated just because he is unable to move these parts. 
This case appears to be problematic both for Evans and Brewer. It is unclear what 
resources Brewer‘s view has to answer the case, since in the case of a paralysed subject who 
still feels his body ‗from the inside‘ but is no longer able to act with it, there is no longer a 
behavioural connection. Perhaps Brewer can respond that spatial content in this case holds 
in virtue of the connection to past action; the spatial content is still presented in terms of 
implications for actions – actions that the subject can no longer perform, but he retains his 
behavioural dispositions. This would be similar to Evans‘s response. Evans‘s view is that 
retreating to the merely dispositional answers this objection, as the claim is that behavioural 
dispositions are a condition on the egocentricity of perception, and does not require the 
dispositions to be manifested. This response is unsatisfactory since it is unclear in what sense 
a paralysed subject still retains his behavioural dispositions. A temporarily paralysed subject 
could plausibly be described as still possessing the appropriate behavioural dispositions, but 
what of a subject who is permanently paralysed due to the loss of efferent nerves or damage 
to the motor cortex? In what sense does he still retain his behavioural dispositions? After all, 
even  the  categorical  bases  –  the  efferent  nerves  or  an  intact  motor  cortex  –  of  these 
dispositions  have  been  destroyed.  So  the  objection  from  paralysed  subjects  remains 
unanswered. 
 
 
3.5.2.   Awareness of body parts that we do not directly control 
 
This leads us to the second objection, which concerns awareness of body parts that we do 
not directly control. There are two different sorts of examples here: (1) there are external 
parts like our ears, which we can feel pain and temperature in, but have no ability to act 
directly with; (2) we feel internal organs ‗from the inside‘ that we do not normally directly 
control  –  e.g.  pains  in  the  kidney,  feelings  of  emptiness,  fullness,  pain  in  the  stomach. 92 
 
Remember that Enaction claims that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ because one 
can act directly with it. Now this claim can be made more specific so that it can concern 
individual body parts: one can feel a body part ‗from the inside‘ because one can directly act 
with it. This certainly is shown to be false by our examples here. What are the ramifications 
of  these  cases  for  Evans‘s  dispositional  formulation?  Evans‘s  formulation  talks  of 
appropriate behavioural dispositions which leaves things sufficiently vague, so perhaps the 
case of external parts like ears can be dealt with by saying that the appropriate behavioural 
dispositions are one‘s where one acts on one‘s ears – such as rubbing them when they are 
painful, scratching when they itch. This is clearer on Brewer‘s account, where he speaks of 
acting in connection with the body part, which is presumably meant to cover both cases of 
acting on these parts and/or acting with these parts. This, however, still leaves us with the 
earlier problem of paralysed subjects. What about the case of internal organs? We certainly 
cannot act with these and it would be very implausible to claim that it is because we can act 
on our internal organs that we can feel pain in them. 
 
 
3.5.3.   Double dissociations between bodily awareness and bodily agency
57 
 
Enaction already faces grave problems with our first two objections from paralysed subjects 
and body parts that we feel ‗from the inside‘ but cannot act directly with, but there are also 
empirical obstacles. Recent work in neuropsychology provides ample evidence for a double 
dissociation  between  bodily  representations  for  action  and  bodily  representations  for 
perceptual awareness. This is analogous to the kind of dissociation that we earlier alluded to 
in  discussing  optic  ataxia  in  the  visual  system.  Besides  evidence  from  functional 
dissociations, there is also neurophysiology evidence that the processes have distinct neural 
bases (Dijkerman and de Haan 2007). 
However Enaction is formulated, there appear to be empirical obstacles that stand in 
the way of an account that claims that bodily action is a condition on bodily awareness. We 
can find instances of double dissociations between bodily perception and bodily action. Thus 
we have cases where subjects are able to consciously detect stimuli, without being able to act 
                                                 
57 In preparing this section, I have benefitted from reading de Vignemont 2009. 93 
 
on the stimuli and converse cases where subjects are able to consciously detect stimuli, 
without being able to act on the stimuli.   
If  we  examine  at  pathological  cases,  we  find  a double  dissociation  presented  by 
contrasting  the  capabilities  of  a  centrally  deafferented  patient,  RS,  and  a  peripherally 
deafferented patient, GL (Paillard 1999). RS provided the first clinical demonstration of 
numbsense (Paillard et al. 1983). When tactile stimulus is applied to her deafferented right 
arm, she does not feel any stimulation on her arm, but is able to point to the location of the 
tactile stimulus with her other hand in the absence of vision. In contrast, in the absence of 
vision, GL is able to feel and localise a restricted class of tactile stimuli on her arms but is 
unable  to  point  to  their  location.  Despite  the  loss  of  information  from  muscular 
proprioception, skin receptors, and joint receptors, the small sensory fibres left intact by her 
neuropathy enable GL to consciously detect thermal and pricking stimulation. She is able to 
report  the  location  of  thermal  or  pricking  stimuli  either  verbally  or  by  pointing  out  its 
location on a body diagram despite being blindfolded when the stimuli is applied, but is 
unable to point to the location of the stimulus on her body in the absence of vision. Thus we 
have a double dissociation between conscious detection of the location of a stimuli and 
being able to act on the location of the stimuli on one‘s body.
58 
What of normal agents? There are now a number of cases we can draw on to show a 
double dissociation in normal agents as well.
59 In the case of the Rubber Hand Illusion 
(Botvinick and Cohen 1998), an experimental subject watches a rubber hand which is in an 
anatomically congruent position with his own unseen hand being stroked by a  brush whilst 
his own unseen hand is also stroked synchronously. The effect of this is that subjects feel the 
location of their unseen hand to be shifted toward the location of the rubber hand. 
However, it has been shown that acting on and acting with one‘s unseen hand is not affected 
by the illusory felt location induced by the experimental procedure (Kammers et al. 2008).
60 
                                                 
58 We have presented a double dissociation relying on tactile stimulation on the surface of the subjects‘ arms. 
One  might  ask  what  tactile  stimulation  has  to  do  with  bodily  awareness.  This  is  to  forget  that  touch  is 
intimately related to bodily awareness even though the former is an exteroceptive sense. In the thermal case, 
one may alternately attend to the temperature of the objected sensed or the temperature of the location on the 
body part sensing the object. In the pricking case, one may alternately attend to the location at which one is 
being pricked or the sharpness of the pricking object. 
59 Other experiments we could have used include the two experiments that will play a major role in the next 
chapter: Marcel 2003 and Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998. 
60 Note that the actions that subjects were asked to perform in this experiment were ballistic actions performed 
so fast that there are no on-line adjustments. The results here with ballistic actions contrast with Botvinick and 
Cohen‘s  (1998)  results  where  the  Rubber  Hand  Illusion  affects  pointing  behavior.  Arguably  pointing  or 94 
 
Subjects could accurately reach for the affected hand with their unstimulated hand in the 
absence of vision and could also accurately reach for the unstimulated hand with the affected 
hand in the absence of vision. Furthermore, despite moving the stroked hand, and thus 
updating proprioceptive signals on hand position in the process, the felt position of their 
stroked hands remained illusory. Thus in this case, we see that (one) the subject‘s conscious 
experience of the spatial location of his hand is not determined by the spatial parameters 
controlling action with and on his hand and (two) the felt spatial location does not control 
action with or on his hand. Given this double dissociation between bodily awareness and 
bodily action, it is clear that bodily awareness cannot be determined by spatial parameters 
associated with action. 
The three objections we have considered – from the case of paralysed agents, body 
parts that we cannot act directly with but can feel ‗from the inside‘, and empirical double 
dissociations  –  present  Enaction  with  serious  difficulties.  Thus  Enaction  cannot  be  the 
correct articulation of the intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
But  what  of  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  claim  that  some  aspects  of  the  content  of  bodily 
awareness is best expressed in terms of how to act with the body part in question, in terms 
of  practical  knowledge  best  articulated  through  employing  action  demonstratives? 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s observation is phenomenologically plausible, and brings out the intimacy 
between bodily awareness and bodily action in our normal experience of bodily agency. 
However, as noted  earlier, the  claim that  the  spatial content of bodily awareness is  best 
expressed in practical terms does not commit him to the claim that the spatial content of 
bodily awareness holds in virtue of connections to behavior. And this also does not commit 
him to the claim that the spatial content of bodily awareness must be expressed in practical 
terms. This raises issues about the sense in which bodily action can be a condition on bodily 
awareness. We have no quarrel with the claim that the spatial content of bodily awareness is 
canonically specified in terms of action descriptions, and that this is a correct description of 
the phenomenology; but, in the light of the problems we have seen for Enaction, we should 
reject that there is an explanatory connection here that spatial content holds in virtue of the 
connection with action. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicating where one‘s arm is more connected with the part of the motor system associated with semantic 
recognition. 95 
 
 
3.6.   Summary and conclusion 
 
In this chapter we explored one way of articulating the connexion between bodily awareness 
and bodily agency. Enaction claims that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ because 
one  has  direct  power  over  it.  Because  very  few  theorists  have  developed  the  claim,  we 
approached Enaction by way of considering a more general dependency on perception on 
action. We considered the motivations behind Enactivism and explored various difficulties 
for it. This provided us with a sense of the pitfalls that the view faces. With the difficulties of 
the general dependency thesis in mind, we then set about formulating Enaction by exploring 
ideas  from  Hampshire,  Evans  and  Brewer.  We  isolated  a  dispositional  formulation  of 
Enaction from Evans and also considered a claim from Brewer and O‘Shaughnessy that the 
canonical specification of the spatial content of bodily awareness is in practical terms. We 
considered objections from paralysed subjects and pains in internal organs against Enaction. 
Finally, we saw that recent empirical work showing double dissociations between bodily 
awareness and bodily agency present an obstacle for any account that claims that bodily 
action is a condition on bodily awareness. Thus Enaction cannot be the correct account of 
the  relation  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency.  Given  that  Independence  is 
unsatisfactory, the task remains for us to articulate some kind of intimate connexion between 
bodily awareness and bodily agency. In the next chapter, we will examine the converse claim 
that one can directly act with one‘s body because one can feel it ‗from the inside‘. 96 
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The argument of this dissertation  up to this point has been  that reflection on ordinary 
agency and pathologies like numbsense show that there has to be some intimate connexion 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency. The moral we drew from the discussion in 
chapter  two  of  Independence  was  that  in  order  to  make  sense  of  action  as  a  rational 
response  to  experience,  there  has  to  be  some  substantial  dependency  relation  between 
perception  and  action.  In  the  previous  chapter  we  considered  and  rejected  one  way  of 
articulating the intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily action: Enaction. 
This is the view that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ because one has direct power 
over it. We saw that Enaction falls prey to counterexamples from the case of paralysed 
subjects and also our awareness of body parts that we can‘t directly act with. More seriously, 
double dissociations between bodily awareness and bodily action from recent empirical work 
show that bodily awareness cannot be dependent on bodily action. This leaves us with the 
other direction of explanation – that bodily agency is possible because of bodily awareness – 
as the most attractive general picture of the relation between bodily awareness and bodily 97 
 
action. This picture is also the most intuitive one, for our ordinary model of sensorimotor 
control seems to be one where we act on an object at a location because we experience that 
object at that location. I reach to the left of my laptop for the coffee mug because I see it 
there. 
The most straightforward way to develop this picture is O‘Shaughnessy‘s claim that 
feeling a body part ‗from the inside‘ is necessary for any instance of directly acting with that 
body part, which we have dubbed Necessity. The plan for this chapter is as follows. We will 
begin by briefly considering the motivations behind Necessity. After this, we will look at 
how bodily awareness might be thought to ground the egocentric axes. This provides us with 
an instance of how bodily awareness figures in the control of ordinary bodily action. I will 
then proceed to consider the case for Necessity. The most influential defence of Necessity is 
to be found in Brian O‘Shaughnessy‘s work on action (1980, 1992, 1995, and 2008). I lay out 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s arguments for Necessity and analyse them. It turns out that there are two 
different strands implicit in O‘Shaughnessy‘s account. The first strand is based on the idea 
that bodily awareness provides an ineliminable source of feedback for the control of actions. 
The second strand is that there is a conceptual tie between bodily awareness and bodily 
agency. I tease these strands apart and evaluate them separately. The attractions of Necessity 
are  obvious  and  perhaps  even  deep-rooted.  But  counterexamples  are  knocking  on 
Necessity‘s door. In the second section of this chapter, I consider three counterexamples 
against Necessity: (one) the case of deafferented agents, who appear to be able to directly act 
with parts of their body that they have no sensation in; (two) the case of direct brain control 
of  physical  apparatus  that  has  been  made  possible  by  various  brain-machine  interface 
technologies; and (three) the majority of our bodily actions seem to be accomplished without 
conscious attention to or awareness of the body parts involved. Each case presents different 
difficulties for Necessity, but they unite in opposing any claim that the contribution of bodily 
awareness to bodily agency is indispensable. We are thus left with a seeming antinomy at this 
point in the dialectic. There are compelling reasons for believing in Necessity, but we are 
also faced with powerful counterexamples against it. Whilst the intimacy between bodily 
awareness and agency is not in doubt, the counterexamples suggest that their relation cannot 
quite be understood in the way that Necessity claims. 
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4.1.   Necessity 
 
There appears to be an intimate connexion between feeling our limbs ‗from the inside‘ and 
our power to act directly with them. This intimacy can be brought out by the difficulty of 
conceiving of how one might move a limb that is completely without feeling where one does 
not have any other forms of perceptual feedback available. Or consider how some intricate 
task involving complex physical elements – like skiing – would be possible in the absence of 
any bodily awareness. This connexion between bodily awareness and bodily action is not 
restricted to the exercise of unusual motor skills but pervades all motor activities. It is hard 
to see how even a relatively mundane activity like running after a bus is possible in the total 
absence of bodily awareness. The intimate connexion is reflected in the phenomenology of 
ordinary agency: in agency as we know it, bodily awareness seems to play a crucial role in the 
control of actions. Thus there is prima facie reason to think that bodily awareness plays some 
kind of constitutive role in the control of bodily action.  
As we noted in the introductory chapter, despite the recessive character of bodily 
awareness,  its  importance  is  obvious  once  its  presence  is  recognised.  Regardless  of  the 
sensory  modality  or  modalities  involved  in  a  sensorimotor  transaction,  it  will  (typically) 
involve acting with one‘s body in some way even if the action goes beyond the boundaries of 
one‘s body as it often does. Intuitively, to act with a body part, one needs to know the state 
and position of it in order to have some sense of what one needs to do in order to achieve 
one‘s aims in the scenario. The thought, then, is that bodily awareness is always there to 
provide these parameters, presenting them to the acting subject so that he can control his 
actions. After all, we are not always looking at or touching those body parts that we can act 
with, yet we are almost always ready to act with those body parts that we can act with. 
Furthermore,  even  in  cases  where  sight  can  provide  the  agent  with  knowledge  of  the 
location  and  current  dispositions  of  his  limbs,  bodily  awareness  is  unique  in  presenting 
awareness of the limb ‗from the inside‘. This is what allows for the possibility of striving with 
the limb. In sensing the limb, the agent is thereby presented with it as affording action. In so 
characterising how bodily awareness relates to bodily action, Necessity helps make sense of 
why the limits of sensation correspond to the limits of striving. 
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4.1.1.   Necessity as an instance of a general sensorimotor synergy
61 
 
Necessity can be seen as a particular manifestation of the general cooperation between 
perception and action. Perception presents the agent with the way things are in his environs, 
whilst action grants him the means to intervene in this ambient arena as he sees fit. Each is a 
handmaiden to the other: Without action the perceiving subject would have no means of 
effecting change in the world given in perception. He is impotent. Without perception the 
agent would have no means to locate his targe ts and monitor his activities. He can only 
grope in the wind. He too is powerless.  
Our concern is with the terms of their alliance when perception comes to the aid of 
action. Physical action is mostly a distinctive kind of reaction to perceptually registe red 
environmental changes. Two aspects of this encounter merit discussion. In reactive mode, 
perception is what jolts the agent into action. But more than that, it provides one with the 
objects that one‘s action is directed at. Having identified the object of my action, perception 
now  enables  me  to  track  my  target  so  as  to  monitor  the  success  of  my  campaign.  As 
O‘Shaughnessy says, action is ―concerned to wreak change in the world, and in consequence 
one must be aware of its objects, firstly to know where the Will is to strike, secondly to 
monitor its effects‖.
62 
Necessity is an instance of this general sensorimotor synergy. We arrive at Necessity 
when we retreat from the world back within the limits of the embodied agent. Now the 
object of the will is the agent‘s own body and the objects of awareness are its parts. And thus 
we have the thesis that without experience of his own body, the agent would have no means 
to locate his body parts and control his bodily striving. 
But one  might wonder why bodily  awareness is thought to be special  here  with 
respect to the control of action. Don‘t other sensory modalities also provide experience of 
one‘s own body? Why think of bodily awareness as more central to bodily action than other 
perceptual modalities?  
                                                 
61 I refer the reader back to remarks I made earlier in chapter 1, sections 1.3.1 and 1.5 for some discussion of 
theoretical assumptions in play here concerning the role of the general awareness-agency connection in my 
argument and also the distinction between objects that one is acting on (such as a coffee mug that one reaches 
out for) as opposed to objects that one is (directly) acting with (such as one‘s body). 
62 O‘Shaughnessy 1992, p. 226. 100 
 
Amongst the  familiar sensory  modalities,  the  strongest candidates for a modality 
essential to bodily action are vision and touch. Vision is quick, has high resolution, and 
operates over a long range. Its utility in a wide range of situations is unmatched. However, it 
can hardly pretend to be necessary to bodily action, for sighted agents can often act perfectly 
well in total darkness and unsighted agents can act with their bodies faultlessly. Touch is a 
more complicated case. There are reasons to think that touch and bodily awareness are 
interdependent, – since when one feels an object poking at one‘s skin, one is also aware of 
one‘s  skin  as  being  poked  –  and  if  so  touch  does  not  represent  a  modality  that  is  in 
competition with bodily awareness.
63  
But there is a deeper phenomenological contrast that provides positive grounds for 
thinking that bodily awareness is essential to bodily action. When one experiences one‘s 
body in sight, one‘s body is given as one among many other possible objects of perception. 
In contrast, for each and every modality coming under the banner of ‗bodily awareness‘ one 
can only be aware of one‘s body: when one feels a limb moving, one feels that it is one‘s 
own limb that is moving and not anyone else‘s; when one feels a pair of hands stretched out, 
one feels that it is one‘s own hands that are stretched out and not another‘s.
64 This provides 
for a sense of ownership of one‘s body as one is not presented with one‘s body amongst 
other bodies which one also feels but is only aware of one‘s body in this way – yet one‘s 
body is also experienced as an element of the objective order which also contains other 
bodies and objects (Martin 1995). If we couple this with the observation that one is able to 
act with one‘s body in ways which one is incapable of acting with other bodies or objects, we 
can begin to see how bodily awareness can underwrite the agent‘s sense that her body is the 
distinctive respondent to her will. 
 
 
                                                 
63 See Martin 1992 and 1993 for discussions of the interrelations between touch and bodily sensations. 
64 This is not to say that one‘s body does not occupy a distinctive position of some sort as it is presented in the 
more familiar sense modalities. As Ernest Mach observed in The Analysis of Sensations, if one shuts an eye but 
leaves the other open one is presented with a view of parts of one‘s body – the ridge of one‘s eyebrow and 
one‘s nose – that no one else can have. There is a nice discussion of various ways a body could present itself as 
‗mine‘ in the chapter entitled ‗The Phenomenology of the Subject Position‘ in J. J. Valberg‘s Dream, Death, and 
the Self. 101 
 
4.1.2.   Bodily awareness in grounding the egocentric axes 
 
I now propose to examine a particular case of how bodily awareness figures in the control of 
ordinary bodily action. This way we can begin to have a sense of the shape that such a claim 
might take. I will look at the relation between bodily awareness and orientation – specifically 
how the former might be thought to ground the latter.  
In action as we know it, in order that actions can be a means of intervening in the 
world as the agent sees fit, he needs to have perceptions that are egocentrically specified. 
The perceptual field has to be specified as belonging to the agent in some appropriate sense 
such that the objects that come into view within it are of direct relevance to the agent with 
that perspective on the world. The perceptual field has to be presented as appropriately 
related to the agent and various symmetries or asymmetries of his body (and its relation to 
the environment) that the agent needs to be sensitive to for action. (Think of the difference 
between the peripersonal space of a jellyfish and a human agent.)  
Let us focus on just one aspect of the egocentric character of perceptions: how 
perceptions  have  an  orientational  structure.  Charles  Taylor  describes  this  feature  of 
perception and its connection with spatial action: 
 
Our perceptual field has an orientational structure, a foreground and a background, an up 
and down … [T]his orientational structure marks our field as essentially that of an embodied 
agent. It is not just that the field‘s perspective centres on where I am bodily—this by itself 
doesn‘t show that I am essentially agent. But take the up-down directionality of the field. 
What is it based on? Up and down are not simply related to my body—up is not just where 
my head is and down where my feet are. For I can be lying down, or bending over, or upside 
down; and in all these cases ‗up‘ in my field is not the direction of my head. Nor are up and 
down defined by certain paradigm objects in the field, such as the earth or the sky: the earth 
can slope for instance.  
Rather, up and down are related to how one would move and act in the field. For it is 
of course as a bodily agent functioning in a gravitational field that ‗up‘ and ‗down‘ have 
meaning for me. I have to maintain myself upright to act, or in some way align my posture 
with gravity. Without a sense of ‗which way is up‘, I falter into confusion. My field has an up 
and a down because it is the field of an agent of this kind. It is structured as a field of 
potential action. (Taylor 1978-79, pp. 154-155) 102 
 
 
When presented with an array of objects in one‘s visual field, we (typically) experience the 
objects as distributed according to their spatial relation to oneself – some to one’s left and 
somewhat below, others to one’s right and somewhat above, say. Whilst the left-right axis of 
the perceptual field is plausibly defined by the left-right axis of the agent‘s body, as Taylor 
points out, this is not the case with the up-down axis. Up-down directionality is not just a 
function of the head-trunk asymmetry, but rather tracks the orientation of the gravitational 
field and the agent‘s relation to it.
65 Even when one is upside down, ‗left‘ and ‗right‘ follows 
the left and right of one‘s body, but up and down remain unchanged. The feeling of being 
upside down makes this plain – one‘s head is now where one‘s feet were whilst standing but 
it is uncomfortably clear that ‗up‘ is not the direction one‘s head is pointing toward. In 
suffering vertigo, one lacks a sense of orientation, and thus ―falter into confusion‖, crippling 
one‘s ability to act. 
To see how critical one‘s sense of ‗which way is up‘ is for us, consider how difficult it 
is for astronauts to act in low gravity environments, and the length of training required for 
them to learn how to do this. Contrast this with the situation for divers, who work under 
conditions where the forces are quite different from those experienced by terrestrial animals, 
but where the gravitational aspect remains constant. Whilst this already introduces unfamiliar 
elements,  as  anyone  who  has  had  a  play  fight  with  his  sibling  under  water  knows,  the 
differences low gravity environments introduce are far more radical.  
It is important to realise that it is not enough for the agent to have information 
regarding the orientation of the up-down axis. The significance of one‘s possession of the 
vestibular sense does not just consist in its providing information about the gravitational 
field and one‘s relation to it. An agent may have a device registering the absolute orientation 
of the axis, but need not know how to act in accordance with that axis – the information 
must have psychophysical significance for the agent, it must be exploitable (in some sense) 
by the agent. What‘s particularly interesting about the vestibular case is that intuitively we 
have an axis which is not defined as and not always aligned with a natural axis of the body 
but yet is egocentric. This allows us to make a powerful case that the contrast between 
allocentric as opposed to egocentric representations (axes, frames of reference, etc.) cannot 
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just consist in the fact that allocentric representations need not be centred on one‘s body or 
a body part, since the gravitational axes are not centred on one‘s body at all, unlike other 
more  familiar  egocentric  axes.
66 Rather, the egocentric axes have to have a practical, 
psychophysical significance for the subject in terms of the control of his action.  Absent this 
structure, it is hard to see how perceptions could have direct implications for spatia l action: 
for any allocentric representation and an agent acting on the basis of that representation, 
there will always remain a gap between the allocentric representation and how the agent can 
physically act directly on the basis of information presented by the allocentric representation 
unless the information acquires the requisite physical significance for the agent; the only way 
to do so is by the information having egocentric content that is causally indexical (Campbell 
1993, pp. 82-88). That is, the causal significance of the information has to be given in terms 
which essentially invoke the particular subject‘s perceptual and agentive capacities. Thus it is 
plausible to think that egocentric specification is a condition on spatial action.  
John  Campbell  attempts  to  flesh  out  the  notion  of  experienced  objects  having 
psychophysical  significance  for  the  subject  by  pursuing  a  connection  here  between  the 
perceptions and the actions of a subject. He contends that egocentric content is that which 
has direct implications for physical action.
67 This, however, is too strong, since optic ataxics 
are plausibly thought to have egocentric perceptions – they are able to describe in detail the 
spatial relation of objects presented to them – but are unable to act on these objects.
68 Thus 
                                                 
66 See Campbell 1993, pp. 71-76, for arguments against defining an egocentric frame as a body-centred frame. 
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by the subject in the direction of action … It may be that no very precise definition can be given of that notion 
of ‗immediate‘ use, and that the notion of an egocentric frame must to that extent remain a rough and intuitive 
one.‖ (Campbell 1993, p.75). Campbell speaks of egocentric axes having a ‗physical significance‘ for the subject, 
that the subject must ‗apprehend‘ these axes, and that egocentric space is a ‗psychological notion‘. Rather than 
follow Campbell on this, I have used the term ‗psychophysical significance‘ instead to pick up on both these 
aspects. It is perhaps more appropriate also to the generally psychophysical character of physical actions. 
68 In the most comprehensive study of optic ataxics to date, the visual space perception of optic ataxics 
appeared to be relatively normal on clinical examination (Perenin and Vighetto 1988). All patients examined in 
this study were able to provide accurate verbal estimates of the distance or relative position of objects 
presented within each hemifield and were also able to judge whether the orientation of two rods (each of which 
was shown in one of the hemifields) was the same or different. However, the case still has to be described with 
some care. Optic ataxics will not have ‗action demonstratives‘ available to them, so they cannot judge ‗I can 
reach it like this‘ or ‗I can post this through the slot like that‘, but this does not deprive them of judging ‗This 
object is oriented in such-and-such fashion as roughly this distance from me‘. Plus, the optic ataxics can make 
judgements about the objects, whilst judging is a mental action it is not the appropriate sense of acting on an 
object in question here. So, if we think there are a plurality of egocentric axes, centred on the hand, the foot, 
etc., some of these will still have immediate implications for action. For a more detailed description of optic 
ataxia and its philosophical significance see chapter 5. 104 
 
the experiences of optic ataxics, whilst egocentric, do not (always) have direct implications 
for physical action. 
The argument here has been that bodily awareness is crucial to the control of spatial 
action, because it is what grounds the egocentric axes, which in turn are a condition on 
spatial  action.  Specifically,  we  have  examined  the  case  of  the  vestibular  sense  and  its 
connexion with orientation. To underline what is distinctive about bodily awareness, it is 
useful to contrast the contribution of bodily awareness here with that of vision. The key 
question  to  ask  is  whether  information  about  orientation  is  given  in  optical  flow.  The 
ecological tradition in psychology has emphasised that exteroceptive senses provide self-
specifying information alongside information about the external world; the optic flow carries 
information  about  the  movement  and  spatial  position  of  the  subject  (Gibson  1979). 
Consider how we may extract information about movement from how objects loom or 
retreat in the visual field. For one thing, if we are to be orthodox Gibsonians, then insofar as 
one eschews internal representations one will face problems distinguishing self-generated as 
opposed to passive movement. But closer to the case at hand, it is hard to see how we can 
extract information about orientation just from the optic flow, independent of vestibular 
calibration. As Taylor points out, the up-down axis is not ―defined by certain paradigm 
objects in the field, such as the earth or the sky [since] the earth can slope for instance‖. In 
unique circumstances, information from optic flow may help the agent to guess what way he 
is oriented, but, typically, the information available in the optic flow alone will not settle the 
question of where up and down are. 
Quassim Cassam, drawing on Husserl, has also provided an argument to the same 
conclusion  (1997,  pp.  52-55).  The  general  argument  is  what  Cassam  calls  the  ‗Intuition 
Version of the Objectivity Argument‘. The idea is that if one‘s experience is to present itself 
as  objective,  that  is,  as  experience  as  of  a  mind-independent  physical  world  containing 
objects with shape, size, location, and solidity, then a condition on this is that the subject of 
experience must experience himself qua subject as possessing shape, size, and solidity. But 
this is just for the subject of experience to experience himself as a physical object, as a bodily 
presence in the world. The specific argument as applied to location is as follows. He begins 
with  the  observation  that  the  spatial  content  of perception  is  egocentric;  objects  in  the 
perceptual field are presented as located relative to the perceiver. In Husserl‘s words: ―the 
―far‖ is far from me, from my Body‖ (Husserl 1989, p. 166, quoted on Cassam 1997, p. 52). 105 
 
Husserl‘s notion of the ‗Body‘ (der Leib), which is the ―animated flesh of an animal or human 
being‖, is meant to contrast with his notion of a mere ‗body‘ (der Körper), which is just 
―inanimate physical matter‖. In employing this contrast, Husserl means to be drawing out 
something  distinctive  about  the  subject  of  perception.  The  subject  of  perception  is  not 
merely a geometric origin of the perceptual field, but is an embodied subject of experience. In our 
case, it is a flesh and blood human being which is extended in space and which feels his own 
body  ‗from  the  inside‘.  The  thought  is  then  that  the  egocentricity  of  spatial  perception 
―involves a sense of oneself as a bodily presence in the world‖ (Cassam 1997, p. 53). This 
sense  of oneself as a bodily presence requires that one  experiences one‘s body  through 
bodily awareness. Husserl‘s idea here is that it is one‘s Body that is the ‗zero point‘, as he 
puts it, or the origin of the egocentric axes of all spatial perception: the Body ―has, for its 
particular  Ego,  the  unique  distinction  of  bearing  in  itself  the  zero  point  of  all  these 
orientations.  One  of  its  spatial  points,  even  if  not  an  actually  seen  one,  is  always 
characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here ... it is thus that all things of the 
surrounding world possess an orientation to the Body‖ (Husserl 1989, p. 166; quoted in 
Cassam 1997, p. 53). The argument thus could be interpreted as running something like this: 
Spatial perception is intrinsically egocentric – all objects given in the perceptual field are 
given to one‘s left or right (and so on); bodily awareness is key to lived corporeal experience, 
an essential aspect of the notion of Body; bodily awareness provides awareness of the Body 
that is the origin of the egocentric axes. So this suggests that bodily awareness – which partly 
underwrites one‘s sense as a bodily presence in the world – is a condition on egocentric 
spatial perception.
69 
Up to this point, we have seen that there appear to be good intuitive grounds for 
thinking that bodily awareness plays a crucial role in guiding action both directly and also in 
terms of grounding the egocentric axes, which in turn are required for spatial action. These 
thoughts have influenced much work on bodily awareness in philosophy; its most vigorous 
development to date is  to  be  found  in  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  oeuvre.  We  shall  now  consider 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s arguments for Necessity. 
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pertaining to a bodily sense of self-consciousness. But this should not worry us here, since all we are after is an 
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4.1.3.   The case for Necessity 
  
We can also argue for Necessity directly. The argument involves three interrelated strands: 
The  deep  reason  for  Necessity  is  that  conscious  experience  plays  an  essential  role  in 
explaining action; in particular, it is experience that rationalises action. The first strand of 
argument thus consists in showing how bodily awareness is crucial in rationalising bodily 
action. The question then arises as to how bodily awareness manages to do this, which is 
what the second and third strands of argument concern. The answer is that it (one) provides 
the bodily will with its ‗target-object‘ and (two) provides necessary feedback for the control 
of bodily actions as they unfold. 
 
 
4.1.3.1.   The rational role of bodily experience 
 
Earlier, when we busied ourselves with the fly in the study (in chapter 1, section 1.3.1), our 
little episode hinted at the rational links between experience and action. Our common sense 
picture of the link between experience and action is committed to the idea that experience 
plays a direct role in guiding one‘s action. Experience supplies reasons for an agent acting in 
the way he does and thus rationalises one‘s actions. I swat to my left because I see the fly 
hovering there. It escapes and disappears behind me. Now I turn around and spotting the fly 
once again, wait for it to land on the window before I strike again. If the fly had hovered by 
my right, I would have swatted to my right. If the fly had landed on the flypaper, I would 
have  stopped  swatting.  These  fine  counterfactual  links  are  another  manifestation  of  the 
rational control that experience underwrites. 
One way to tease out the rational commitments of our picture of the connexion 
between perception and action is by looking at the phenomena of blindsight and blindtouch. 
We  have  already  met  with  both  pathologies  in  chapter  two.  Blindsighted  patients  are 
‗functionally blind‘ in certain areas of their visual field due to damage to the visual cortex. 
They do not respond spontaneously either in action or judgement to stimuli presented in 
their blind field, but are able to reliably guess what is presented in their blind field (for some 
range of properties) and to reliably direct actions to objects in their blind field despite their 
absolutely denying that they have experiences of things in their blind field. Blindtouch, or 107 
 
numbsense, is the somatosensory analogue to blindsight. In blindtouch, we have subjects 
who do not feel tactile stimulation on a limb, and are unable to guess where the stimulus was 
applied, but are able to point at the stimulus location on his limb with a success rate above 
chance. This kind of dissociation is also possible for proprioception. Rossetti‘s patient was 
unable  to  verbally  report  the  position  of  his  right  index  finger  when  it  was  positioned 
passively on a horizontal plane by an experimenter, but could accurately point to this finger 
with his left hand.  
In both blindsight and blindtouch we have subjects who have the ability to localise 
targets of action and act whilst seeming to lack any sensory experience. Our bewilderment – 
also shared by the patients – point to our commitment to experience rationalising one‘s 
actions. In both pathologies,  though the  agent is able to acquire information  about the 
location of his targets and the development of his actions through his sense organs, this 
information is not presented to the agent in a way where it might be exploited to allow for 
conscious guidance  of action. Rather, perceptual information  plays in  these  pathological 
cases is ‗brutely causal‘.  
To bring home how we are committed to the thesis in the specific case that we are 
interested  in  – bodily awareness rationalising bodily action  – let us  once again consider 
Anscombe‘s view on bodily sensations. She famously denied that there is such a thing as 
kinaesthesia  or  genuine  felt  location  of  sensation.
70 She denies that  that we feel bodily 
sensations as at particular bodily locations, but claims rather the ‗bodily sensation‘ should be 
analysed as a unit consisting of a sensation and a propensity to act towards a particular body 
part – e.g., to scratch behind my left ear if it itches there. 
Anscombe‘s account fails to accommodate the idea that when I feel an itch behind 
my left ear, there are complex rational links between the nature of the bodily experiences and 
the actions we take in response to them. Her account comes down to there being some brute 
propensity to act on the sensation which can not only be automatic, but also accurate (if the 
subpersonal information processing systems underlying the propensities are reliable). But 
this  is  to  miss  the  point  that  the  appropriateness  of  the  action  resides  not  only  in  its 
effectiveness,  because  one  can  exhibit  brute  dispositionality  to  stimuli  without  such 
behavioural responses seeming at all appropriate to the stimuli. Thus, Anscombe‘s account of 
location of sensation in terms of brute propensity to act on those locations cannot discern 
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between cases of basic reflexes and conditioned responses versus far more complex cases of 
action in response to multifarious bodily experiences. It is important to stress that the heart 
of Anscombe‘s troubles lies in the failure of her account to make sense of the complex 
rational links between the bodily experiences and the actions that they lead to.  
Now  that  we  have  shown  how  deep  seated  our  commitment  to  action  being 
rationalised by experience is, and have seen the force of the claim in the specific case of 
bodily awareness, a natural worry arises about the difference between bodily awareness and 
other forms of perceptual experience. You ask: is bodily awareness not a peculiarity of sorts 
since our attention is often directed outwards even in cases of basic bodily striving? Unlike 
other forms of perceptual experience, bodily awareness is highly recessive and very seldom 
in focal attention. Does this disqualify bodily awareness from playing the rationalising role 
that other forms of perceptual experience seem to play in guiding action? After all, how is 
bodily awareness going to play something like the tracking role required when one monitors 
how one‘s action is unfolding if it is almost permanently in the background? 
When O‘Shaughnessy contends that feeling a body part ‗from the inside‘ is necessary 
for acting directly with that body part, he means that acting directly with a certain body part 
requires occurrent awareness of the body part in question. If a defence of Necessity is to be in 
line with what experience is like we have to make sense of bodily awareness as occurrent and 
typically in the background but yet available to rationally guide actions. Such recessiveness 
―seems at variance with the normal function of attention, which is somehow to bring things 
before  the  mind‖.
71 Might  we  retreat  to  something  weaker,  a  merely  ‗counterfactual‘ 
awareness of the body part? No: (one) it is unclear that there can be such things as non-
actual experiences of a body part (where these are understood as a form of experience) and 
(two) even if there were such things they could not do the work that Necessity required of 
them. Thus we are faced with the task of explaining how bodily awareness can underwrite 
rational connexions with action whilst being largely recessive. It is a nice question why bodily 
awareness relates to attention in this recessive manner, and I will leave it unanswered here. 
Instead, let us turn the question on its head: what would happen if bodily awareness were 
largely in focal attention? O‘Shaughnessy observes that if bodily awareness too were at the 
centre of one‘s attention, it would compete for attention with the external objects that one‘s 
eye  is  trained  on  –  such  as  the  incoming  ball  that  one  is  batting  –  and  instead  of  a 
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harmonious synergy, these different attentive projects would stand in each other‘s way and 
the consequent distraction would spell failure for our activities, which are largely directed 
toward  external,  environmental  objects  even  in  the  case  of  basic  bodily  striving.
72 Thus 
bodily awareness cannot but be largely recessive on pain of disrupting other attentive 
projects. But this does not prevent it from playing a rational role in guiding agency, as we 
saw in the discussion of Anscombe‘s account of bodily sensations. The itch on one‘s back, 
the  niggling  ache  in  one‘s  ankle,  the  sense  of  fatigue  in  one‘s  thigh  may  all  be  in  the 
background of one‘s global experience, but that doesn‘t prevent us from acting on them. 
Having set up the rational framework within which experience guides action and set 
aside the worry about the recessive character of bodily awareness, we can turn to the second 
and third strands of argument for Necessity. O‘Shaughnessy argues for Necessity by first 
challenging the reader to explain how bodily action is possible in the absence of bodily 
awareness: How could one reach out and grab something if one did not have proprioception 
and kinaesthetic sensations to tell one about the position of one‘s arm and the way it is 
moving? If one felt nothing in one‘s limbs, they might be moved in all sorts of ways through 
space without one knowing – and they may even be torn off without one knowing, since, 
after all, one feels nothing in them. One‘s limbs may be picked just as one‘s wallet may be 
without one‘s knowing. Without the feedback that we receive from bodily awareness, how 
might we correct for mistakes in the direction of movement? How would one know that one 
is moving one‘s arm in this way rather than that? The problem is worse still for cases of more 
complex intentional movements – how can one walk without bodily awareness? How would 
one know whether one is balanced as one thrusts out one leg, or that one has tripped and is 
sprawled on the floor. And how does one even know that one is thrusting out one‘s leg—
because one has performed the preliminary volition to do so? 
Notice that these questions raise a number of slightly different issues, each of which 
is thought to be a significant and distinct function of bodily awareness. The contention is 
that bodily awareness provides certain functions that are required for bodily action. A further 
assumption, somewhat implicit in the argument, is that bodily awareness is the only ‗faculty‘ 
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that can fulfil these functions. As we have seen, none of the familiar sense modalities are 
good candidates for being essential to action. It thus follows that without bodily awareness 
bodily action would be impossible. 
As we noted earlier, there are two strands to this part of the argument concerned 
with the specific implementations of the rational role of bodily experience. The first strand 
has to do with the requisite feedback required for control and fine-tuning of actions and the 
second strand has to do with a conceptual tie between bodily agency and awareness. 
 
 
4.1.3.2.   Bodily awareness as an ineliminable source of feedback
73 
 
The second and more straightforward strand of the argument is that bodily awareness 
provides the requisite feedback required for control and fine -tuning of actions. It is easy to 
discern this strand of the argument. Earlier we posed such questions as: How could one 
reach out and grab something if one did not have proprioception and kinaesthetic sensations 
to tell one about the position of one‘s arm and the way it is moving? Without the feedback 
that we receive from bodily awareness, how might we correct for mistakes in the direction of 
movement? How would one know that one is moving one‘s arm in this way rather than that? 
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position to him is never straightforward, even when we are concerned with his most central claims. Some may 
claim  that  the  feedback  strand  of  argument  is  entirely  absent  in  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  work.  If  doubts  arise 
concerning this attribution, a relatively clear statement of this can be extracted from O‘Shaughnessy‘s debate 
with Brewer where he insists that the short-term body image is essential for guiding action (O‘Shaughnessy 
1995, pp. 201-202; also in O‘Shaughnessy 2000). Also, in discussing how perception assists action, in a passage 
applying both to basic and non-basic bodily action and the role of bodily awareness and also exteroception,  
O‘Shaughnessy writes ―action is concerned to wreak change in the world, and in consequence one must be 
aware of its objects, firstly to know where the Will is to strike, secondly to monitor its effects‖ (1992, p. 226). It 
is natural to read the second clause as one concerning the role of perception in providing feedback. Another 
passage implicating my claim in the negative is the following (O‘Shaughnessy 2003, p. 348; my underlining): 
―[The proprioceptive mode of awareness] must be of central importance so far as physical action is concerned, 
indeed in a general sense must be essential to the very phenomenon of physical action. True, the use of  a 
mirror in shaving demonstrates that the epistemological feedback in physical action can be distributed amongst 
the senses, and it may even  be that a  particular bodily act might  occur in the absence  of proprioceptive 
awareness of the body. However, it seems that they could not in general do so.‖ See also O‘Shaughnessy 1980, 
pp. 101-103. There are numerous other passages in his work which could be interpreted as supporting my 
reading. However, this is not to deny that there are possible ways of reading O‘Shaughnessy‘s work where 
feedback may play little role in his arguments. If the reader thinks my interpretation is erroneous, then he or 
she may read my argument as applying to a hypothetical theorist who would hold the claims in question.   111 
 
It is clear the thrust behind these challenges to explain how bodily agency is possible 
is that bodily awareness provides us with crucial feedback on the state of one‘s arm such that 
one can control one‘s actions. Within this strand of the argument we can discern two ideas:  
(One) acting requires one to know the state of one‘s limbs, and bodily awareness 
puts us in a position to know the state of one‘s limbs.  
(Two) actions – unlike reflexes, e.g. – are robust in that agents in acting can achieve 
the desired goal state in a very large number of ways. (E.g., if you are reaching for the salt 
cellar and there are bottles blocking a direct approach to the salt cellar, one can reach around 
them.) Changes in one‘s environment (obstacles changing position, say) and changes in one‘s 
bodily state (fatigue in the arm, say) thus require that one gets feedback that allows for fine-
tuning so that the agent can be sensitive to conditions affecting the performance of his task.  
The need for continuous feedback comes out clearly in cases of learning complex 
intentional  movements.  Consider a violinist who is trying  to learn how  to play  a flying 
spiccato  passage  in  a  Sarasate  showpiece.  The  flying  spiccato  is  a  very  delicate  bowing 
technique where a series of notes are played with a single – either upwards or downwards – 
stroke of the bow but where the bow flies on and then just off the string, and on again for 
the next note, just off, and so on. He needs to feel the pressure of his index finger against his 
bow and the weight of his arm, correcting his motions if the pressure is either insufficient or 
overly strong.  
The upshot of these two points is that without the requisite feedback we would have 
no ability to control our actions. Call this the Feedback for Control Argument, or Feedback for 
short. 
 
 
4.1.3.3.   A conceptual tie 
 
The third strand of thought in O‘Shaughnessy‘s argument is that there is a  conceptual tie 
between bodily action and bodily awareness. It is difficult to articulate what is exactly behind 
this thought, but the idea is that the phenomenology of bodily action  necessarily involves 
bodily awareness such that we could not conceive of acting directly with a certain body part 
without feeling it ‗from the inside‘. The very way we understand bodily action requires that 
bodily action  is accompanied by bodily awareness.  We  might express this alternately by 112 
 
saying that the idea of bodily action without bodily awareness is an incoherent one or by 
saying that bodily action without bodily awareness is inconceivable.  
J. J. Valberg, who follows O‘Shaughnessy on this point, gives voice to this idea:  
 
… It is an important fact about the phenomenology of [agency] that will is not independent 
of feeling. Where feeling is completely absent here there is no sense of my body at all—the 
possibility of the movements of my body occurring within my experience as willed is absent 
as well. There can be bodily feeling without will, but not will without feeling. 
Note, we are not talking here about numbness—the sort of thing you get, say, with 
local anaesthesia. Numbness itself is (or involves) a kind of feeling. We are talking about the 
more extreme possibility of a total loss, a sheer absence, of feeling. If this happened to your 
arm, could you move it (in the normal way)? It is not that if you tried to move it you would 
fail. You could not even try to move it. Without feeling, there is, so to speak, nothing at 
which the will might aim. Feeling is what makes the body ―visible‖ to the will. And  if 
something is not visible, you cannot aim at it. (Valberg 2007, p. 272) 
 
The key move is in the last three sentences. Call this the Target-Object Argument, or Target for 
short.
74 
Notice that the conceptual tie between bodily awareness and agency being alluded to 
is  related  to  the  first  idea  we  encountered  in  analysing  the  feedback  strand  of 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s argument. We put the idea by saying that acting with one‘s limbs requires 
one to know the state of one‘s limbs, and bodily awareness puts us in a position to know the 
state of one‘s limbs. The putative conceptual tie consists at least in this basic informational 
link and beyond this claims that we cannot even make sense of directly acting with a body 
part that one does not feel ‗from the inside‘. 
The key claim is that if there was nothing it is like to feel a body part from the inside, 
without this ‗lighting up‘ with sensation of certain body parts we could not even ‗aim‘ at 
them; the idea being that if they were not phenomenally given, so to speak, then an agent‘s 
body parts would not be presented to the agent as being parts that he might act directly with 
at all. Bodily sensation is our (only?) method of ‗latching on‘ to the body part. And if we 
can‘t ‗latch onto‘ a certain body part, we cannot act with that part. We can‘t conceive of 
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acting directly with a body part that we can‘t feel ‗from the inside‘, because we would have 
no way of singling out that body part to act with and exertion involving it. Bodily awareness 
presents (certain) body parts to the agent as ‗affording‘ action. Bodily awareness is thus the 
mode through which we apprehend parts of our body which allows for the possibility of 
acting with these parts – as opposed to say vision, which might present one with the body 
part but not present it as a body part that the agent might act with. 
A further thought that might have crossed the mind of a proponent of the Target-
Object Argument is that without feeling in body parts, we will have no way of singling out a 
certain body part as opposed to some other body part ‗from the inside‘, since neither of 
them are presented to the agent in that way. And since action initiation is ‗from the inside‘ 
too, there would be no way to try to move one‘s left arm as opposed to trying to move one‘s 
right arm or even trying to move one‘s left toe… Though this thought is not explicitly 
discussed in either O‘Shaughnessy or Valberg, I submit that this may be part of the reason 
why they think that bodily agency as we know it would be inconceivable in the absence of 
awareness ‗from the inside‘ of the relevant body parts. 
Let us sum up the argument for Necessity. We began by seeing Necessity as an 
instance  of  the  general  coordination  between  perception  and  action  when  the  limits  of 
perception and action are pushed back within the agent‘s body. There, by considering the 
contrast with blindsight and blindtouch, we saw how that if perceptual information is to 
make rational sense of an agent‘s actions, this perceptual information has to be conscious. 
We were able to bring out our commitment to this rational link holding between bodily 
awareness and bodily agency by examining and rejecting Anscombe‘s revisionary account of 
bodily awareness. We then considered just how this rational link was secured. A worry about 
the recessive character of bodily awareness disqualifying it from supporting rational action 
was pushed aside. Finally, we saw reason to think that bodily awareness plays an essential 
role  in  providing  feedback  to  the  agent  for  control  of  his  actions  and  that  there  is  a 
conceptual tie between bodily agency and awareness. Thus we appear to have a powerful 
case for Necessity. 
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4.2.   Counterexamples 
 
The attractions of Necessity are obvious, but trouble looms for the thesis. It appears that 
there  are  counterexamples  against  the  thesis.  In  this  section,  I  consider  three 
counterexamples against the necessity thesis:  (one) the case of deafferented agents, who 
appear to be able to directly act with parts of their body that they have no sensation in; (two) 
the case of direct brain control of physical apparatus that has been made possible by various 
brain-machine interface technologies; and (three) the majority of our bodily actions seem to 
be accomplished without conscious attention to or awareness of the body parts involved. 
These probe the Necessity thesis in different but related ways. They unite in opposing any 
claim that the contribution of bodily awareness to bodily agency is indispensable.
75 
 
 
4.2.1.   Deafferented agents 
 
Deafferented agents who retain a capacity to act with parts of their body that they no longer 
have sensation in pose a direct threat to Necessity. I am not saying that physical action is 
possible in the  complete absence of bodily awareness – a definitive answer to that question 
would require further empirical investigation than has previously been carried out. There is 
the much discussed case of Jonathan Cole‘s patient IW, who is able to dress himself, walk, 
write, and even drive, despite being deafferented from the neck down (Cole 1991, Cole and 
Paillard 1995). Thus physical action is possible even if one‘s bodily awareness is drastically 
reduced. But more importantly, IW appears to be able to act with many body parts that he 
has no sense of touch or of movement in. This seems to be a direct counterexample to 
Necessity.
76  
I do not doubt that what it is like for IW to act is radically different from the 
phenomenology of agency of normal human beings. But this is not our question. Unless we 
                                                 
75 Note that there is a larger question looming behind the question which I am posing in this dissertation. I will 
not be able to answer this larger question but we should keep it in view: When one acts immediately with 
something, do we thereby have to feel it ‗from the inside‘? 
76 IW retains some bodily awareness in parts of his body where he has no touch, proprioception or kinesthesia, 
but his possession of these forms of awareness, such as pain, temperature, and  some sense of fatigue and 
effort, are insufficient by themselves to explain his capacities for bodily action, since they do not provide 
essential information about limb location and movement. 115 
 
can show that IW cannot be understood as capable of bodily agency at all with those parts of 
his body that he doesn‘t have sensation in, this constitutes a powerful counterexample to the 
Necessity Thesis. It is no grounds to deny that IW is capable of bodily action because he 
lacks proprioception and kinaesthesia in those parts; IW clearly is able to do various things 
with parts of his body. For IW, it is not the case that he has occurrent awareness of many 
body parts that he acts directly with. It is not even the case that he sometimes has awareness 
of those parts of the body below his neck, when, e.g., he is not acting with them. 
IW was only able to perform many mundane tasks, such as walking and even sitting, 
by painstakingly relearning them, for he now has to be able to perform them without the 
benefit of bodily awareness. He has to compensate for lack of immediate bodily awareness 
by paying close visual attention to the state of his body and needs to constantly anticipate his 
next moves so as to deal with obstacles that the environment turns up—such as a slight 
bump on the street, which if he misses would throw his balance off and cause him to fall 
down, whereas in our case we are able to quickly correct any imbalance. (We will return to 
consider the import of this in the next two chapters.) 
I emphasise that what we have here is not an isolated anomaly (even though even 
that would suffice as a counterexample), but that there is a range of other cases, with slight 
individual  differences:  Paillard‘s  patient  GL,  Oliver  Sacks‘s  ‗disembodied woman‘,  and  a 
bewildering variety of cases discussed by William James in his Principles of Psychology. We have 
focussed on IW partly because his amazing rehabilitation allows us to present a particularly 
sharp case.
77 
 
 
4.2.2.   Brain-machine interface (BMI) technology  
 
The second putative counterexample to Necessity consists of cases in which direct recording 
from the motor cortex of experimental subjects is exploited to control external physical 
systems, such as a computer cursor.
 78 Call these BMI actions. Miguel Nicolelis and colleagues 
                                                 
77 For GL, see Cole and Paillard 1995; for the cases discussed by James, see James 1890, chapter 26; for Sacks‘s 
case, see chapter 3 ‗The disembodied lady‘ in Sacks 1985; the other major laboratory study of a deafferentated 
agent is discussed in Rothwell et al. 1982. 
78 See Nicolelis 2001, Donoghue 2002, Serruya et al. 2002, Taylor et al. 2002, and Carmena et al. 2003. The basic 
idea was proposed more than three decades ago in Fetz 1969. 116 
 
have trained macaque monkeys to operate a computer cursor with visual feedback to chase a 
moving target on a screen initially by manual manipulation of a joystick and later by directly 
issuing motor commands without overt behaviour (Carmena  et al. 2003). An even more 
dramatic demonstration of the potential of BMI technology involves monkeys using cortical 
control of a robot arm to feed themselves (Velliste et al. 2008). As with the previous case, the 
monkeys were initially trained to operate the robot arm with a joystick. Afterwards, their 
own arms were restrained and they learnt to use their motor cortical activity to control the 
robot arm. The monkeys were able to learn how to feed themselves using the robot arm with 
fluent movements in a matter of days. The movements of the robot arm displayed features 
characteristic of skilled motor activity: the monkeys were able to use alternate trajectories to 
avoid  obstacles  and  also  make  rapid  corrections  to  the  trajectory  of  the  arm  when 
experimenters  unexpectedly  changed  the  location  of  the  food  item.  The  robot  arm 
effectively functioned as a surrogate arm for the monkey. 
The  basic  idea  is  that  by  recording  directly  from  an  agent‘s  cortex,  with  the 
appropriate equipment (implanted electrodes, channels for information transfer, computers), 
an  agent  may  learn  to  exert  direct  control  over  arbitrary  physical  systems  that  are 
appropriately connected to him. What subjects are doing in these cases is learning how to 
use their brainwaves to directly cause changes in some external system. It has been shown 
that  given  adequate  feedback  (often  visual),  subjects  are  able  to  latch  onto  statistical 
correlations and learn to control their brainwaves such that these can directly cause changes 
in an external system – e.g., guide movement of computer cursors.
79 Moreover, there is 
nothing mysterious about the set-up. It is not a form of telekinesis since we can provide a 
complete story of how ‗BMI actions‘ are possible in terms of electric circuitry hooked up to 
equipment sensitive to brainwaves. 
‗BMI actions‘ are naturally thought of as actions since moving the computer cursor 
with one‘s brainwaves is  prima facie something that one  does.  Moreover,  it appears to be 
something active that one does, unlike sleeping. I shall not attempt to set down conditions 
such that we can conclusively decide whether ‗BMI actions‘ qualify as actions, but insofar as 
                                                 
79 Recent empirical work suggests that this may be an instance of the general ability of subjects to increase the 
activity of a specific brain area at will with appropriate training. There is some evidence that subjects can learn 
to  voluntarily  increase  the  degree  of  activation  of  their  motor  cortex  during  an  imagined  manual  action 
(DeCharms et al. 2004). Initially, subjects were provided with feedback about the activation level of their motor 
cortex in terms of a continuously updated fMRI signal taken from their cortical motor area. After the initial 
training period, subjects were able to increase motor activation without recourse to the feedback signal. 117 
 
we have reason to think that they do, we also have reason to think that they appear to be a 
species of basic action. Subjects appear to directly effect changes on the state of the computer 
cursor rather than doing so by performing some distinct act that produces the events of 
cursor movement.
80 But these subjects do not feel the apparatus tha t they can act on ‗from 
the inside‘, since there are no bodily sensations associated with the apparatus at all. Rather, 
the only feedback these subjects have is seeing the cursor move. 
We have, as yet, no counterexample to Necessity, since the ‗BMI actions‘ discussed 
above involve control of physical systems external to the body.
81 Necessity makes a claim only 
about  bodily action  and  not  physical  action  at  large.  A  counterexample  is  not  far  away, 
however. As one of the pioneers of BMI technology, J. P. Donoghue, puts it, the barriers are 
‗merely technological‘. 
Scientific interest in BMI technology is in large part due to its medical potential. BMI 
technology  may  allow  scientists  to  construct  devices  that enable  patients suffering  from 
severe motor disabilities or paralysis to regain some measure of motor functioning. This may 
consist either in building systems that bypass the central nervous system entirely and go 
directly from the cortex to nerves in the limb in cases where the patient‘s muscles remain 
intact  or  direct  cortical  control  of  external  devices.  Whilst  the  technology  is  as  yet 
unavailable,  we  can  envisage  neuroprosthetic  devices  which  exploit  BMI  technology  for 
agents who have lost both sensation and motor function in their limbs to regain mobility. 
The agent‘s afferent nerves within and efferent nerves to his limbs have been destroyed, but 
now we engineer a direct cortical link to his original limbs (with the appropriate transducers, 
etc.). If the muscles and the efferent nerves in the agent‘s limbs are intact, then the agent can 
learn how to control and move his limbs without feeling his limbs ‗from the inside‘ – since 
he has no afferent nerves in his limbs and no substitute proprioceptive system has been 
provided  for.  This  would  give  us  another  case  of  basic  bodily  action  with  a  body  part 
without feeling it ‗from the inside‘. 
‗BMI actions‘ and deafferented agents constitute the same kind of counterexample 
against Necessity. In both, we have agents who act with parts of their body that they don‘t 
                                                 
80 This is not to deny that ‗BMI actions‘ may be non-basic actions for the subject during the learning phase; 
e.g., he may be acting on the external device by conjuring a certain image. My point is rather that practised 
behaviour exploiting BMI technology is such that one can have direct cortical control of external devices where 
one performs actions with these devices not by performing some distinct action. 
81 But these cases do bear on the larger question alluded to earlier of whether one ha s to feel ‗from the inside‘ 
those things that one acts immediately with. 118 
 
feel ‗from the inside‘. However, O‘Shaughnessy might respond that Necessity concerns the 
normal  or  non-pathological  (where  by  this  he  means  the  conceptually  central  and 
paradigmatic  cases,  as  opposed  to  whatever  is  statistical  predominant)  cases  of  physical 
agency, and we have not shown that Necessity fails there. The next counterexample attempts 
to undermine this. 
 
 
4.2.3.   Automaticity: sub-personal mechanisms of control
82 
 
Perhaps Necessity fails when we consider more outré cases like deafferented agents and BMI 
technology, but surely the requirement on bodily awareness is binding for normal agents 
engaged in  mundane  bodily acts,  such as reaching  to scratch  an itch? O‘Shaughnessy  is 
willing to concede that there may be extreme cases even in the repertoire of normal agents 
that  require  an  alternative  treatment,  but,  he  stresses,  ―the  normal  acts  of  reaching  are 
scarcely on a par with sudden high-speed duckings from what shows as a mere blur in one‘s 
visual field!‖
83 
Unfortunately, O‘Shaughnessy‘s contention is open to empirical counterexamples. 
Psychologists  have  studied  the  question  of  whether  sensory  feedback  concerning  the 
progress of an action is necessary for online control of an action for more than a century 
(since the pioneering studies of Woodworth 1899). There is now overwhelming evidence 
that even if we restrict ourselves to central cases of ordinary bodily action, such as mundane 
arm raisings and the like, it appears that (one) most instances of these are accomplished 
automatically and without constant bodily awareness, (two) even when movement involves 
bodily awareness, the online control involved in fine-tuning actions is mostly non-conscious. 
This,  unsurprisingly,  is  due  to  the  workings  of  various  sub-personal  mechanisms  which 
monitor the state of our body and underwrite our ability to act.
84  
                                                 
82 By the term ‗automatic‘ I mean to pick out those instances of actions that appear not to be performed under 
conscious feedback control but rather by dedicated subpersonal action systems (such as Milner and Goodale‘s 
vision-for-action  system).  These  differ  from  reflexes  and  conditioned  responses  (other  phenomena  often 
referred to as ‗automatic‘) in that they are teleologically robust in the sense alluded to earlier: they are sensitive 
to changes in the environment and effector and can tailor the specific means employed according to these 
changes. 
83 O‘Shaughnessy 1995, p. 201. 
84 It is often said that habitual actions are often performed without awareness or attention. Psychological 
evidence in favour of automaticity in practised behaviour does not uncontrovertibly support the idea that these 119 
 
The first claim that most instances of our ordinary bodily actions are accomplished 
automatically  and  without  constant  bodily  awareness  can  be  established  by  comparing 
execution times of actions with the time required for sensory feedback to arrive from the 
periphery. Karl Lashley (1951) observed that the frequency at which finger alternations take 
place whilst a subject is playing a fast musical passage can reach up to sixteen strokes per 
second. The speed at which finger movements take place during these passages precludes the 
possibility of any sensory feedback influencing the command system.  
This  example  also  bears  on  our  second  claim  concerning  the  role  of  sensory 
feedback for online fine-tuning of many ordinary bodily actions, which are often very quick 
and accurate: sensory feedback is delayed. Proprioceptive information is delayed because of 
the time it takes for neural signals to propagate from the limbs to the brain. Therefore, if 
motor control relied on sensory feedback for online control of fast actions, the reafferent 
information would be inevitably out of date. This has the consequence that: 
 
Relying on feedback information during fast movements will not increase accuracy, and will 
lead to instability. Keele and Posner (1968) found that vision of the target and moving hand 
only improved the accuracy of aimed movements if these lasted more than 200ms. The 
motor system thus faces a bandwidth problem in needing to use detailed information about 
ongoing movement as fast as possible. (Haggard 2001, p. 123) 
 
So far our argument against the need for occurrent bodily awareness of a body part 
in order to act directly with the body part in question has been a purely negative one: (one) 
the timescales of certain actions are so short that sensory feedback – which takes time to 
propagate from the periphery to the brain – is too slow to make any impact and (two) 
because of the inevitable delay of sensory feedback, use of feedback during fast actions is 
counterproductive as these delays may lead to instability when attempts are made to bring 
fast movements under feedback control (Miall et al. 1993, Jordan and Wolpert 2000, pp. 607-
                                                                                                                                                 
practised behaviours may be done without awareness or attention, so on-line control is not in as bad a position 
as psychology textbooks indicate. Pashler (1998) argues that the evidence does not support the automaticity 
contention at all, but at most shows that practised behaviour requires less attention  pace the classic picture 
presented by Richard Shiffrin and colleagues in various papers. Thus, the best evidence against feedback for 
on-line control is the timing required for conscious awareness from periphery being much longer than the 
timescales for some fast reaching actions. 120 
 
608). Since these fast actions form a large and important part of an agent‘s repertoire, the 
thesis of on-line control cannot hold. 
However, recent empirical work testing for dissociations between motor awareness 
and action seem to allow us to make a strong positive case that there are scenarios where the 
sensory information fed back cannot be what the agent exploits in acting, and so cannot be 
necessary for online fine-tuning of actions. None of this is to deny that sensory feedback 
may be essential when the bodily actions are appropriately complex or slow,
85 or that sensory 
feedback doesn‘t play an important role generally. As Jordan and Wolpert (2000, p. 607) 
note, ―there are inevitable disturbances acting on the physical system that are not modelled 
by  the  internal  model;  thus  the  feedback  from  the  actual  system  cannot  be  neglected 
entirely‖. I shall discuss two experiments that are relevant here: Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s 
(1998) stylus experiments which involve visuo-proprioceptive conflict and Marcel‘s (2003) 
experiments exploiting vibrotactile illusions. 
Fourneret  and  Jeannerod  (1998)  conducted  a  series  of  stylus  experiments  where 
subjects were asked to draw straight lines with a stylus on a digital tablet in the sagittal 
direction with their drawing hand hidden from sight. During some trials, the experimenters 
introduced a bias of up to 10º in the visual feedback – on a computer screen reflected in a 
mirror where the subjects saw the lines they were producing – which was inconsistent with 
the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic information subjects received. Effectively, subjects had 
to draw a tilted line in the opposite direction of the bias in order to produce a straight line 
on the screen.  
Subjects performed experimental trials in two sessions. The trials in the two sessions 
differed only in the response required of the subject at the end of the trial. At the end of the 
first session, subjects were asked to give a verbal report of their action. They were shown a 
card with lines at different angles from a single point of origin (between -10º to -2º to the 
left and 2º to 10º to the right, with six lines each side of the line running straight up from the 
origin), and asked to pick out which line most closely approximated how they moved their 
hand. At the end of the second session, the experimenter placed the subject‘s hand holding 
the  stylus  at  the  starting  point  and  subjects  were  asked  to  draw  a  line  in  the  direction 
corresponding to what they had perceived during the trial with their eyes shut.  
                                                 
85 See Desmurget and Grafton 2000 and Jeannerod 1988 for discussion. 121 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s experimental setup (top  and middle) and graphic representation of one 
perturbed trial (bottom). From Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998). 
 
The results were as follows: Firstly, subjects were consistently able to trace out lines 
that appeared sagittal. This means that they were able to correct for the bias on trials when it 
was present. Secondly, subjects gave responses for both sessions that indicated that they 122 
 
thought their hand had moved straight even on perturbed trials. During the verbal reports, 
subjects tended to report a direction approximating to the sagittal. The mean direction of the 
motor responses also showed a tendency on the part of the subjects to draw lines close to 
the sagittal direction. Since both the verbal and motor responses indicated that the subjects 
were under the impression that they moved their arms straight during perturbed trials, it is 
plausible to think that conscious bodily awareness provided erroneous information about the 
actual task parameters in these cases. Given that the subjects were systematically successful, 
we may infer that they could not have been exploiting the false information to accomplish 
the task, but rather that some automatic sub-personal mechanisms were at work.
86 
This suggests that: (one) occurrent conscious awareness can‘t be playing the role that 
the thesis of on-line control requires, because the subject can accomplish the experimental 
task without veridical awareness of information from conscious bodily experience, and (two) 
since the subject was systematically successful, online control and fine-tuning must have 
been at least partly due to non-conscious processes. 
Marcel  (2003,  pp.  62-67)  exploited  vibro-tactile  illusions  of  limb  position  and 
movement in experiments testing for dissociations between motor awareness and action. We 
find more acute dissociations here than in Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s stylus experiments; the 
results include cases where the subjects appear to form motor intentions that are sharply at 
odds with what they end up doing to achieve the goal. Vibration of a muscle tendon at the 
joint of a limb at around 100 Hz causes a reflex movement of the limb; this is known as the 
tonic vibration reflex (Hagbarth and Eklund 1966). Vibrating the biceps tendon at the elbow 
causes flexion, whilst vibrating the triceps tendon at the elbow causes extension. If the tonic 
vibration reflex is inhibited, subjects experience an illusion of movement of their limb in the 
direction opposite to that of the tonic vibration reflex for the muscle tendon in question – 
an illusion of extension for the biceps and flexion for the triceps – and an illusion that the 
joint and dependent segments of the limb (in this case, the forearm and the hand) are where 
they would be were the muscle actually stretched (Hagbarth and Eklund 1966 and Goodwin 
et al. 1972). This illusion of position is particularly pronounced when experimental subjects 
cannot see the limb subject to vibration. Experiments can probe the subject as to where the 
                                                 
86 Fourneret and Jeannerod note that there are two conflicts generated during the perturbed trials: (one) a 
visual-kinesthetic conflict, since the visual and kinesthetic signals indicated different directions of movement, 
and (two) a conflict between the motor command sent to the arm to trace a line straight ahead and kinesthetic 
signals generated by that action. 123 
 
illusory  experienced  location  of  the  arm  is  by  either  having  the  subjects  indicating  the 
position on a visual map or by showing where the arm feels to be with the arm which is not 
subject to vibration. Yet, if, at the initial maximal point of the illusion, the subject is asked to 
grasp the wrist with the free hand, they are able to do so, and also typically do not notice the 
discrepancy in location (Lackner and Taulieb 1983).  
Marcel‘s experimental setup can be seen in figure 2 below. The subject is positioned 
at an apparatus divided into two sides, one of which is a raised surface that the subject‘s 
dominant arm is placed under, and the other is a surface on which the subject‘s other arm is 
allowed  to  draw  the  intended  or  performed  movement.  The  subject‘s  forearm  of  his 
dominant arm is fixed to a restraint that is hinged at the elbow and can be either held 
stationary or can swivel to trace an arc in the horizontal plane if released. The raised surface 
occludes the arm and has a series of target lights that shadow the possible trajectory of the 
arm below. The dominant arm is passively positioned in a way that the subject has no good 
awareness of the position of his arm and vibrators are attached to the biceps and triceps 
tendons. The angle of the elbow and whether the triceps or biceps is vibrated is varied across 
trials; on control trials, the vibrators are operated in such a way that no illusory movement is 
generated. 
The experimental tasks are as follows. After vibro-tactile stimulation, one of the 
target lights goes on and the subject has to either (1) draw the movement he has to make 
with his free hand and, after a further signal, move his bound hand under the light, or (2) 
move his bound hand under the light and then immediately draw the movement just made 
with his free hand, or (3) draw the intended movement with the free hand, move the bound 
hand under the light, and finally draw the performed movement with the free hand. To have 
a sense of the difficulty of the task, note that under normal conditions, it is easy to move 
one‘s hand to a location that is singled out visually even when one cannot see one‘s hand. 
The trials of greatest interest are those when the target lights are in the central area of the 
arc: the subject‘s hand is to one side of the target light but is experienced as positioned on 
the  opposite  side  (see  third  illustration  in  figure  2).  On  these  trials,  the  discrepancy 
introduced by the illusion affects the direction and not just the extent of movement. 
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Fig. 2. Marcel‘s experimental setup. From Marcel (2003). 
 
 
Marcel found that subjects were always able to move under the target light despite 
being overwhelming subject to initial illusions of position, the latter being indicated by the 
pre-movement drawing. If the pre-movement drawing reflects conscious intention, as Marcel 
presupposes, then the specification of conscious intention draws on the felt location of the 
limb. Despite the intuitive thought that the experienced location enters the specification of 
the  motor  intention,  the  subject‘s  action  tracks  the  actual  rather  than  the  felt,  illusory 125 
 
location of the arm – and subjects are often unaware of the incongruence even after they 
perform the movement, as only 30 to 40 per cent of the subjects drew the movement they 
performed correctly afterwards. The incongruence is especially stark in the trials when the 
target lights are in the central area of the arc, and the subject ends up moving in a direction 
opposite  to  what  the  experienced  location  of  his  arm  relative  to  the  target  light  would 
require. It is arguable that in some cases the locus of the subject‘s attention may be simply to 
successfully move toward the light without any attention to specific means. But in the cases 
where the subject makes a pre-movement drawing, the direction of intended movement 
should be apparent to the subject – since it is plausible to think that this is a parameter that 
he needs to be aware of to execute the drawing – and he will be aware of some specific 
means to achieve the goal (‗move left in this way towards the light‘) beyond that of simply 
moving toward the light. Marcel‘s experiment thus provides us with a powerful case of how 
sensory information fed back through conscious bodily experience cannot be what the agent 
exploits in acting, and so cannot be necessary for online fine-tuning of actions. It is perhaps 
more  extreme  than  the  previous  experiment  since  the  subject  seems  to  form  a  motor 
intention that is at odds – at a gross level, moving left as opposed to moving right, rather 
than moving straight as opposed to 5º to the left, which may be less easy to detect – with 
what he ends up doing to achieve the goal. 
The  upshot  of  these  points  is  that  our  claim  that  continuous  conscious  bodily 
awareness is required for epistemological feedback such that action is possible is not true for 
even central cases of ordinary basic bodily action since in many cases online correction takes 
place only at non-conscious sub-personal levels.
87 There is more to be said on these cases; 
we will return (in section 5.3 in the following chapter) to analyse them in greater detail.  
 
 
4.4.   The conflict between lived experience and cognitive psychology 
 
At this juncture we appear to be faced with a conflict. Reflection on lived experience gives us 
compelling reasons to think that bodily awareness is necessary   for bodily action, yet 
                                                 
87 Here is an extra wrinkle about motor awareness and motor performance that we should keep in mind when 
we  consider  experiments  of  this  kind.  It  appears  that  even  when  our  actions  are  successful  we  have  no 
articulate knowledge of how we succeed. See the work of McLeod and colleagues, e.g. Reed, McLeod and 
Dienes ―Implicit learning and motor skills: what people who know how to catch a ball do not know‖. 126 
 
cognitive psychology teaches us that this cannot be the case. But neither the rejection of the 
lessons of lived experience nor that of cognitive psychology presents a satisfactory option. 
If  we  go  with  the  counterexamples  from  cognitive  psychology  and  forsake  the 
intimate connexion between bodily awareness and agency that reflection on our experience 
of agency suggests, we are threatened with the loss of any understanding of how bodily 
action is possible. What now rationalises bodily actions? And, most importantly, what now 
presents one‘s moveable body parts as parts that afford action? Without occurrent bodily 
experience, we lack any conception of how the bodily will can target parts of one‘s body and 
how the agent can guide his actions. No matter how impressive subpersonal action systems 
are, we appear to be forced into the predicament of blindtouch patients with the rejection of 
this dependence relation. Yet the testimony of experience is that normal agents are not cast 
in  this  unfortunate  predicament.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  not  simply  reject  these 
counterexamples from cognitive psychology as isolated instances that our theory can ignore. 
As we saw, there is a convincing body of evidence from both pathological and normal cases 
that shows Necessity to be false. We are thus in the unenviable position of having to pick 
between biting the bullet and rejecting the scientific evidence and being left with a brutely 
causal understanding of the link between perception and action. In the next chapter we shall 
explore how we should respond to this conflict. 
 
 
4.5.   Summary and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we examined the most straightforward way to develop the picture that we 
have direct control of our bodies because we can feel them ‗from the inside‘. Necessity 
claims that feeling a body part ‗from the inside‘ is necessary for any instance of directly 
acting with that body  part.  We  began by considering the  motivations behind  Necessity, 
which stem from an intuitive picture of sensorimotor control. We then examined how bodily 
awareness might be thought to ground the egocentric axes – which provided us with an 
instance of how bodily awareness might figure in the control of ordinary bodily action. In 
arguing for Necessity, we teased apart two different strands in O‘Shaughnessy‘s arguments. 
The first strand is based on the idea that bodily awareness provides an ineliminable source of 
feedback for the control of actions. The second strand is that there  is a conceptual  tie 127 
 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency. Despite the intuitive attractions of Necessity, a 
number of counterexamples present problems for it. I considered three counterexamples 
against Necessity: (one) the case of deafferented agents, who appear to be able to directly act 
with parts of their body that they have no sensation in; (two) the case of direct brain control 
of  physical  apparatus  that  has  been  made  possible  by  various  brain-machine  interface 
technologies; and (three) the majority of our bodily actions seem to be accomplished without 
conscious attention to or awareness of the body parts involved. Each case presents different 
difficulties for Necessity, but they unite in opposing any claim that the contribution of bodily 
awareness to bodily agency is indispensable. We are thus left with a seeming antinomy at this 
point in the dialectic. There are compelling reasons for believing in Necessity, but we are 
also faced with powerful counterexamples against it. Whilst the intimacy between bodily 
awareness and agency is not in doubt, the counterexamples suggest that their relation cannot 
quite be understood in the way that Necessity claims. In the next two chapters, we shall 
explore  yet  another way  to  develop  the  idea  that  we  have  direct control  of  our  bodies 
because we can feel them ‗from the inside‘, but one where bodily awareness does not always 
have to play a role in online control. 
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We ended the previous chapter on a note of conflict between lived experience and cognitive 
psychology about the role of bodily awareness in bodily action. We appear to be caught 
between  a  brutely  causal  understanding  of  the  link  between  perception  and  action  and 
having  to  reject  the  counterexamples  from  cognitive  psychology.  Neither  option  is 
acceptable. It is the task of this chapter to resolve to this conflict. 
How should we respond to this conflict? In order to better appreciate the force of 
the conflict we are faced with, we will begin by working through a specific case, returning to 
consider the case of bodily awareness in grounding the egocentric axes. Once we have a 
sense of the depth of the difficulty we are faced with, we turn to analysing the terms of the 
conflict in order to concoct a strategy to respond to it. The basic strategy will be to accept 
that  while  the  counterexamples  show  that  occurrent  awareness  ‗from  the  inside‘  of  a 
particular body part cannot be necessary for on-line control of actions employing the body 
part in question, they do not impugn the presence of some intimate connexion between 
bodily awareness and agency. Thus we will have to reject Necessity as stated, but at the same 129 
 
time try to retain the insights behind it whilst allowing room for the cases from cognitive 
psychology. This will require us to articulate a role for bodily awareness in the control of 
action which is at a remove from a direct role in on-line control. The rest of the chapter 
implements the strategy. First, we will analyse what is mistaken in the arguments that we 
earlier gave for Necessity. The purpose of this analysis is to discern what was right about the 
earlier arguments so that we  have some  sense  of what a correct picture of the relation 
between bodily awareness and agency should look like. To attain a deeper understanding of 
the issues involved, we don‘t only need to know what was wrong with the arguments for 
Necessity but also why we were tempted to think in those ways. The second subsection 
attempts to diagnose just why Necessity attracted us in the first place. I suggest that the error 
is due to a mistake concerning the role of bodily demonstratives in action explanation. The 
discussion in this section will consider in some depth how the bodily sense field differs 
radically in terms of its structure from the visual field, which is the sense modality that most 
other sense modalities are understood in terms of. It turns out that the unique structure of 
the bodily sense field places constraints on how the agent can strive with his body. This, of 
course, has important ramifications for understanding the intimate connexion. In the final 
section, I will propose what I take the intimate connexion to consist in. 
 
 
5.1.   Reconsidering bodily awareness in grounding egocentric axes 
 
In understanding what force the conflict has on our understanding of our problem, it will be 
useful to work through a specific case. Once again we return to the relation between bodily 
awareness and the egocentric axes. 
In the previous chapter (section 4.1.2), we argued that bodily awareness appears to 
be vital to the control of spatial action, because it is what grounds the egocentric axes, which 
in turn are a condition on spatial action. Given the gauntlet thrown down by the dilemma 
concerning  awareness  in  action,  we  are  obliged  to  re-examine  our  previous  argument 
concerning bodily awareness as a condition on egocentricity.
88 
                                                 
88 Though I have used this point as a possible motivation for why bodily awareness appears to be vital to the 
control of spatial action, I want to note that this point does not derive from O‘Shaughnessy. The claim that 
bodily awareness might be used to ground the egocentric axes is considered and rejected in Campbell (1993) 130 
 
Our  argument  there  was  that  the  egocentric  axes  have  to  have  a  practical, 
psychophysical significance for the subject in terms of the control of his action. Merely 
having the relevant information in allocentric terms, even when the axis is a body-centred 
leaves an epistemic gap. The suggestion then – which is surely the obvious one – was that 
subjects draw on bodily awareness and the ‗body image‘ they possess, within which such 
awareness is couched, to do this. But we need to look more carefully at this proposal. The 
question of what kind of body image the proposal requires becomes expedient and, indeed, 
pressing. 
Theorists of the body image, where the relevant kind of body image is that which is 
exploited in direct action control,
89 have typically distinguished between (at least) two senses 
of body image: a long -term body image and a short -term or here-and-now body image 
(O‘Shaughnessy 1980, pp. 241-248, Lackner 1988).
90  
The  long-term  body  image  is,  roughly,  a  settled  picture  of  one‘s  own  physical 
dimensions,  which may change (slowly) depending  on development of the  body  (grafts, 
amputations, growth). This describes the structure of one‘s body – how it is shaped, sized and 
hinged – and thus what possibilities of movement are open to one. This tells us what basic 
actions the body can afford.
91 Whilst, this is all well and good, the long -term body image 
only tells us what range of actions are possible for one given the structure of one‘s body. It 
tells us nothing about the current state of one‘s body, including its current position and 
spatial dispositions. One‘s long-term body image remains the same whether one is upside 
down or downside up, whether one is in loving embrace or skiing down a slope. But, if so, 
then the long-term body image cannot by itself set up a system of egocentric axes for current 
action. 
What we need, then, is a body image which gives us a sense of what range of actions 
are currently possible for one. And this requires an image that describes one‘s current posture 
and dispositions of body parts. This is what O‘Shaughnessy calls the short-term body image. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
and in Bermúdez (1995) such an argument is explored as a possible interpretation of one of O‘Shaughnessy‘s 
claims (1980, vol. 1, pp. 140-142). 
89 As opposed to the sense of body image that psychologists of personality and social disorders speak of when 
they speak of patients having a ‗distorted body image‘ in discussing phenomena such as bulimia and other 
eating disorders. This is not to say that these various notions of body image are not at all related. After all, the 
distorted  body  image  of  bulimics  controls  their  eating  behaviour.  For  discussion  of  this  distinction  see 
O‘Shaughnessy 1992. 
90 Valberg (2007) draws a similar distinction, using the terms ‗standing‘ as opposed to ‗occurrent‘ body image. 
91 By affordance, I mean ―the set of possible actions allowed by the form of an object and given a set of 
effector capabilities‖ (Glossary, Wing, Haggard, and Flanagan 1996, p. 501).  131 
 
―given by the description or drawing or model one would assemble in order to say how the 
body seems to one at a certain instant. For example: torso straight, right cylindrical arm 
stretched out from body, crooked at right angles, etc.‖ (O‘Shaughnessy 1980, p. 241). The 
thought is that once the agent has the short-term body image this allows him to set up a 
system of egocentric axes that spatial perception and action calls for.
92 The plausibility of this 
suggestion derives from the (apparently) direct connection between the s hort-term body 
image and bodily action, which the egocentric axes then inherit. 
But the promise of this proposal is illusory. The short -term body image cannot be 
what grounds the egocentric axes. First of all, as we saw in discussing the counterexamples 
against Necessity, the short -term bodily image isn‘t necessary in various cases of action. 
Certain deafferented agents are able to act directly with parts of their body that they do not 
feel ‗from the inside‘ so there will be no short-term body image of these parts. Similarly, in 
the case of fast actions, there is insufficient time for the agent to first target and then, once 
he is aware of his limb, use conscious guidance to control his action.  
Second,  we  may  wonder  how  the  short-term  body  image  has  this  practical, 
immediate connection with action. The body image is not the image of an extensionless 
point source from which actions emanate; it is the image of a living, animal body with 
articulated parts and spatial relations among these parts. But how are the spatial relations 
among these parts given: egocentrically or non-egocentrically? If the spatial relations are 
given non-egocentrically then the short-term body image itself cannot ground the egocentric 
axes. It is plain, however, that the short-term body image is already specified egocentrically – 
think of how one apprehends the position of one‘s feet vis-à-vis one‘s arms as one stretches 
to touch one‘s toes. Thus, the short-term body image cannot be what grounds egocentricity.
93 
At this point, it might be  thought that our discussion of Husserl‘s distinction (in 
section 4.1.2.) between der Leib – the Living or Animated Body, as we might say – and der 
Körper – a mere body would perhaps alleviate some of the issues raised by the previous 
problem. After all, Husserl meant to provide an antidote to the idea of the self of perception 
and action as an abstract entity or an extensionless ‗source‘ or ‗limit‘. Husserl intended to 
                                                 
92 Let me stress that this suggestion is not due to O‘Shaughnessy and I do not mean to ascribe it to him. The 
suggestion that the short term body image can be used to set up the egocentric axes is canvassed and rejected 
in Campbell 1993. However, O‘Shaughnessy does suggest that bodily awareness is crucial to orientation in 
perception, and provides a short regress argument for this thesis (see O‘Shaughnessy 1980, vol. 1, pp. 140-141). 
93 This argument comes from Campbell 1993, p. 73. 132 
 
draw attention to lived corporeal experience in drawing his distinction. We can discern two 
aspects that he was trying to highlight: (one) animation, the active aspect of life, in terms of 
the movement of the body and (two) how one has a distinctive experience of one‘s body 
‗from the  inside‘.  As we noted  earlier, in  employing this contrast, Husserl  means to be 
drawing out something distinctive about the subject of perception. The subject of perception 
is not merely a geometric origin of the perceptual  field,  but is an embodied  subject  of 
experience, a flesh and blood human being which is extended in space and which feels his 
own body ‗from the inside‘. The argument was that the egocentricity of spatial perception 
―involves a sense of oneself as a bodily presence in the world‖ (Cassam 1997, p. 53); and that 
this sense of oneself as a bodily presence, in turn, requires that one experiences one‘s body 
through bodily awareness, which provides the ‗zero point‘ of egocentric spatial relations 
manifest  in  spatial  perception.  So  this  suggests  that  bodily  awareness  –  which  partly 
underwrites one‘s sense as a bodily presence in the world – is a condition on egocentric 
spatial perception. Given the emphasis on the very concreteness, the corporeality of the 
subject of experience, this line of argument might be thought to escape some of the earlier 
problems. But it does not. Obviously this argument is of great interest, and deserves a far 
more extended developed and treatment. Here I will simply note a problem at its heart. If we 
are talking about the Body, we are talking about a living, animal Body with articulated parts 
and spatial relations among these parts and not an extensionless point, with spatial relations 
amongst these parts already given egocentrically. But what does it mean to speak of ―the zero 
point‖, as Husserl puts it, of egocentric spatial relations? Which part of one‘s Body would be 
the ‗zero point‘? It can‘t be that every part of the Body can be the zero point – after all, the 
Body is extended in space. There does not always appear to be a privileged point of origin 
when we  consider the perceived spatial relations between  different  body parts.  There is 
perhaps some sense in which everything is related to my Body and given as such in spatial 
perception. The question is whether we can understand this in such a way that it makes 
sense to speak of the Body as the zero point of the perceptual field in every case. But if we 
speak of the origin of the egocentric axes which have immediate implications for an agent‘s 
actions this creates problems. First of all, it is not clear just where is the origin, if there is a 
single origin: at the head? at the eyes? the hands? in the middle of one‘s chest (as Peacocke 
1992 suggests)? at the feet? but which foot? or …? Second, it is not clear that there is a single 
origin of the egocentric axes at all and thus unclear that we can correctly speak of ―the zero 133 
 
point‖ of a subject‘s perceptual field. Work in the field of motor control appears to be 
committed to a variety of egocentric axes centred on different parts of the body, depending 
on the kind of action an agent is performing: egocentric axes may be centred on the eyes or 
on a particular hand, just to take two examples.
94 But if that is so, then it makes little sense to 
speak of ―the zero point‖ of all spatial relations manifest in perception.
95 
Finally, there is empirical evidence that in certain very basic situations actions can be 
entirely specified by their distal targets in the absence of any central body image (Kelso 
1977). Thus grasp and exploitation of one‘s short-term body  image is additional  to any 
requirements for egocentric axes, and cannot be a condition on any spatial action. 
Where does this leave us with the egocentric axes? Can we beat a retreat to the long-
term body image? As we saw, whilst the long-term body image is of major significance to 
spatial action – after all it tells the agent what actions his body affords on the basis of its 
structure – it cannot, by itself, set up a system of egocentric axes, since it does not tell one 
straight off what the implications for action are. Yet, the agents in our counterexamples are 
demonstrably capable of spatial action. So what is going on in these cases? 
Certainly not magic. There is a theoretical notion which can pick up the slack for us 
here.  Whilst  there  still  remains  much  terminological  confusion  in  the  scientific  and 
philosophical literature on bodily awareness, some theorists have distinguished between the 
notions of body image – a personal-level phenomenon – and body schema – a sub-personal 
mechanism  of  sorts.
96 There is no accepted definition of what a b ody schema in the 
literature, though theorists agree that it is what mediates transformations between perception 
and action. Here is a rough gloss that is sufficient for our purposes. Body schemata are a 
system of motor capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance 
of posture operating at the sub -personal level.
97 Examples of such schemata include those 
representations that theorists of hand -eye coordination posit that underlie such behaviour 
(Kalaska et al. 1998) or those that are posited in postural control (Gurfinkel and Levick 
                                                 
94  For  references  to  the  empirical  work  see  Wing,  Haggard,  and  Flanagan  1996  concerning  hand-eye 
coordination and Bermudez 2006 for references to further empirical work concerning egocentric axes for other 
effectors. 
95 Given our earlier discussion of the vestibular sense (section 4.1.2.), it should also be clear that the Body 
cannot be the origin of the egocentric axes associated with the orientation of the body in the gravitational field, 
since this is relational.  Up-down directionality is not just a function of the head -trunk asymmetry, but rather 
tracks the orientation of the gravitational field and the agent‘s relation to it.  
96 See, e.g., the articles by Gallagher and Martin in Bermudez et al. (eds.) 1995. 
97 See Haggard and Wolpert (2005) for the most comprehensive attempt at characterising bodily schemata to 
date. 134 
 
1991). I want to suggest that bodily schemata are what ultimately provide for a system of 
egocentric axes that allow for spatial action. This is consonant with the observation we made 
at the beginning of the paper that many of the internal information channels are in fact 
largely  unconscious.  There  may  be  plausible  architectural  or  computational  grounds  for 
holding such a position.
98  
Detailed exploration of egocentricity shows us that the situation is eve n starker than 
we had envisaged. Even in the case of egocentric axes and orientation, which earlier had 
struck us as a basic case for control, occurrent bodily awareness is not always necessary. 
Where does this leave us? Is conscious awareness just smoke on the fire of neural processes? 
 
 
5.2.   The force of the conflict 
 
Now that we have a better feel for the conflict, it is high time to draw out its force and 
confront it head on. 
We may cast the conflict in the shape of a dilemma: (first horn) reflection  on action 
as we know it, and on what goes wrong in numbsense suggest that experience of the objects 
of action seems to be required for intentional agency; yet (second horn) cognitive psychology 
presents us with cases where experience of the objects of acti on doesn‘t seem to be crucial 
to the guidance of actions as they unfold. 
We have had a taste of what it would be to move forward by rejecting one of the two 
horns. When re-examining the relation of bodily awareness to the egocentric axes, we came 
to see that neither the long-term nor the short-term body image could ground a system of 
egocentric  axes,  and  arrived  at  the  view  that  sub-personal  bodily  schemata  are  what 
ultimately provide for a system of egocentric axes that allow for spatial action, and that any 
conscious bodily awareness is juxtaposed on the system of egocentric axes that these sub-
personal mechanisms provide for. But the thought that bodily schemata by themselves are 
enough to run the show leaves us with a sense of intellectual vertigo; we lose our bearings 
with respect to the idea of action as a rational response. We agents seem to be left behind, 
groping for that mirage of conscious control, whilst the neurophysiological edifice with its 
                                                 
98 I am envisaging a style of argument here for bodily schemata as a condition on spatial action akin to that 
which Eilan (1998) deployed for memory and its subpersonal requirements. Bernstein (1967) can be read as 
having put forward plausibility arguments for such a position.  135 
 
intricate sub-personal routines speeds ahead. On the other hand, we cannot simply reject the 
cases from cognitive psychology as irrelevant. 
At this juncture we appear to be faced with a powerful conflict. Reflection on lived 
experience gives us apparently compelling reasons to think that bodily awareness is necessary 
for bodily action, yet cognitive  psychology  teaches us that this cannot be  the  case. But 
neither the rejection of the lessons of lived experience nor that of cognitive psychology 
presents a satisfactory option. 
If  we  go  with  the  counterexamples  from  cognitive  psychology  and  forsake  the 
intimate connexion between bodily awareness and agency that reflection on our experience 
of agency suggests, we seem to be threatened with the loss of any understanding of how 
bodily action is possible. What now rationalises bodily actions? And, most importantly, what 
now presents one‘s moveable body parts as parts that afford action? Without occurrent 
bodily experience, we lack any conception of how the bodily will can target parts of one‘s 
body and how the agent can guide his actions. No matter how impressive sub-personal 
action systems are, we appear to be forced into the predicament of blindtouch patients with 
the rejection of this dependence relation. It leaves us without a perspective on our own 
bodily activity. Yet the testimony of experience is that normal agents are not cast in this 
unfortunate  predicament.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  not  simply  reject  these 
counterexamples from cognitive psychology as isolated instances that our theory can ignore. 
As we saw, there is a convincing body of evidence from both pathological and normal cases 
that shows the thesis of conscious on-line control to be false. We are thus in the unenviable 
position of having to pick between biting the bullet and rejecting the scientific evidence or 
being left with a brutely causal understanding of the link between perception and action. 
There are a number of objections one might make to the dilemma. The first is that 
the puzzle it poses is simply a non-starter. The objector reasons that the body is necessary 
for action – and thus embodiment is necessary – but bodily awareness is not, as the second 
horn  of  the  dilemma  clearly  shows  and  as  the  existence  and  utility  of  bodily  schemata 
underline. So the dilemma simply takes a circuitous route to make the familiar point (against 
Cartesian dualism) that embodiment is a condition on action. This objection misses how 
bodily awareness seems to be a significant aspect of the phenomenology of ordinary agency. 
But it does raise the question – which is one of the issues at the heart of the dilemma – as to 
why  leaving  agents  without  a  perspective  on  their  own  bodily  activity  is  so  profoundly 136 
 
disturbing. If we have ambitions of understanding ordinary bodily action, as we know it, 
then we must be sensitive to epistemic and phenomenological questions. 
The second concerns the formulation of the dilemma. The objector asks: don‘t the 
counterexamples in the second horn impugn a target-based approach? And if so, why say 
that the problem is that, absent any role for awareness, we are placed in the position of 
blindtouchers with respect to out own action? The sense in which the counterexamples 
vitiate against a target-based approach (such as O‘Shaughnessy‘s) is that (one) we don‘t need 
to first target a body part so that one knows the state and spatial dispositions of a body part 
required for motor control, (two) related to the first point, we don‘t need to first target a 
body part (just to make it ‗visible‘ to the will and independent of the information being 
accurate) so that the bodily will can engage with it, and (three) support for the importance of 
targeting can‘t come from it‘s role in feedback. But we need to distinguish between different 
kinds of target-based approaches to bodily awareness. One kind (O‘Shaughnessy‘s) claims 
that targeting is required for any action with a body part for its initiation and control. But we 
can have weaker target-based approaches, on which the agent needs to have some awareness 
of his body so that he can have a perspective on his activity, without this condition applying 
to each and every bodily action the agent performs. Thus, the falsity of the former kind of 
target-based approach does not entail that the latter variety is false. This objection touches 
on a significant issue concerning the structure of bodily awareness that we will have to return 
to. (I am thinking here of how attention in the bodily field differs from that in the visual 
field, in part because in the bodily field we only ever encounter one object and its parts.) 
The third objection questions the need for bodily actions to be rationalised. We were 
exercised by the absence of appropriate reasons to rationalise bodily action if we gave up the 
need  for  awareness.  But  this  invites  the  comment,  according  to  the  objector,  that  our 
dilemma is about conditions on action, not conditions on the rationalisation of action; it is not 
the possibility of the rationalisation of action that is in question – it is supposed to be the 
possibility of action itself.  
This goes to the heart of the general issue about awareness and agency. Let me make 
two remarks about this. Firstly, we ought to be sceptical of a notion of action that is entirely 
divorced from any intentional or rational aspect. Actions – unlike reflexes, e.g. – are robust in 
that they involve a kind of means-ends flexibility. Agents in acting can achieve the desired 
goal state in a very large number of ways. (E.g., there are ways and ways how one can flick a 137 
 
light switch, and if obstacles come in between one and the switch in the meantime, one can 
reach around them.) This kind of means-ends flexibility requires that actions are activities 
that are sensitive (in some way) to means-ends rationality. This is not to say that all actions 
are  intentional;  it  is  clear  that  there  are  sub-intentional  actions,  actions  that  are  not 
intentional under any description.
99 Yet even these exhibit means-ends flexibility – obstacles 
are fluidly dealt with – despite not being products of means-ends reasoning. If we do not 
want to completely divorce action from its intentional or rational aspect, then conditions on 
intentional  action  will  have  some connection  with  conditions  on  action.  After  all,  bodily 
action is not just a causal mechanism for the production of effects in the ‗outward‘ direction; 
it is not like sweating or one‘s knee jerking in response to a tap.  
Secondly,  the  statement  of  the  dilemma  about  awareness  in  action  is  explicitly 
couched in terms of intentional agency. The first horn says that experience of the objects of 
action seems to be required for intentional agency, whilst the second horn says that experience 
of the objects of action doesn‘t seem to be crucial to the guidance of actions as they unfold. 
This provides us with the vital clue about how to approach the dilemma. If experience of the 
objects of action is only a condition on intentional action, but not action as such, then we can 
see  how  awareness  is  crucial,  but  still  allow  for  cases  of  actions  which  do  not  involve 
awareness.  Given  how  we  understand  intentional  action,  this  is  not  a  surprising  thesis: 
intentional actions involve, in some sense, knowingly taking some means toward an end. 
Thus, intentional actions have a pull on self-reflection that non-intentional actions can only 
have at a remove, since the former are done knowingly.
100 
Whilst we agree with O‘Shaughnessy that ―a necessary condition of willing bodily 
events is that an epistemological contact should be set up between the putative agent and his 
body‖  (1980,  vol.  1,  p.  137),  we  disagree  on  the  nature  of  the  epistemological  contact. 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s contention is that ―the body must be ‗there‘ for [the agent], more or less 
come what may and as it were through the thick and thin of the mind‘s vicissitudes, and in an 
                                                 
99 O‘Shaughnessy 1980, vol. 2, chapter 10. Thus the orthodox view that actions are those events which are 
intentional under some description is incorrect. 
100 A worry about this strategy, expressed to me by Christopher Peacocke, is that in focusing on conditions for 
intentional action we end up focusing on its intentionality rather than its active aspect, and that perhaps we should 
be more ambitious and attempt to work out the connection between awareness and agency more generally 
rather than retreating to intentional action at this early stage. (This is a variant on the third objection in the 
text.) There are very large questions lurking here which I cannot hope to resolve in this dissertation, such as the 
relation between intentional actions and actions more generally, an account of which will impact whether the 
more ambitious account Peacocke suggests we should pursue is available. 138 
 
immediate mode, if he is to be in a position to act‖ (1980, vol. 1, p. 137; my italics). And as we 
have seen from the various counterexamples we have considered, this is false. The intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency cannot consist in conscious bodily 
awareness being required for on-line control. 
What then can the role of bodily awareness? It might appear that despite the intuitive 
plausibility of the claim that bodily awareness plays a crucial role in our physical agency, 
given  the  range  of  counterexamples  that  can  be  mustered  against  a  dependency  claim 
between feeling and ability to act, we should submit that bodily awareness can at best play a 
peripheral role in physical agency. This, however, is too pessimistic a reading of the situation. 
Does reflection on lived experience really teach us that occurrent awareness ‗from the inside‘ 
of  a  particular  body  part  is  necessary  for  striving  with  that  body  part?  Whilst  the 
counterexamples canvassed above from cognitive psychology show that occurrent awareness 
‗from the inside‘ of a particular body part cannot be necessary for striving with the body part 
in  question,  they  do  not  deny  the  presence  of  some intimate  connexion  between  bodily 
awareness and agency. Thus we need to reject the thesis of on-line control as stated, but at 
the same time need to tease out the deep insight behind it while allowing room for the cases 
from cognitive psychology. In rough outline,  this will  involve relaxing  the  link between 
bodily  awareness  and  agency  from  the  very  direct  connexion  that  the  thesis  of  on-line 
control claims. If we properly restrict the scope of our claim, we can perhaps discern the role 
that bodily awareness plays, which may be at a remove from a direct role in online control. 
This, I suggest, will allow us to hold on to the crucial insight that we began our dissertation 
with:  that  our  conception  of  ourselves  as  agents  is  as  embodied agents.  The  rest  of  this 
dissertation is an attempt to work out this strategy in some detail. 
Before  turning  to  my  own  attempt  at  a  positive  view  of  the  relation  between 
awareness and agency, allow me to make some remarks about the character of the project. 
My project here is not so much an attempt to vindicate the ordinary understanding of how 
things are – which we have surely shown to be false – as attempt to try to discern the subtle 
and enigmatic relation between bodily awareness and bodily agency on its own terms. This is 
not  to  say  that  my  attempt  is  insensitive  to  aspects  of  the  phenomenology  of  ordinary 
agency. But given that the scientific study of consciousness has thrown up numerous slight 
mismatches between the world as presented in consciousness and the way things actually are, 
it would be naïve to insist that things must be as they strike us unreflectively.     139 
 
5.3.   Upshot: Bodily Awareness and Bodily Agency 
 
The general strategy that we have taken in response to the dilemma is to tease out the role 
that bodily awareness plays by relaxing the link between bodily awareness and agency so as 
to make sense of an intimate connexion between bodily awareness and agency while making 
room for bodily actions without concurrent awareness of the body parts the agent is striving 
with. In order to implement this strategy it will be useful to know just where we went wrong 
with the arguments for Necessity, which seemed to have some intuitive force. In this section 
we will analyse what is mistaken in the arguments that we earlier gave for Necessity in the 
light of the counterexamples discussed. The purpose of this analysis is to discern what was 
right about the earlier arguments so that we have some sense of what a correct picture of the 
relation between bodily awareness and agency should look like.  
What is the upshot of these counterexamples for Necessity? The issues here are 
complicated. As we have seen, Necessity is buttressed by two distinct lines of thought: the 
idea that bodily awareness provides an ineliminable source of feedback for bodily action and 
that bodily awareness provides the will with a ‗target-object‘ so that body parts are given as 
affording action. To assess the consequences of the above counterexamples, it is best to 
consider  their  consequences  for  the  two  distinct  lines  of  thought  supporting  Necessity 
individually. 
 
 
5.3.1.   On the ineliminability of feedback from bodily awareness 
 
The idea that feedback from bodily awareness is ineliminable falls prey to two problems:  
(One) We can substitute feedback from bodily awareness with visual information. In 
fact, this is IW‘s strategy. Earlier, we noted that IW was only able to perform many mundane 
tasks, such as walking and even sitting, by painstakingly relearning them, for he now has to 
be able to perform them without the benefit of bodily awareness. He has to compensate for 
lack of immediate bodily awareness by paying close visual attention to the state of his body 
and needs to constantly anticipate his next moves so as to deal with  obstacles that the 
environment turns up. Similarly, we suggest that our hypothetical BMI-aided patient – who 
exerts direct cortical control over his limbs through the BMI but has no proprioceptive 140 
 
information  –  can  employ  feedback  strategies  like  IW‘s  for  motor  learning  and  online 
control.  (I  am  not,  however,  suggesting  that  IW‘s  online  control  of  actions  is  entirely 
dependent on his visual awareness. More on this later.) 
Notice that part of our earlier motivation for the feedback line of thought was that, 
in contrast to visual awareness, bodily awareness appears to be indispensable for bodily action. 
Sighted agents can often act perfectly well in total darkness and unsighted agents can be 
perfectly good at acting with their bodies. This, at best, shows that when agents lack visual 
feedback,  proprioceptive  feedback  becomes  crucial.  However,  as  the  case  of  IW 
demonstrates,  this  fails  to  establish  that  bodily  awareness  is  an  ineliminable  source  of 
feedback.  The  fact  that  we  can  and  usually  do  rely  on  proprioceptive  and  kinaesthetic 
feedback in acting does not imply that it is necessary. 
(Two) Our discussion of automatic mechanisms shows that feedback for fine-tuning 
actions is not necessarily from conscious experiences of one‘s body. We saw that (a) the 
timescales  of  certain  actions  are  so  short  that  sensory  feedback  –  which  takes  time  to 
propagate from the periphery to the brain – is too slow to make any impact; (b) because of 
the  inevitable  delay  of  sensory  feedback,  use  of  feedback  during  fast  actions  is 
counterproductive; and (c) there are scenarios where subjects are successful at performing a 
task despite illusory information from bodily awareness. 
We might worry that this requires us to accept that conscious bodily awareness is 
epiphenomenal, but we can safely set this aside. First of all it is fallacious to think that if a 
certain factor is not necessary for some phenomenon, then it cannot play some causal role 
when present. To take a simple example, not all patients afflicted with lung cancer are or 
were smokers, yet there is strong evidence that smoking is a cause of lung cancer. Secondly, 
it is clear that loss of bodily awareness does have an impact on one‘s ability to act with one‘s 
body. At the beginning of his Though IW has learnt by trial and error the amount of force 
required for him to pick up and hold an egg without breaking it, if his attention is diverted to 
a different task, his hand crushes the egg (Cole et al. 1998). The capability of deafferented 
agents to act is degraded, even in IW‘s case. Haggard (2001, p. 123) notes that ―pathologies 
which reduce the availability of proprioceptive information from muscles, tendons and joints 
produce major motor impairments. In particular, such patients are unable to maintain a 
constant motor output (Rothwell et al. 1982)‖. Furthermore, Jeannerod (2003, pp. 134-136) 
reports experiments by Slachevsky et al. (2001) similar to the stylus experiment described 141 
 
above where the bias was very large (up to 42° compared to Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s 10°). 
In  these  experiments,  the  subjects  noticed  that  the  proprioceptive  and  kinaesthetic 
information was inconsistent with visual feedback. Jeannerod‘s hypothesis is that conscious 
awareness kicks in when the automatic system cannot handle the task. 
The upshot of our discussion here is that there is no obvious necessity on this score. 
This  is  not  to  say  there  can‘t  be  online  conscious  control,  but  that  contemporaneous 
conscious  bodily  awareness  is  not  necessary for  acting  with  that  body  part  –  where  the 
necessity holds because bodily awareness provides an indispensable source of feedback. The 
dialectical  burden  of  defending  Necessity  falls  therefore  on  the  alleged  conceptual  tie 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
 
 
5.3.2.   On the conceptual tie 
 
Remember that the second strand of thought in O‘Shaughnessy‘s argument for Necessity is 
that there is a conceptual tie between bodily action and bodily awareness. We found it difficult 
to articulate the content of this second strand of thought, but it seemed to involve a number 
of ideas that were related but not obviously the same. The first is that the phenomenology of 
bodily action necessarily involves bodily awareness such that we could not conceive of acting 
directly with a certain body part without feeling it ‗from the inside‘. The second was captured 
by talk of bodily awareness ‗making the body ―visible‖ to the will‘. The idea there being that 
if body parts were not phenomenally given, so to speak, then an agent‘s body parts would 
not be presented to the agent as being parts that he might act directly with at all. 
The latter idea about bodily awareness providing the ‗target-object‘ of the will is 
tricky. If the idea here is that bodily awareness of a certain body part is what presents that 
body part to the agent as one that ‗affords‘ acting with or that bodily awareness is the mode 
through which we apprehend parts of our body which allows for the possibility of acting 
with these parts, we might think that there is a gap in the argument for Necessity on these 
grounds. Whilst it might be true that bodily awareness is crucial in presenting body parts as 
affording action, it is unclear how that requires occurrent bodily awareness to be (roughly) 
contemporaneous with the bodily action so as to provide an ―immediate concrete seeming presence‖ 
(O‘Shaughnessy 1995, p. 202). Why can‘t bodily awareness provide for knowledge of bodily 142 
 
potential, where this is standing knowledge based on past experiences of the limb and of 
acting with it, and thus present body parts as affording action? This would not require bodily 
awareness to present a body part each time the agent strives with the part in question. 
The most straightforward answer relies on leaning  back on the  feedback  line of 
thought. We  need  occurrent awareness of body  parts to directly  act  with them because 
bodily awareness contemporaneous with bodily action allows one to monitor and control 
one‘s action. As we have seen, in the case of ordinary bodily actions which are fast, bodily 
awareness appears to play little role in online control. Furthermore, since the Feedback and 
Target-object lines of thought are distinct – neither entails the other – we cannot assume 
that we have argued for one of them by arguing for the other. 
But the Target-Object line of thought is open to counterexamples. Both the case of 
deafferented agents and our hypothetical BMI-aided patient involve cases where agents are 
able to directly strive with body parts that they do not feel ‗from the inside‘. Thus, in these 
agents, there is no need for sensation in body parts so that they become ‗target-objects‘ for 
the agents‘ wills to engage. IW lacks bodily awareness in his body parts below his collarline 
and thus lacks such a highlighting target mechanism but yet can still act directly with many of 
these parts.  
How then is bodily action possible in IW in the absence of this ‗target mechanism‘? 
Whilst it is true that IW relies on visual information for bodily areas where he does not have 
bodily awareness and vision does not appear to present body parts as parts that he might act 
with,
101 as our earlier discussion of ‗BMI actions‘ seems to indicate, if agents are given a 
suitable training environment where they receive appropriate feedback (which may be purely 
visual) about the success of their strivings, agents appear to be able to learn to directly act 
with objects that they have no sensation in.
102 In a sense this is no surprise, since in the case 
of IW, whilst his afferent nerves have largely been destroyed (he has lost all large myelinated 
sensory nerve function fr om below his collar line but has intact small myelinated and 
unmyelinated  nerve  function),  his  efferent  nerves  are  completely  intact.  Since  motor 
commands to the periphery are sent via the efferent nerves, there is no bar to motor 
                                                 
101 In fact it is unclear that vision cannot present body parts as parts that an agent can act with. In the mirror 
neuron literature, much of evidence appears to point to agents being able to simulate actions that others are 
performing or can perform on the basis of visual information (about tools, body parts, etc.).  
102 Cf. also the experiments done by deCharms  et al. (2004) described in fn. 18 of chapter 4, where subjects 
learn to voluntarily increase the degree of activation of their motor cortex during an imagined manual action. 143 
 
commands reaching the periphery. And since the peripheral biomechanical structures were 
undamaged,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  could  not,  in  principle,  respond  to  motor 
commands issued by the central system. O‘Shaughnessy and Valberg, however, claim to be 
able  to  rule  this  out  by  reflection  on  the  conceptual  tie  between  bodily  awareness  and 
agency. 
This point also allows us to also respond to worries about an agent‘s inability to 
single out body parts to act on if sensation were absent. At the end of section 4.1.3.3, I 
suggested that a further thought behind the Target-Object Argument is that without feeling 
in body parts, we will have no way of singling out a certain body part as opposed to some 
other body part ‗from the inside‘, since neither of them are presented to the agent in that 
way. And since action initiation is ‗from the inside‘ too, there would be no way to try to 
move one‘s left hand as opposed to trying to move one‘s right hand or even trying to move 
one‘s left leg… Once again, the answer to the individuation requirement here is that (one) as 
long as the agent can send appropriate motor commands to the specific effector and (two) 
agents  are  placed  in  a  suitable  training  situation  where  they  receive  feedback  about  the 
success of their strivings, there is no bar to agents being able to pick up various statistical 
correlations between their strivings and the results of their strivings and learn to exploit this 
to act. Bodily awareness may be the most effective ‗faculty‘ for performing this individuative 
function in normal circumstances, but this fails to establish any necessity.  
(Though intact efferent mechanisms coupled with statistical learning under feedback 
conditions is crucial, this represents only part of the story for how action is possible. We still 
have to provide for the possibility of acting from within the agent‘s perspective. What the 
statistical learning point shows is that there are mechanisms that can be exploited where 
these are not constrained by the way normals do things – in fact, normals could in principle 
increase  their  repertoire  via  these  methods  –  and  these  enlargements  of  repertoire  are 
plausibly thought to be accompanied by changes in the agent‘s conception of what he can 
do. IW is likely to have a different sense of practical possibility which is largely visual and 
employs visual imagination. This point also applies to the putative role of bodily awareness 
in singling out body parts for the agent to engage with; here again we need to provide for a 
sense  of practical  possibility  for the  agent. We  will  return to discuss  the  role  of bodily 
awareness in providing for a sense of practical possibility for normals at the end of this 
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At  this  point,  O‘Shaughnessy  may  insist  that  these  cases  fail  to  represent 
paradigmatic cases of agency and so fail to dent his conceptual claim. However, once we 
understand how sub-personal mechanisms take over much of the processing for various 
actions that agents undertake, the role for occurrent conscious awareness appears to be 
diminished,  and  this  would  naturally  lead  us  to  be  sceptical  about  the  conceptual  tie 
expressed by Necessity. At this point, O‘Shaughnessy is likely to respond that even in these 
automatic cases the agent is, strictly speaking, aware of that part of his body, but that this 
awareness is very peripheral. This claim, however, is open to empirical counterexamples as 
we have seen. 
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  discussed  Fourneret  and  Jeannerod‘s  (1998)  stylus 
experiments.  There  the  visual  feedback  which  subjects  received  should  have  been 
inconsistent  with  the  proprioceptive  and  kinaesthetic  information  subjects  received. 
However,  after  effectively  drawing  tilted  lines  to  produce  a  straight  line  on  the  screen 
subjects reported that they had moved their arms straight. The conclusion we drew there was 
that  since  conscious  bodily  awareness  in  this  case  was  inaccurate  about  the  actual  task 
parameters but subjects were successful at their task, we should infer that subjects could not 
have  been  exploiting  false  information  received  from  non-visual  sensory  feedback  to 
accomplish the task, since this would have led them to draw a straight line. Rather, some 
automatic sub-personal mechanism was responsible for online correction of the drawing. 
In the case of Marcel‘s (2003) experiment, there are situations where the subject 
seems to form a motor intention that is opposite at a gross level to what he ends up doing to 
achieve his goal. Under the influence of the vibro-tactile illusion about the position of his 
arm, the subject thinks that he has to move left toward the light (as his pre-movement 
drawing attests to), but, unbeknownst to him, ends up moving right in order to achieve his 
goal.  This  shows  that  the  parameters  for  the  initial  position  of  the  arm  and  motor 
specification  for  movement  cannot  be  derived  in  this  case  from  those  given  by  bodily 
awareness. Insofar as the movement requires feedback, this also cannot be provided by the 
parameters  from  bodily  awareness  since  these  would  specify  the  opposite  direction  of 
movement.  
Remember that part of the Target-Object line of thought trades on the idea that 
acting  with  one‘s  limbs  requires  one  to  know  the  state  of  one‘s  limbs,  and  that  bodily 
awareness puts us in a position to know the state of one‘s limbs. The putative conceptual tie 145 
 
consists at least in this basic informational link. But if conscious awareness sometimes fails 
to provide veridical information about one‘s limbs, how can conscious bodily awareness be 
always ‗putting one in a position to know the state of one‘s limbs‘ – and hence providing the 
will with its ‗target-object‘? Might O‘Shaughnessy respond by asking why bodily awareness 
cannot still be making body parts ‗visible‘ to the will even though it later provides false 
information  about  the  target  object?  Perhaps.  But  what  can  be  the  point  of  that?  As 
O‘Shaughnessy (1995, p. 202) himself writes: ―Then if some esthesia is a necessary condition 
of the normal [tennis] stroke, why so? It can scarcely be that one needs intellectual reassurance 
that the limb still exists!‖ However, the response highlights that once we retreat from aspects 
of the Target-Object line of thought that trade on its providing a target for action and 
control of action – which require information to be accurate – then it is unclear why we 
would still want to hold on to Necessity. This is not to deny that there is some intimate 
connexion  between  bodily  awareness  and  agency,  but  to  deny  that  Necessity  correctly 
captures the character of this intimacy. 
A further problem with the Target-Object line of thought, insofar as it embraces the 
idea that bodily awareness provides the will with a ‗target-object‘ so that the will can act with 
it – which seems to indicate a slight temporal priority for events of awareness, is that circuits 
which subserve conscious awareness of motor performance appear to be far slower than 
circuits which are involved in online fine tuning of actions (Castiello et al. 1991; see also 
Jeannerod 2006, ch. 3). If this is so, then, for an important class of ordinary actions which 
are fast, conscious bodily awareness cannot be temporally prior in a way that the priority is 
what the will exploits to know what to latch on to and how to control it. 
Perhaps  our  line  of  argument  against  the  necessity  of  the  conceptual  tie  can  be 
resisted.  Our  protagonist  acknowledges  that  the  experiments  of  Jeannerod,  Marcel,  and 
others show that some spatial parameters provided by proprioception and kinaesthesia do not 
control bodily action, in both abnormal and normal cases. But she will insist that this does 
not yet show (one) that feeling in a body part is not necessary for acting with it in the normal 
case and (two) that some spatial descriptions of one‘s bodily actions are still derivable, and, 
indeed, are derived from proprioception and kinaesthesia. This suggests that these spatial 
descriptions  should  be  thought  of  as  contributing  to  the  motor  instructions  or  motor 
intentions of the agent. A putative example of such an instruction is: ‗Move (this felt) hand 
away from body‘. If this prognosis is correct, then while these experiments put pressure on 146 
 
the idea that bodily awareness is involved in every aspect of online control of bodily action, 
and  dislodge  us  from  a  conception  on  which  online  control  is  entirely  due  to  spatial 
parameters  derived  from  conscious  bodily  experience,  they  leave  the  claim  that 
proprioception and kinaesthesia is necessary for bodily action (in normal cases) untouched. 
Given that the different experiments each challenge different aspects of a picture on 
which bodily awareness plays a crucial role in online control, it will be useful to make clearer 
the limitation of the scope of the conclusions we can draw from these experiments. Let us 
consider  the  claim  that,  despite  the  dissociations  demonstrated  by  these  experiments,  it 
remains the case that some spatial descriptions of one‘s bodily actions can be and are derived 
from  proprioception  and  kinaesthesia,  and  these  can  contribute  to  the  control  of  one‘s 
actions insofar as they enter into the specification of the motor instructions. The example 
given was a command like: ‗Move (this felt) hand away from body‘. This response may meet 
some of the difficulties presented by Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s experiments, but appears to 
run  into  trouble  with  Marcel‘s.  When  subjects  are  under  the  vibro-tactile  illusion,  their 
judgements  tend  to  reflect  the  illusion,  both  before  and  after  the  experiment,  yet  their 
performance is unaffected. They are consistently successful even in situations where they 
have to move their arm in a direction opposite from what would be expected on the basis of 
their illusory experience. There is room to quibble about the exact ramifications of results 
like this, but Marcel‘s results suggest that the parameters for the initial position of the arm 
and motor specification for movement cannot be derived in this case from bodily awareness, 
even if we take a specification as plain as ‗Move (this felt) hand away from body‘ – since in 
Marcel‘s most interesting cases the subject may actually be moving his hand away from his 
body when he thinks he is moving towards it. Insofar as the movement requires feedback, 
this also cannot be provided by parameters from bodily awareness since these would specify 
the  opposite  direction  of  movement.  Our  opponent  will  seek  to  weaken  the  motor 
specifications from the subject‘s perspective even further. Rather than moving his hand away 
or toward his body, the commands would be even more modest in terms of commitments 
made in their spatial description. Examples would be: ‗Move (this felt) hand in this way‘ or 
‗Move (this felt) hand in this direction‘ where the way or direction one‘s hand is moved is 
specified by reference to whatever way one is actually moving it. In specifying his action 
through what we might call an ‗action demonstrative‘ of this sort, he may be uncommitted to 
the specific direction of movement (e.g., left or right) but committed only to thinking that he 147 
 
is moving his hand toward the target light.
103 It is arguable that in some cases the locus of the 
subject‘s attention may be simply to successfully move toward the light without any attention 
to specific means. But in the cases where the subject makes a pre-movement drawing, as 
Marcel points out, the direction of intended movement should be apparent to the subject – 
since it is plausible to think that this is a parameter that he needs to be aware of to execute 
the drawing – and he will be aware of some specific means to achieve the goal (‗move left in 
this way towards the light‘) beyond that of simply moving toward the light. Given this, there 
are grounds for doubting that our protagonist‘s reply is adequate for the full range of cases 
which  the  experiments  discussed  present.  It  is  also  not  entirely  clear  how  in  the  less 
challenging cases, the agent can be said to have no specific idea at all of what means he is 
taking to move toward the light. This raises a difficult and significant question about what 
Marcel  and  Jeannerod‘s  experiments  can  tell  us  concerning  the  motor  specifications  in 
various basic everyday situations of reaching for targets based on exteroceptive experience in 
combination with proprioceptive and kinaesthetic experience.
104 
Even if we are not able to resolve the dispute concerning what we should take away 
from these experiments beyond doubt, we have further resources to argue our case. 
Remember that fast actions also generate problems for the ‗target-object‘ line of thought, 
since events of awareness of body parts have to precede, or at least be simultaneous with, 
acting with them, otherwise there will be no ‗target-object‘ for the will. Here the case seems 
to be clearer. The neural circuits responsible for conscious awareness of motor performance 
appear to be far slower than the circuits involved in online fine tuning of actions (Castiello et 
al. 1991, Jeannerod 2006, ch. 3). If so, then, for ordinary actions which are fast, conscious 
bodily awareness cannot be temporally prior or even simultaneous in a way that the priority 
is what the will exploits to know what to latch on to and how to control it. Therefore, if we 
accept  the  claim  that  these  fast  actions  form  a  large  and  important  part  of  an  agent‘s 
repertoire, then Necessity cannot hold even for normal acts of normal agents. This once 
again  raises the  question  of how  we  are to understand  what counts within the  class of 
normal actions, and what theoretical significance we are to assign to different sorts of actions 
                                                 
103 As Peacocke (2003) suggests. The suggestion is discussed in the Introduction to Roessler and Eilan (2003).  
104 Other possible moves here are: (one) to admit that the scope of rational control (in the sense of what we cite 
as reason for acting) is much narrowe r than we are (pre-theoretically) inclined to think or (two) to argue that 
the phenomenology of acting and rational control come apart  – the former being much richer than the latter 
(Peacocke 2003). For discussion of both options see the Introduction to Roessler and Eilan (2003) and also 
Eilan (2010). 148 
 
within the class. So one move that our opponent might make in response is to accept that 
fast actions fall resolutely within the class of normal actions of normal agents, but deny that 
they are conceptually central. But it is unclear what grounds our opponent has for denying 
that fast actions are conceptually central when we consider the normal actions of normal 
agents. The kinds of basic reaching actions and other fast movements in sporting, musical, 
and even secretarial activities provide us with a strong case that these fast actions do form a 
significant class for our self-understanding as agents and thus ought to be considered a 
central case of normal actions of normal agents.
105 
Valberg tries to deal with such cases by making a distinction between what he calls 
‗standing‘ versus ‗operative‘ states and applying this to feeling one‘s body in the case of will. 
By ‗operative‘ he means something like ‗occurrent‘ whilst by ‗standing‘ he means something 
like  ‗having  the  appropriate  disposition  or  capacity‘,  comparing  the  former  to 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s short term body image and the latter to his long term body image. Thus 
instead of understanding Necessity as expressing a connexion between occurrent awareness 
of some body part and acting directly with it, we should understand Necessity as expressing 
a connexion between bodily action and ‗standing‘ bodily awareness. This, however, doesn‘t 
help to rescue Necessity since Necessity makes a claim about the link between occurrent 
bodily  awareness  and  bodily  action;  but  since  there  are  no  such  things  as  ‗standing‘ 
experiences but only occurrent ones, the distinction is unhelpful here.
106  
This leads us to a final wrinkle concerning the debate with O‘Shaughnessy to do with 
his two notions of body image: the short term body image and the long term body image. 
Strictly speaking, the debate surrounding Necessity is concerned only with the short term 
body image as these are the occurrent, but usually recessive experiences of the body that 
Necessity claims is essential to bodily action. However, why not retreat to the claim that 
really all we need is something like the long term body image, which contains information 
                                                 
105 For a different take on fast actions, see Roessler‘s ―Transparency and Practical Knowledge‖ (ms.).  
106 Besides O‘Shaughnessy‘s and Valberg‘s arguments, there are arguments due to other philosophers which 
defend necessary connections between bodily awareness and bodily action and also awareness and agency. 
Roessler  (2003)  argues  that  we  experience  consequences  of  our  actions  as  the  upshot  of  our  intentions. 
Roessler‘s view in this paper concerns awareness and agency generally; he does not tell us what he thinks is the 
relation between bodily awareness and agency, and the view he defends in this paper appears to be consistent 
with bodily awareness not always being required for the control of normal bodily actions. Dokic (2003) argues 
that in acting intentionally we are proprioceptively presented with actions as controlled by ourselves; in other 
words, proprioception gives a sense of control. I do not fully understand Dokic‘s view, insofar as I can make 
sense of it, it seems to me that the case of fast actions provides a straightforward counterexample. I intend to 
consider Roessler‘s and Dokic‘s views in depth in future work. 149 
 
about possible sites of sensation, bodily structure and bodily dispositions, but is not to be 
understood as a form of occurrent experience of one‘s body? Conceding this much is already 
to concede that Necessity is false as it stands, and what this points to is that the connexion 
between bodily awareness and agency is more complicated that our original picture suggests 
and may involve a number of different factors contributing in complex ways. This is what 
we turn to consider in the next section, but before that, let us sum up the situation for 
Necessity up till now. 
Whilst we agree with O‘Shaughnessy that ―a necessary condition of willing bodily 
events is that an epistemological contact should be set up between the putative agent and his 
body‖  (1980,  vol.  1,  p.  137),  we  disagree  on  the  nature  of  the  epistemological  contact. 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s contention is that ―the body must be ‗there‘ for [the agent], more or less 
come what may and as it were through the thick and thin of the mind‘s vicissitudes, and in an 
immediate mode, if he is to be in a position to act‖ (1980, vol. 1, p. 137; my italics). And as we 
have seen from the various counterexamples we have considered, this is false. The intimate 
connexion  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency  cannot  be  as  strong  a  link  as 
Necessity. 
 
 
5.4.   Bodily Demonstratives and Action Explanation
107 
 
If Necessity is wrong why did it strike us as being so attractive a thesis for understanding the 
link between bodily awareness and agency in the first place? In this subsection I attempt to 
diagnose the source of our error. I will suggest that the reason why we thought there was an 
intrinsic tie was because of a mistake concerning the link between bodily demonstratives and 
action explanation. My general strategy here is to begin by exploiting some ideas about the 
link between perceptual  demonstratives and action explanation in the visuomotor case  – 
partly because the visuomotor case is more worked out – and explore how far we can export 
                                                 
107 John  Campbell‘s  (2003)  discussion  of  the  upshot  of  empirical  work  on  multiple  visual  pathways  for 
understanding the role of visual demonstratives in action explanation was a stimulus for this section. In this 
section,  I  employ  a  strategy  of  Campbell‘s  and  explore  if  it  can  help  us  salvage  Necessity.  However,  my 
employment  of  Campbell‘s  strategy  is  not  an  endorsement  of  his  claims  about  the  rationalizing  role  of 
awareness or the role of awareness in knowledge of action in that paper. Indeed, Campbell himself keeps them 
distinct in his paper. One could accept his general strategy for salvaging a role for awareness in action without 
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ideas about the visuomotor case to that of bodily awareness and agency. The point of going 
through this diagnosis is to expose certain deep structural dissimilarities between the bodily 
field and the visual field. Philosophers all too often base their analyses of other perceptual 
modalities on the visual modality and lose sight of what is distinctive about other sense 
modalities. In the bodily case, I suggest that the way we think about and experience our body 
and its parts is very different from the way we think about and experience the world visually. 
This, I will suggest, has important consequences for how we strive with our body. 
 
 
5.4.1.   Visuomotor action and Visual Demonstratives 
 
It is tempting to think that perceptual demonstratives in general have a crucial role to play in 
action  explanation.  Christopher  Peacocke  suggests  that  ―no  set  of  attitudes  gives  a 
satisfactory  psychological  explanation  of  a  person‘s  acting  on  a  given  object  unless  the 
content of those attitudes includes a demonstrative mode of presentation of that object‖ 
(1981, pp. 205-206). Whilst this cannot be generally correct since one may fail a student or 
vote against a candidate without a demonstrative mode of presentation of the student or 
candidate, it may be plausible for some more basic actions, such as pointing to, or grasping, 
or reaching to something in one‘s immediate surroundings. Restricting ourselves to these 
more  basic  cases  of  bodily  striving,  we  may  try  to  articulate  the  link  between  visual 
demonstratives and visuomotor actions in the following thesis that we will call ‗Grounding‘, 
following John Campbell: 
 
Grounding: The meaning of a perceptual demonstrative is grounded in those aspects 
of perceptual experience that set the parameters for my action (how far I move, in 
what direction, and so on). (Campbell 2003, p. 152) 
 
The assumption here is that the visual information that sets the parameters for action 
must be part of the content of one‘s experience. But this thesis, as will be obvious from our 
earlier  discussion  on  the  rationalising  role  of  experience,  faces  serious  problems.  In 
blindsighted subjects, visual information used in setting parameters for action are not part of 
the content of the subjects‘ experience. This thesis faces further problems from empirical 151 
 
work on vision, which appears to point to there being distinct visual systems subserving 
different purposes (Ungerleider and Miskin 1982, Milner and Goodale 1995). Psychologists 
and neuroscientists working on vision generally endorse a dissociation between two streams 
of visual processing, anatomically identified as the dorsal and ventral streams, but the exact 
extent of dissociation and the specification of just which functions are dissociated remains a 
matter of controversy.
108 However, we need not be worried about this as empirical evidence 
points toward a double dissociation between broadly pragmatic processing , a low -level 
system remote from consciousness that is responsible for fine tuning motor movements, as 
opposed to semantic processing, which is responsible for conscious perceptual awareness for 
identification  and  reidentification  (Jeannerod  1997,  2006).  A natomically,  pragmatic 
processing is done in the dorsal stream whereas semantic processing is done in the ventral 
stream. We can marshal evidence for this double dissociation between pragmatic and 
semantic visual processing both from pathological cases and   normal cases. Let us first 
consider the pathological cases. 
Milner and Goodale‘s patient, DF, who has visual form agnosia, has problems with 
identifying the orientation and shapes of objects, but is able to act perfectly well on them. 
Conversely,  patients  who  have  optic  ataxia  are  entirely  articulate  and  proficient  when it 
comes to identifying objects and their orientation and shape, but are unable to act on them. 
Neurologically, DF suffers from a ventral lesion whilst the optic ataxics suffer from dorsal 
lesions. This opposed set of proficiencies and deficiencies is manifest in the card slotting 
experiment  used  by  psychologists  to  demonstrate  the  dissociations.  The  experimental 
apparatus consists of a slot, which can be oriented between 0º to 359º, and a card, which the 
subject is supposed to post through the slot. Whilst DF cannot identify the orientation of 
the  slot,  she  is  very  successful  at  posting  the  card  through  the  slot.  The  optic  ataxics, 
however, show the opposite behaviour. They know the orientation of the slot but are unable 
to  post  the  card  through  the  slot.  In  optic  ataxia,  the  subjects  have  conscious  visual 
experience of the objects of perception that can support identification and reidentification of 
these objects and can feed into various other higher-cognitive processes, like memory, but 
this cannot be exploited to guide action. The optic ataxic is clueless as to what he can do, 
                                                 
108 See Rossetti and Pisella 2002, Glover 2004, and Jeannerod 2006 for recent discussions. E.g., Milner and 
Goodale speak of ‗action‘ versus ‗perception‘ systems, Jeannerod of ‗semantic‘ versus ‗pragmatic‘ processing, 
and Bridgeman as well as Rossetti and Pisella of ‗cognitive‘ versus ‗motor‘ functions. Glover attempts to draw 
the distinction between processes for planning versus those for execution. 152 
 
and is at chance when posting the card. Thus we have intact perceptual experience, but 
hampered action. DF, in contrast, is able to post the card successfully despite being unable 
to report on the orientation of the slot. Here we have capacity of action in the absence of 
intact perceptual experience.  
It might be objected that this evidence only shows that damage to specific areas of 
the brain can impair the normal, harmonious hand in glove relation between perception and 
action,  but  has  little  bearing  on  visuomotor  action  for  normals.  Unfortunately  for  the 
defender  of  Grounding,  this  too  is  open  to  empirical  counterexamples.  There  is  good 
evidence  for double dissociations between  vision for pragmatic  purposes and vision  for 
semantic purposes in visuomotor action in normals. We can see this in either experiments on 
motor effects of perceptual processing that exploit the ‗double step‘ paradigm when targets 
of  visual  tracking  are  moved  during  saccadic  shift  or  involve  visual  illusions  like  the 
Titchener illusion or Roeloff effect (see Rossetti and Pisella 2002 for a recent comprehensive 
review). 
Experiments done  within the ‗double step‘  paradigm involve conditions where a 
visual target is first present to the subject and then displaced as the subject acts in response 
to the stimulus. (The paradigm is so-called because it involves two steps: the first is fixation 
on the target and the second is displacement of the target from its initial position to a second 
position.) The paradigm exploits the psychophysical finding that subjects are unaware of 
displacements in  their visual  field  if these  displacements are timed  to coincide  with the 
saccadic shift. (Saccades are the jerky, step-wise movements of the eyes when they move 
between  different  fixation  points.)      This  apparent  lack  of  perceptual  awareness  during 
saccades is known as ‗saccadic suppression‘. A number of experiments have looked at the 
effects of saccadic suppression on pointing movements. In an early experiment done by 
Bridgeman and colleagues (Bridgeman et al. 1979), subjects were instructed to point at a 
target that was displaced during the saccade and then extinguished. Surprisingly, the saccadic 
suppression  phenomena  did  not  lead  to  expected  visuomotor  errors.  They  found  that 
pointing movements made toward the target following target displacement were accurate 
irrespective of whether the subject was aware of the target displacement (as evidenced by his 
verbal  reports).  Since  this  pioneering  experiment,  a  long  line  of  experiments  have  been 
performed  that  corroborate  their  results  (see  Rossetti  and  Pisella  2002,  pp.  64-65).  The 
saccadic suppression coupled with visuomotor accuracy in these tasks suggests that in these 153 
 
instances the parameters for visuomotor action are in fact not set by the parameters as given 
in conscious perceptual experience, since the subject successfully points to the displaced 
target and yet is perceptually unaware of the target shift due to saccadic suppression. 
We  can  also  elicit  dissociations  between  the  functioning  of  the  semantic  and 
pragmatic systems in experiments involving visual illusions where the subject is reaching 
towards  or  grasping  various  targets.  I  will  consider  two  illustrations  of  this.  A  classic 
experiment also done by Bridgeman and colleagues involves the Roeloff effect (Bridgeman, 
Kirch and Sperling 1981). The Roeloff effect is a visual illusion where a small visual target 
which remains stationary is framed by a large structured background that is displaced during 
visual fixation on the small target, with the effect that subjects have an illusory experience as 
of the small target moving (in the opposite direction of the frame displacement). Bridgeman 
and colleagues found that subjects are reliably successful  at pointing  at  the  small  target 
despite  experiencing  the illusory  movement of the  target. They  concluded that apparent 
target displacement affected only conscious experience of the target whilst the pragmatic 
system was insensitive to the illusion but kept track of the actual location of the target. If this 
is so, the parameters of the visuomotor action are not set by conscious experience – which 
was susceptible to the illusion – but by the pragmatic system. 
A more recent experiment done in Goodale‘s laboratory by Aglioti and colleagues 
involves exploiting a size-contrast illusion,  the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, to test for 
dissociations between the semantic and pragmatic systems (Aglioti et al. 1995). The subject is 
presented with two target circles of the same size. However, one of the circles is surrounded 
by a ring of circles which are smaller than the size of the target circles, whilst the other circle 
is surrounded by a ring of circles which are larger than the size of the target circles (see 
Figure 3 below). Most people experience the target circle surrounded by a ring of smaller 
circles to look larger than the other target circle surrounded by larger circles. Experimenters 
can also manipulate the target circles so that they are experienced to be of the same size by 
enlarging the target circle surrounded by the larger circles. This illusion may be ‗translated‘ 
into three dimensions without loss. Aglioti and colleagues implemented the illusion with 
poker chips that subjects were asked to pick up. Despite the robustness of the experienced 
illusion of size contrast, it was shown that subjects picking up the poker chips scaled their 
grips according to the actual sizes of the chips. Thus, the grips were of the same size when 
the target chips were experienced as differing in size and different when the target chips 154 
 
were experienced as equivalent in size.
109 Once again Grounding seems to run into problems 
since the parameters for grip scaling do not appear to be set by conscious experience as the 
illusion of size contrast or similarity is robust.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Varieties of size-contrast visual illusions: (a) Ebbinghaus-Titchener size-contrast illusion, (b) Ponzo 
illusion, (c) horizontal-vertical illusion and (d) ‗dumbbell‘ version of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Experiments on 
the influence of visual illusions on grip aperture have been done using the all these size-contrast illusions. From 
Bruno (2001). 
  
 
The upshot of these experiments is that evidence of a double dissociation between 
pragmatic and semantic processing can even be found in normals: neither are the parameters 
for  action  set  by  the  perceptual  system  nor  is  the  content  of  conscious  experience 
determined by the action system. (A) As we have seen, the parameters for action in normal 
subjects are not being set by conscious experience – since this may be systematically illusory 
–  but  rather  by  sub-personal  action  systems,  which  need  have  no  echo  in  conscious 
experience.  (B)  The  content  of  conscious  experience  is  not  determined  by  the  ‗action‘ 
                                                 
109 The  extent  to  which  experiments  like  these  establish  the  two  systems  hypothesis  is  now  somewhat 
controversial. In part the controversy is due to Milner and Goodale‘s earlier stance on the two visual systems as 
independent systems. See Rossetti and Pisella 2002 and Bruno 2001 for discussion. 155 
 
system, since the content of conscious awareness can fail to reflect what the ‗action‘ system 
must pick up in order that the action be successful (e.g. point at where the target moves 
when it moves during a saccade). Here, with normal subjects, as earlier with pathological 
cases, it appears that Grounding is false and should be abandoned.  
Does this mean that we should also abandon any hopes of a link between conscious 
visual attention and explanation of visuomotor actions? It is important to realise that if we 
left the story at that the insight we had in considering what was amiss about blindsight would 
be  lost  (chapter  2).  There  we  saw  that  while  blindsighted  subjects  are  able  to  acquire 
information about the location of his targets and the development of his actions through his 
sense organs, this information directs online guidance of action in a way that is brutally 
causal. We would be unable to make sense of our agency, because we have a commitment to 
understanding action as a rational response to experience. But if the content of conscious 
experience  that  goes  into  interpreting  a  visual  demonstrative  is  not  what  provides  the 
parameters for action, how are we to hold on to the idea that there is something important 
about visual demonstratives in the explanation of visuomotor action (and thus vouchsafe its 
rational character)? 
Goodale and Jeannerod both make a similar suggestion in response to this problem. 
Even though the experiential and executive systems are dissociable, this does not show that 
the semantic or perceptual system is epiphenomenal in relation to action control. Rather, the 
experiential and executive systems interact and cooperate. We may think of their response as 
one to a threat raise by the dissociation of these systems: if conscious experience does not 
set the parameters for visuomotor action, how can we even guarantee that the different 
systems engage with the very same object? (Think back to the discussion of fly swatting in 
section 4.1.1 of chapter 4. The object of my swatting is not accidentally the fly that I sighted. 
It is not that seeing the fly occasions my swatting, and the fly that I swat at just happens to 
be the fly that provoked my action. Rather, my swatting is directed at that very fly that I 
saw.) Goodale develops his suggestion as follows: 
 
Consider for example the simple act of picking up a ripe pear from a basket of fruit. Your 
perceptual system, with its rich and detailed representation of the visual array, would enable 
you to discriminate the pears from the apples and other fruit in the bowl—and to select the 
most appealing of the several pears available. But once your perceptual system had ‗flagged‘ 156 
 
a particular pear, dedicated visuomotor systems in the dorsal stream (in conjunction with 
related circuits in premotor cortex, the brainstem and other brain areas) would carry out the 
required computations to get your hand onto the pear and pick it up. Both systems are 
required for purposive behaviour—one system to select the goal object from the visual array, 
the  other  to  carry  out  the  required  metrical  computations  for  the  goal-directed  action. 
(Goodale 1998, p. 32) 
 
The basic idea here is that even though the semantic or perceptual system does not set the 
precise parameters for the pragmatic system to accomplish the visuomotor task, what it does 
is single out a target object for the pragmatic system which is dedicated to fine online motor 
control  to  engage  with.
110  Campbell  codifies  this  strategy  by  distinguishing  between 
Grounding and what he calls ‗Binding‘: 
 
Binding: Conscious attention is what defines the target of processing for the ‗action‘ 
system, and thereby ensures that the object you intend to act on is the very same as 
the object with which the ‗action‘ system becomes engaged. (Campbell 2003, p. 160) 
 
Remember that Grounding posits a more direct role for conscious experience to play. It 
claims that the role of conscious experience is to directly set the parameters for action. As 
we have seen, this is a mistake. This new proposal has consciousness playing a less direct 
role: what conscious attention does is to define the ‗target‘ of processing for the ‗action‘ 
system and then hands the dirty work of online control and adjustments over to the ‗action‘ 
system. This ensures that what the agent intends to act on is the same object as what the 
‗action‘ system engages.
111 
The point of going through the visuomotor case is to provide us with a fairly worked 
out instance of a dispute regarding the role of experience in guiding action in the hope that 
working through it would provide us with some ideas how to proceed with our dialectic. We 
                                                 
110 Jeannerod develops his response by considering location as the de facto binding principle for the two systems. 
The idea is that there may be areas in early processing that are in common between the two visual pathways 
where  visual  primitives  and  spatial  localization  are  presented  on  the  same  map  and  that  ―attentional 
mechanisms would play a role in binding different modes of representation into a single, higher-order one‖. 
See Jeannerod 1997, p. 80. 
111 This naturally links up with the idea of consciousness as playing a role in action planning – as I propose later 
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now appear to have a general strategy to preserve a distinctive role for experience to play in 
action from consideration of the role that visual demonstratives play in visuomotor action. 
We turn to examine the viability of this solution for the case of bodily awareness and bodily 
action in the next subsection. 
 
 
5.4.2.   Bodily Demonstratives and Necessity 
 
Let us apply the strategy canvassed above with visuomotor action to the case of bodily 
awareness and agency. If we accept something like Binding for bodily awareness, we might 
think that O‘Shaughnessy‘s ‗Target-Object‘ idea (chapter 4, section 4.1.3.3) is vindicated – 
since the thought behind Binding is that conscious attention to the body specifies the target object that 
one’s automatic systems can then engage with. This is an interesting move. It simultaneously allows 
for bodily awareness to play an indispensable role and also deals with the earlier argument 
that  we  rehearsed  in  terms  of  the  inaccuracy  of  conscious  awareness  not  being able  to 
directly  guide  successful  actions.
112 Awareness specifies the target and then automatic 
systems take over; thus awareness need not be accurate as to the exact parameters for action 
as long as it latches onto the target object so that the action system can  engage with the 
target. But as we‘ve seen the Target-Object line of thought is problematic (this chapter, 
section 5.1.2). Why do we find it attractive here? 
I will offer a diagnosis of why the Target-Object line of thought is so alluring in 
terms of a mistake about the role bodily demonstratives play in action explanation. I suggest 
that  the  precise  locus  of  the  error  is  in  the  thought  that  bodily  demonstratives  are 
indispensable in making sense of bodily action. This diagnosis is bolstered by consideration 
of one of O‘Shaughnessy‘s arguments for Necessity. 
O‘Shaughnessy argues that in most cases of bodily action, basic or otherwise, the 
action is intentional under some description such as ‗reaching in this way‘ (O‘Shaughnessy 
1995, 2000; see also Kelly 2002). His argument for this claim is as follows:  
 
                                                 
112 I am thinking of experiments pertaining to bodily awareness like Fourneret and Jeannerod‘s (1998) and 
Marcel‘s (2003) discussed above and those discussed in Johnson, van Beers and Haggard 2002 and Johnson 
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[A] particular act can be intentional under both ‗locking a door‘ and ‗turning a key‘. And we 
can bring this out by saying things like ‗I decided to unlock the door by turning the key‘. 
Then in cases like this we might very well have added ‗I decided to unlock the door by 
turning the key by swivelling the hand that grasped the key‘. Here both ends and means are 
chosen and hence are intentional, and the means in this example are chosen right down to 
the basic bodily means of swivelling a hand. The next thing to say is that swivelling is 
generally  a  proprioceptively  detectable  phenomenon:  if  someone  swivels  my  left  hand 
unexpectedly, I am usually immediately and proprioceptively aware of the existence and type 
of that movement. Finally, we should note that intentional acts are known to their owner 
under the heading ‗swivelling a hand‘. Then since one can scarcely know one has swivelled a 
hand  without  knowing  one‘s  hand  has  swivelled,  and  since  one  must  discover  this 
proprioceptively, we are forced to conclude that in a case of this kind—where an act is 
intentional under both instrumental [i.e. non-basic] and basic-act descriptions—and where 
the  latter  is  a  spatially  determinate  description  like  ‗swivel‘—one  must  have  been 
proprioceptively  aware  of  a  determinate  bodily  movement  and  therefore  also  of  body 
positions across time. (O‘Shaughnessy 2000, pp. 631-632) 
 
Note that the argument as quoted does not use a description of an action that exploits a 
bodily demonstrative, since in the case discussed – swivelling – we have a word in English 
for  it,  but  the  general  form  of  the  argument  can  be  extended  to  descriptions  that  use 
demonstratives like ‗reaching in this way‘. (This is clearly O‘Shaughnessy‘s intention.) Thus 
the key move in the argument in such a case employing a demonstrative would be the 
transition: knowing that one has reached in this way requires one to know that one‘s arm has 
moved in this way, where this is anaphoric to the previous ‗this way‘, and that one could 
hardly know the latter but through proprioception.
113 
Having noted this, I want to make three remarks about the argument:  
(One) Can one know that one has swivelled a hand without knowing one‘s hand has 
swivelled proprioceptively? Since efferent nerves are distinct from afferent nerves and we 
can have the former without the latter, if one can be aware of sending efferent signals (i.e. 
motor commands), then it would seem that one can know that one has swivelled a hand 
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without knowing it proprioceptively. Support for this claim also comes from the Jeannerod 
and Marcel experiments described in the previous chapter – the conscious description is 
presumably derived from the motor command plus absence of any error signal reaching 
central planning. Plus, one can know that one‘s hand has swivelled through vision. So in 
general the argument doesn‘t work, but helps to illustrate how O‘Shaughnessy is thinking 
about the matter, which is seductive – but should be resisted. Thus the key transition move 
in the argument is problematic. But we should already have expected this from our previous 
discussion; more interesting is why this line of thought is seductive. 
(Two)  Why  does  this  argument  seem  attractive?  My  suggestion  is  that 
O‘Shaughnessy is trading on a notion of basicness that is causal and assuming that that is the 
only salient notion of basicness for the archetypal case of bodily action (on the assumption 
that the kind of case we have here is somewhat representative). 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s notion  of basicness is  something like this:  A basic action  is an 
action that is not non-basic. An act of kind N is non-basic if and only if an act of kind N 
occurred because some distinct act caused the e-kind event required for an N-kind act. Thus 
if Barry trips because I stick out my leg just as he walks by, then a non-basic act of tripping 
Barry occurred. A bodily act like tilting my head just by moving my head is basic because it 
was my head was tilted just because I tilted my head, and not because I pushed my head 
against a cupboard or because I used my arm to push my head to one side or … 
If we stick only to a causal notion of basicness there are some grounds for thinking 
that where we have some non-basic physical action, like O‘Shaughnessy‘s example of locking 
a door then there are some more basic bodily ways of achieving the event required for this 
act and that it is plausible that the agent has to have some conception of how to unlock a 
door by moving bits of his body in a certain way (say, this way, the agent demonstrating) and 
so it ought to be (in central cases) intentional under the latter description as well. Thus, 
argument has some prima facie attractiveness when we stick to a causal notion of basicness. 
However, if we instead avail ourselves of a notion of teleological basicness (Hornsby 
1980, chapter 6) – where an action of A‘s is teleologically basic if A performs it in order to 
perform some other action, but does not perform some other action in order to perform it – 
and once we see that actions can be teleologically basic and yet not causally basic, then the 
argument can be resisted at an earlier step, because there is no reason to think that if a 
physical action is intentional under some description that is not causally basic, there should 160 
 
(or even must) also be a coordinate description that tells us about the specific bodily means 
(and employs a demonstrative to pick out this specific means) – where it should be plausible 
to think in archetypal cases of bodily action that the action should also be intentional under 
the latter description (i.e. the agent knows that he is striving in that way). Thus the driving 
assumption of the argument – that if we have the act being intentional under a non-causally 
basic description then it ought to also be intentional under a causally basic description – is 
less plausible than it might seem at first sight. 
(Three) However, once we see that actions can be teleologically basic and yet not 
causally  basic,  then  we  can  well  have  spatially  determinate  descriptions  but  yet  are  not 
entitled to license a move from something like ‗I know that I have moved body part X in 
manner Y‘ to ‗I know that my body part X has been moved in manner Y‘ (where the claim 
would then be made that the latter can only be known proprioceptively) – because there 
need not be, from the agent‘s point of view, a more basic bodily means of performing the 
action. Consider, for example, playing a sustained note on the viola in a certain spatially 
determinate way, like playing an open C string with a down bow holding it for eight beats at 
a metronome speed of 40 clicks/minute with the standard posture. Thus, we see that we 
have no description to base the key move of the argument on, because there need be any 
causally basic description that the action is intentional under.  
(Note that our discussion here prefigures our discussion of the planning view. Once 
we  realise  that  there  can  be  teleologically  basic  actions,  alongside  causally  basic  actions, 
where these need not coincide, then this removes some of the drive that physical actions 
always require recessive awareness of the means taken, which would be a more plausible 
thing to think if causally basic actions were the only basic actions there were. Rather, as Julia 
Annas (1978) puts it, ―teleological basicness has reference to the agent‘s plan‖ and is tied to 
the agent‘s view of how he can strive with parts of his body.) 
Thus,  we  may  conclude  that  the  clearest  line  of  argument  from  bodily 
demonstratives to Necessity fails, and the way in which it fails is instructive. But didn‘t we 
start this subsection by noting that applying the Binding strategy to bodily awareness seems 
to both allow for bodily awareness to play an indispensable but less direct role and also cope 
with counterexamples in terms of inaccurate parameters provided by conscious experience? 
Despite the failure of O‘Shaughnessy‘s argument from bodily demonstratives to Necessity, 
perhaps we might still be able to salvage Necessity to some extent by applying the Binding 161 
 
strategy to our case. (I say to some extent because Necessity still will face counterexamples 
from  deafferented  agents  and  BMI  technology;  at  best  we  can  salvage  Necessity  for 
normals.) So let‘s examine how bodily demonstratives might work and whether they can 
support the Binding strategy. 
 
 
5.4.3.   The Bodily Field and Bodily Striving 
 
The key question to ask at this point is whether demonstratives play the same role in bodily 
experience as they do in visual experience. If they do, we may be able to apply the Binding 
strategy  fairly  straightforwardly.  Let  us  begin  by  specifying  the  notion  of  bodily 
demonstratives in play. By a bodily demonstrative, I mean a demonstrative that is used to 
pick  out a certain part of the  body  and certain of its properties (e.g.  its current spatial 
dispositions) based on awareness of the part of the body in question ‗from the inside‘. The 
notion of a sense field, as when we speak of the visual field or the tactile field, is one of the 
spatial extent within which objects may be sensed by a given sense modality. In employing 
the term ‗bodily field‘, I mean to use it as the bodily analogue of the notion of a sensory field 
that we use when we employ terms like the ‗visual field‘ or the ‗tactile field‘; it picks out the 
extent within which objects may be sensed ‗from the inside‘. Unlike the visual and tactile 
fields, within which multiple different objects may appear, there is exactly one object – one‘s 
body and its various parts – that can figure from within the bodily field.
114 
Can we think of the bodily field as a sensory manifold ak in to the visual field? We 
might begin by considering both fields as undifferentiated sensory manifolds in some sense. 
The visual field can be thought of as a conical structure largely defined by the extent of 
receptivity of the eyes to the space and objects within the space through the medium of light. 
                                                 
114 Because of the sole object nature of bodily perception, one may reject that the bodily field is a field of any 
sort, since one might argue that the notion of a field is that of a sensory manifold within which different objects 
may be encountered, identified and perhaps re-identified. But notice that even if there is no question which 
object is the object of the bodily field (and thus no identification involved), recognition may still be involved in 
picking  out various  parts  of the body. For a response to  the related objection that  perception requires a 
potential manifold of objects, see Martin (1995), pp. 279-280. The general line is that we feel our bodies to be 
situated in a space that extends beyond the space that our bodies currently occupy. In kinaesthetic experience, 
when one swings one‘s arms beside one‘s trunk as one walks, one feels them to move across regions of space 
that extend beyond one‘s body but which one does not have sensations in. Thus an adequate description of the 
spatial content of kinaesthetic experience needs to invoke spatial regions beyond the body that one cannot feel 
‗from the inside‘. 162 
 
Although the field decays toward the periphery and is given to the subject as egocentrically 
oriented,  the  field  is  largely  undifferentiated.  At  the  neurophysiological  level,  the  body 
surface,  (perhaps)  the  primary  organ  of  the  bodily  field,  may  also  be  understood  as  an 
undifferentiated sensory sheet, a membrane functioning as a continuous sense field that is 
without any categorical differentiation corresponding to anatomical body parts. And on this 
undifferentiated sensory  sheet,  we  have receptive fields built up from point-like sensory 
structures – cold spots, hot spots, pressure spots, nociceptors and the like. Does this mean 
that we have in the bodily case a spatial field that is akin to the visual one – and thus that 
demonstratives might play a similar role in attention to parts of the field here?
115 
Despite the possibility of seeing both the bodily and visual fields as undifferentiated 
sensory sheets at some level, there appear to be critical differences be tween the spatial 
structures of the two fields.
116 The first difference is one that we have alluded to already: the 
bodily field only has a single object whilst the visual field and the sense fields of each of the 
four other standard senses take an indefinit e number of objects. In consequence, the two 
sense fields have very different characters – one field has objects (potentially) moving in and 
out of it whilst the object of the other is a single object that remains constantly with one. On 
the face of it, we would expect that this has repercussions for the functions of the fields and 
how attention works within each field to single out parts of the fields – (potentially) different 
objects in the visual field versus parts of the one object in the bodily field. 
Another  salient  difference  has  to  do  with  whether  the  sensory  field  presents  its 
subject not only with objects in space (and their spatial properties) but also with the region 
of space the objects inhabit. It appears that the visual field has this character whilst the 
bodily field doesn‘t. We can bring this out by considering how the perception of absences 
works in the two modalities. Consider the Polo mint, a little ring-shaped piece of candy and 
a subject‘s visual experience of it head-on. One sees not only the solid bits of the mint, but 
also the hole in the middle and the empty space just around the mint. There is no analogue 
of this in the bodily field. There, any part that is apparently felt ‗from the inside‘ is thereby 
                                                 
115 We may want to distinguish between a somatosensory mereology – an articulation of the body into parts 
based on somatosensory input – and a motor mereology – an articulation based on the need to and effects 
from moving the natural motor units of the body. See de Vignemont, Taskiris, and Haggard 2005 for some 
discussion. 
116 This discussion of the contrasts between the bodily field and the visual field is deeply indebted to M. G. F. 
Martin‘s pioneering work on bodily awareness. See especially Martin 1993, section II, and also Martin 1992, 
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felt to be a part of the body and the body is thereby felt to extend to that point. Thus there 
can be no sensing of absences in the bodily field since any point which is sensed is felt to be 
present as a part of the body. (Drawing this contrast does not commit us to the general claim 
concerning  visual  experience  that  spatial  experience  in  the  visual  modality  is  ipso  facto 
experience of space, since there may be forms of visual experience, such as certain forms of 
visual  agnosia,  where  the  subject‘s  spatial  experience  is  so  impoverished  that  it  cannot 
support experience of the ambient space within which the objects are situated.)  
But once we come to grips with the sole-object character of bodily awareness and 
the observation that any part that is apparently felt ‗from the inside‘ is thereby felt to be a 
part of the body, it can be seen that the role of visual space in visual perception is quite 
different from that of bodily space in bodily awareness. The limits of experience in bodily 
awareness correspond to the limits of one‘s body, and any experience is structured in terms 
of  its  location  on  one‘s  body  and  not  in  terms  of  its  location  in  an  ambient  space 
independent of one‘s body.  
The obvious riposte from the proponent of the visual model for the bodily field is 
that the difference between the bodily and visual fields is one of degree, not kind – where 
the  quantity  varied  is  the  amount  of  spatial  information  conveyed  by  the  modality  in 
question.  The  suggestion  is  that  visual  spatial  resolution  is  much  better  than  spatial 
resolution in the bodily case and this explains the differences that we have raised. To answer 
this, we need to consider the differences between two cases that the proponent of this 
riposte would be committed to claiming are similar (Martin 1993, pp. 215-216). First we have 
Evans‘s (1985) example of viewing four points of light arranged in a square array with spaces 
between the four points of light, where the subject is only aware of the four points in space 
at some indeterminate distance. Now contrast Martin‘s (1993) beleaguered climber who is 
sprawled across a sheer cliff face with his four limbs gripping four points on the cliff which 
as a matter of fact form a square with the same metrical properties as Evans‘s array. In both 
cases  the  subject  is  aware  of  four  points  arranged  as  a  square  with  the  same  metric 
properties, in the former via visual means and in the latter via tactuo-kinaesthetic means. Yet 
if the foregoing observations are correct, then the content of the subject‘s awareness in each 
case is very different – contrary to what the objector must hold. In seeing the four points of 
light arranged as a square, the viewer has awareness not just of the four points of light, but 
also of the empty space that stands between and around the points. The climber, however, 164 
 
can have no awareness of the space in the middle of and surrounding the points where he is 
holding on to the rock face. He can have a sense of the square arrangement of the four 
points by being aware of the way his limbs are displaced, but this means gives him no 
awareness of the space between the points and certainly does not present him with the 
ambient space. While the objector is quite right to think that spatial resolution is typically 
much higher in the case of vision than in the bodily case, this is not to say that there are no 
structural differences. The comparison between Evans‘s light array and Martin‘s beleaguered 
climber suggests that structural differences in the respective sense fields remain even when 
the spatial information conveyed is intuitively the same; so structural dissimilarities may not 
be explained away in this manner. 
But why think these differences mark out some  radical dissimilarity between the 
structures of the fields qua sensory fields? After all, why can‘t we be minimalist about the 
specification of what‘s constitutive of a sensory field? Thus we might think of the visual field 
as a spatial region within which visual awareness is possible, and analogously of bodily space 
as a region within which bodily awareness is possible. Whilst there is no error in conceiving 
of sense fields in this minimal manner, but why think such a thin conception would license 
the inference from the role of demonstratives in the visual case to the bodily case? Unless 
one can show that the minimal conception is all that one can say, but our remarks about 
putative structural dissimilarities indicate that there is more to dissimilarities amongst sense 
fields than the minimal conception would have it. 
It is clear then, that there are deep structural differences between the visual and 
bodily field. What, however, does this tell us about our original question concerning the role 
of  demonstratives  in  the  two  fields?  Given  the  contrast  between  spatial  properties  as 
presented in the visual field and the bodily field do demonstratives play a similar role in the 
bodily field as in the visual field? 
Let us draw our study of contrasts to a close and return to the original question we 
posed:  it  seems  that  at  some level,  we  can  conceptualise  the  visual  and  bodily  fields  as 
undifferentiated sensory sheets, and if so might not demonstratives play the same role in 
structuring awareness of the bodily field as in the visual domain? In answer to this, we must 
remember that the level at which the bodily field was characterised as an undifferentiated 
sensory  sheet  was  neurophysiological.  Surely  we  cannot  get  into  a  question  concerning 
demonstratives  at  that  very  level  (it  would  be  a  talking  across  of  levels,  a  sort  of 165 
 
incommensurability), so lack of differentiation at that level wouldn‘t be sufficient for a lack 
of differentiation of the bodily field as it is given in experience – which is what we are 
interested  in.  But  we  find  that  the  field  fails  to  remain  undifferentiated  even 
neurophysiologically: 
 
The body surface may be viewed as an undifferentiated tactile sheet, without categorical 
divisions  corresponding  to  anatomical  body  parts.  …  A  structured  map  arises  because 
specific  patterns  of  lateral inhibition  emerge  during  sensory  experience. Indeed,  primary 
somatosensory representations do generally follow the natural anatomical divisions of body 
parts,  having  receptive fields  confined  to  single  fingers  or  limbs … Differentiation  into 
distinct body parts at the primary somatosensory level may be a reflection of how our bodies 
have been used, rather than a natural unit of neural representation. (de Vignemont, Tsakiris, 
and Haggard 2005, pp. 149-150) 
 
What this suggests is that regardless of whether the bodily field begins as an undifferentiated 
sensory sheet (at some level), in order to understand the bodily field we have to consider 
how the imposition of cognitive representations of body impacts experience of the bodily 
field.  
The possibilities of how bodily experience may be structured in a way that attests to 
the use agents make of their bodies suggests that there might be an alternative model of the 
bodily field: the categorical or map model of the bodily field. In contrast to the model of 
sense fields provided by the visual field – that of a largely undifferentiated sensory manifold 
parts of which are ‗lighted up‘ by demonstratives – the map model of the bodily field is a 
topological one. It is topological because it considers the body as differentiated in terms of its 
categorically distinct parts (head, arm, wrist, hand, foot, etc.) and their spatial relations with 
each other, and also because it characterises the body as that which remains invariant under 
allowable (that is, allowable by the hinges that connect body parts and the muscles that move 
them) transformations of the spatial layout of parts of the body. 
Reflection on bodily experience appears to strong favour a categorical or map model 
of the bodily field over a model of it as an undifferentiated continuum parts of which have 
to be ‗lighted up‘ by demonstratives (as on a visual ‗tracking‘ model). Here are five reasons: 166 
 
(One) Are demonstratives necessary? The body is the sole object of perception; bodily 
awareness is perception of and only of the body. In contrast with visual perception or touch, 
where we can perceive many different things, in bodily awareness we are in contact with one 
and  only  one  object  that  the  agent  cannot  rid  himself  of.  Given  the  functional  role  of 
demonstratives  that  we  earlier  adumbrated,  this  suggests  that  demonstratives  are  not 
necessary for picking out bits of the body and their properties; they may be employed in ad 
hoc awareness of bits of the body but this does not mean that any attention to these bits 
requires demonstratives (as is plausible in the visual field). This is because demonstratives are 
often used – and only become an epistemic necessity – for singling out things that one 
comes into contact with only once. For example, we are wandering in a desert and we note 
that as we crossed this bit of space we heard a vulture squawk. But one‘s body is always with 
one and one has a limited repertoire of moves one can make with one‘s body defined by its 
degrees of freedom and various parameters characterising the effectors (fatigue, injury, etc.). 
Whilst it is true that in human languages we do not have many words for these things, there 
is no bar to us giving names to all these different positions, moves and contortions that the 
body can take. (It still remains true that there is a continuum of variation in, to take an 
example, positions that a limb can take: say, the right arm stretched out straight at a right 
angle to the chest as opposed to the right arm stretched out straight at 90.2  to the chest. 
But these are not differences that are conceptually salient for us because we cannot detect 
them for the most part.) 
Also, the visual field, as we mentioned earlier, has a far higher spatial resolution (as 
the point discrimination tasks attest to), whereas spatial differentiation in the bodily field is 
much coarser. Often experience of the body is localised no more finely than of some body 
part (e.g. ―She caressed my arm‖ or ―My toe hurts‖), whilst the information rich visual 
channel has a great need for a demonstrative device that picks out fine bits of the field since 
there is no natural differentiation into parts of the field (except for the very rough egocentric 
slicings: left, right, up, down, and so on).
117 
(Two) Parsimonious engineering. If we think of the different models of the bodily field in 
terms of engineering them, it would appear that the map model is far more efficient. The 
map model doesn‘t require a system with two levels operating: first an undifferentiated sense 
                                                 
117 This is not to deny that bodily awareness provides a rich source of demonstratives. My point is only that 
demonstratives are not, strictly speaking, necessary for bodily awareness, since it is already structured.   167 
 
field and then a pointer system that allows the subject of the field to attend to demonstrated 
bits of the field. This would be computationally a lot more expensive than the map model of 
the bodily field. Rather, on the map model we can stick to a single system with the body 
articulated into various parts. Parsimony, on its own, provides at best a prima facie reason for 
the map model and would be dialectically quite insufficient against the opposing model – 
especially since there is no guarantee that evolution generates the most parsimonious system. 
However, parsimony weighs in for the map model because the map model it recommends 
tallies with so much else that we know about striving with the body: that we are able to 
imagine acting when we are twice or half our size and that conceptions of striving appear to 
be  body  part-based  (or  to  use  the  term  of  de  Vignemont  and  her  colleagues,  ‗motor 
mereology‘ is joint based). We now turn to these other reasons. 
(Three) Imagining acting when we are shrunken or expanded. We have no problem at all 
with conceiving of how we might strive with parts of our bodies if we were shrunken or 
expanded. In fact, imagining what it is like to kick my foot forward when I‘m twice my size 
doesn‘t seem at all different from what it is actually like to kick my foot forward. This is 
something  that  the  opposing  undifferentiated-continuum-having-to-be-lighted-up-by-
demonstrative  model  of  the  bodily  field  cannot  quite  explain.  On  the  undifferentiated-
continuum-having-to-be-lighted-up-by-demonstrative model, since what one is dealing with 
in terms of the input is a spatial field of a specific extent, bits of which one picks out via 
bodily demonstratives – and this is what one trades on when one strives with one‘s body – 
systematic scaled changes in size should impact how one conceives of one‘s striving. Acting 
when one is twice one‘s size or half of one‘s size should be dramatically different in terms of 
the sensory parameters one is presented with. But this does not tally with the ease with 
which  we  are  able  to  imagine  acting  when  we  are  shrunken  or  expanded.  In  fact,  in 
imagining acting in these scenarios we seem to think of striving with our body in the same 
way we ordinarily think of striving with our body. Perhaps the world in one‘s imagination 
will be different – dramatically smaller or bigger – but flexing one‘s biceps won‘t be that 
different  because  the  idea  is  that  one  extends  one‘s  forearm  out  and  retracts  it  back. 
Assuming  that  imagining  acting  when  one‘s  size  changes  proportionately  exploits  our 
ordinary, operative conception of how one strives, this appears to support my contention 
that the conception of how one strives with one‘s body is part based and that the metric is 168 
 
based on relative distances rather than absolute ones (the explanation of the latter being the 
map or categorical character of the bodily field).  
It is important to note that representations of the body carry both qualitative and 
quantitative information. Geometric – and not only topological – aspects of the body and its 
parts are also crucial to these representations as geometric information about the body is 
crucial to planning and executing action. The agent does not only need to know what kinds 
of parts he has and how they are roughly structured relative to each other, but also the 
(relative) sizes of these parts. I have so far only discussed metric elements, but it is plausible 
to think that analogous points would hold with dynamic elements, such as the forces that we 
need to exert, as well. Here the way we conceive of the forces required seem to be in terms 
of a practical grasp of the intended effects on body parts. 
(Four) Conceptions of striving are body-part based. The body is segmented into parts that 
are moveable and unmoveable via a series of joints. If a certain bit of the body belongs to a 
certain body part it retains its position within the body part (and within a skeletal framework 
of where the parts fit) no matter how that part is moved. Thus body parts (hinged by joints 
and driven by muscles) are the natural units of movement.
118 Given this, it would make the 
best sense if the conception of striving is bound to bits of the body that move together when 
one strives. Since the natural units are segments defined by joints, then it would make the 
most sense if the agent‘s conception of striving is given in terms of practical possibilities of a 
body that is segmented into moveable parts.
119  
(Five) A further worry about attentional overload? Here is a final reason to favour the 
categorical model over the demonstrative model of attending to the body. If we require 
demonstratives in every case of bodily awareness for motor purposes we seem to have a 
                                                 
118 This is not to deny that there are cases of bodily action, e.g.  breathing or pulling in one‘s stomach or 
changing the direction of one‘s gaze by rotating one‘s eyes, where we aren‘t moving bones and limbs. 
119 Cf.:  ―Interestingly,  a  motor  mereology  begins  with  a  different  spatial  object  from  a  somatosensory 
mereology.  We  have  already  described  the  somatosensory  body  surface  as  an  undifferentiated  sheet.  In 
contrast, the starting point of motor mereology would be the set of muscles that one can voluntarily move. 
This is a group of different objects, rather than a continuous sensory organ. Furthermore, intentional actions 
impose an additional functional organisation because of the sets of body parts that work together in intentional 
movements. For example, when I move my forearm, my hand and fingers follow. In contrast, if someone 
touches my forearm, this usually does not tell me anything about the sensation in my hand and fingers. … 
A  more  conceptual  way  of  thinking  about  body  representation  may  suggest  that  action  plays  an 
important role in imposing categorical structure on body space. In particular, we act around our joints, and 
these  become  body-part  boundaries.  While  there  seem  to  be  no  specific  natural  boundaries  for  the 
somatosensory body, we may suggest that the joints constitute the landmarks for segmenting the acting body.‖ 
(de Vignemont, Tsakiris and Haggard 2005, p. 151). See also Bermúdez 1998, ch. 6, and 2006. 169 
 
problem with attentional overload – since it would appear that this requires attention both to 
the task (directed outwards) and also to awareness of the body because attention is necessary 
for demonstration. It is unclear whether this strategy can be employed in a case when the 
awareness of the body is recessive, for otherwise it would interfere with attention directed 
toward the task (as O‘Shaughnessy notes).  
I conclude that these reasons appear to strongly favour the categorical model of the 
bodily field over the model of it as an undifferentiated continuum parts of which have to be 
‗lighted up‘ by demonstratives. This, however, means that the Binding strategy cannot be 
applied in the case of bodily awareness to salvage the thesis that occurrent awareness of a 
body  part  is  in  some  sense  necessary  for  striving  with  that  body  part,  since  bodily 
demonstratives do not appear to be a necessary aspect of the agent‘s conception of how he 
strives with his body (as the bodily analogue of the Binding strategy in the visuomotor case 
would have it). Necessity cannot be salvaged. And the error is to think that demonstratives 
structure the bodily field just as they structure the visual field. The positive moral of our 
discussion is that the structure of bodily awareness is very different from visual awareness, 
and it turns out that the unique structure of the bodily sense field places constraints on how 
the agent can strive with his body. In particular, since the natural units of movement of the 
body are parts of it that are hinged by joints and driven by muscles, having some sense of 
what one can do with one‘s body had better be sensitive to how the body is segmented into 
these parts. With this idea in play we are now ready to articulate our positive picture of what 
the intimate connexion might consist in. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
 
5.5.   Planning: the autonomy of direct control 
 
Where does this leave us in the dialectic? 
Allow me to round up the strategy and summarise the state of the dialectic. The 
previous section analysed what is mistaken in the arguments for Necessity. The point of this 
section was to diagnose why we found the picture of the intimate connexion between bodily 
awareness and agency embodied in Necessity so attractive. I suggested that the source of the 
error concerned the link between bodily demonstratives and action explanation. Our strategy 
there involved exploiting some ideas about the link between perceptual demonstratives and 170 
 
action explanation in the visuomotor case and exploring how far we can export ideas about 
the  visuomotor  case  to  that  of  bodily  awareness  and  agency.  From  discussion  of  the 
pressures that empirical work has placed on understanding how visual experience guides 
action,  we  retreated  to  the  idea  that  the  role  of  consciousness  is  to  bind  visual 
demonstratives which sets the objects that the vision-for-action or pragmatic system then 
engages  with.  This  strategy  whereby  the  experiential  and  the  pragmatic  systems  play 
complementary roles was called ‗Binding‘. The suggestion was to apply the Binding idea to 
the bodily case, exploring whether this might vindicate the Target-Object line of thought 
about the role of bodily awareness vis-à-vis bodily agency to some extent. The idea being 
that if we could see bodily awareness as necessary for selecting the targets for the dedicated 
action system to engage with, we would both allow for the counterexamples from cognitive 
psychology and secure a role for bodily awareness in action control for normals. To this end, 
we  began  looking  at  bodily  demonstratives  and  exploring  their  possible  role  in  action 
explanation. This exploration came in three phases. We began by looking at an argument of 
O‘Shaughnessy‘s from bodily demonstratives to Necessity. There we saw that the crucial 
transition in the argument failed for various reasons. Despite the failure of this promising 
argument from bodily demonstratives to Necessity, the Binding strategy remains open, as 
long  as  we  can  make  out  bodily  demonstratives  as  playing  a  similar  role  to  visual 
demonstratives in action explanation. The second phase of the exploration attempted to 
answer  the  question  of  whether  bodily  demonstratives  do  play  an  analogous  role.  We 
examined differences between the bodily field and the visual field and concluded that these 
two sensory fields are structurally very different. This still left the question of whether bodily 
demonstratives play an analogous role to visual demonstratives open. In the third and final 
phase, we examined competing views of our awareness of our bodies. We contrasted a map 
or categorical view of the body – based on structuring the body into its natural units of 
movement – with a view which sees the body as an undifferentiated sensory field attention 
to  parts  of  which  require  demonstratives.  We  saw  very  strong  reasons  to  favour  the 
categorical  view.  But  demonstratives  are  not  necessary  for  bodily  awareness  on  the 
map/categorical view, so we cannot employ the Binding strategy for bodily awareness and 
agency  and  thus  cannot use  this  line  of  thought  to  vindicate  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  idea  (for 
normals). This allows us to give a diagnosis for why Necessity seemed so attractive: the 171 
 
mistake was to think of demonstratives as playing a role in bodily awareness and agency akin 
to the role they play in the visuomotor case.  
The positive moral of our discussion is that the structure of bodily awareness is very 
different from visual awareness, and it turns out that the unique structure of the bodily sense 
field places constraints on how the agent can strive with his body. In particular, since the 
natural units of movement of the body are parts of it that are hinged by joints and driven by 
muscles, having some sense of what one can do with one‘s body had better be sensitive to 
how the body is segmented into these parts. This provides us with the crucial clue to what 
the intimate connexion might consist in. It is to this that we turn in this final section. 
 
 
5.5.1.   Bodily awareness as providing a sense of practical possibilities with one‘s body 
 
I propose that we develop the idea that we have direct control over our bodies because we 
feel our bodies ‗from the inside‘, but relax the link between Feeling and Direct Control. 
Necessity represents the most attractive answer to our question, but falls prey to various 
empirical  counterexamples  which  show  that  online  control  cannot  be  due  to  conscious 
bodily awareness. This suggests that if we are to hold on to the idea that there is an intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and agency, the connexion between bodily awareness 
and bodily action will be a less tight and less obvious one than bodily experience playing a 
direct role in online control. Furthermore, we have seen that the unique structure of bodily 
awareness places constraints on how the agent can strive with his body; in particular, unlike 
in visual awareness, it is not plausible to think that bodily demonstratives are necessary for 
acting with one‘s body. Rather, I claim that bodily experience plays an essential role in action 
planning, since to plan an action is to have some conception of what you can do – which 
requires body schemata and awareness of current bodily dispositions. My proposal is that the 
point of bodily awareness is to give the agent a sense of what he can do with his body parts 
so that he can plan his actions. In other words,  the  function  of bodily awareness is to 
provide for a sense of practical possibilities of action afforded by one‘s body. This then 
allows the agent to plan his actions. Call this position Planning. I will be arguing that Planning 
is the best answer to our question. 172 
 
We will now attempt to argue for the planning view. We begin with the unifying 
diagnosis offered in the previous subsection, that bodily striving is constrained by a sense of 
what we can do with body parts. Query: How do we come to get a sense of what we can do 
with our body parts? How do we come to know what the limits of bodily striving are? 
Answer: bodily awareness. So what‘s the role of bodily awareness vis-à-vis action? Its role is 
to give us a practical sense of the spatial possibilities of our body parts – of how they afford 
action. This is opposed to the earlier model embodied in conscious on-line control, which 
posits a more direct link between occurrent awareness of a body part and directly acting with 
that body part. Rather, we have seen that bodily awareness plays a less obvious role in 
structuring one‘s sense of how one can strive with one‘s body parts and thereby enabling 
one to plan one‘s actions. To summarise: my suggestion is that the role of bodily awareness is 
to give sense of limits of bodily striving. This in turn is what the agent trades on in planning 
his actions. 
Here is a sketch of how the argument for this position would run:  
We begin by posing our dilemma and responding to it. Counterexamples show that 
the thesis that bodily awareness is necessary for on-line control is false, since there are cases 
where awareness is not required, yet we have action. But the argument from numbsense also 
shows that intentional action on objects requires that the agent not just be able to exploit 
affordances of objects acted on but that these affordances must be manifest to the agent. 
Notice, however, that the latter is a condition on intentional action, not a condition on 
action as such. We can thus allow that action generally does not require conscious awareness 
of objects in all instances, and therefore accommodate the counterexamples. 
But why is bodily awareness a condition on intentional action? We know that when 
it‘s absent the agent loses a source of reasons for acting. What‘s lost is a practical sense of 
the spatial possibilities of our body parts – of how they afford action. How so? Part of acting 
intentionally involves, in some sense, knowingly taking some means toward an end. If we 
restrict ourselves to the teleologically basic ways that an agent can act, or the agent‘s basic 
repertoire of things that he can just do without doing anything else, then it is plausible to 
think that the agent has to have some grasp of the different possible ways he can directly act 
in order to achieve his overarching end. The agent‘s basic repertoire is of course that range 
of things that he can just take himself to do without doing anything else, and if the agent is 
to do anything that is not within his basic repertoire then he ultimately has to do it by doing 173 
 
one of the actions that are basic to him. If the agent lacked this grasp of the different 
possible ways that he can act basically in response to his aims in a certain situation, it would 
be hard to see how he can exploit his basic repertoire of abilities to achieve his overarching 
end. Actions are robust in that they exhibit means-ends flexibility, so this practical grasp of 
possible basic means is presupposed by the agent‘s capacity to act.
120 Thus we see that a 
practical sense of the basic actions open to one is crucial to intentional action. (In non-
intentional action, these basic actions are exploited without grasp of the possible ways open 
and the agent settling on one amongst the many possible ways open.) 
But now the question arises as to how we gain a practical sense of the basic actions 
open to one. It is plausible to think that this will at least involve a practical sense of the 
spatial possibilities of our body parts – of how they afford action – since the spatial possibilities 
of our body parts will constrain what basic actions are possible for one. For normal agents, 
this practical sense will primarily come from bodily awareness (with some contribution from 
vision).
121 But notice that bodily awareness understood as a form of perception cannot by 
itself provide for awareness of bodily  potential,  since  the content of awareness of bodily 
potential  is  not passive.  Awareness  of  bodily  possibilities  is  not  just  a  matter  of  bodily 
perception ‗from the inside‘ but also requires some imaginative capacity on the part of the 
subject to extrapolate from past trials and current awareness. (Bodily awareness thus has an 
imaginative role in action planning.)  
In our discussion of spatial action and egocentric axes, we already came across a 
notion that is of clear importance here: the long-term body image. This, as we saw earlier, is, 
roughly,  a settled picture of one‘s own  physical dimensions,  which may change (slowly) 
depending on development of the body (grafts, amputations, growth). This describes the 
structure of one‘s body – how it is shaped, sized and hinged – and thus what possibilities of 
movement are open to one. This tells us what basic actions the body can afford and thus 
constrains  action  planning.  Note  that  the  long-term  body  image  is  not  an  occurrent 
experience but rather a kind of persisting cognitive representation of the body – one that the 
agent may exploit in imaginative consideration of what courses of action are open to him 
(i.e. off-line action planning). My suggestion is that what bodily awareness does, in part, is to 
                                                 
120 In formulating my argument here I have been influenced by Lucy O‘Brien‘s discussion of basic action and 
knowledge of action; see O‘Brien 2007, pp. 163-168, 189 fn. 29. 
121 Large issues lurk here concerning the multimodal character of most ordinary experience, so perception will 
typically involve contributions from visual as well as bodily awareness. 174 
 
contribute  to  fixing  one‘s  long  term  body  image  which  then  defines  a  sense  of  one‘s 
boundaries and provides for a practical grasp of what one can do with one‘s parts.
122  
 
 
5.5.2.   Consistency with Cartesian Non-Pilot?  
 
However,  at  this  point  a  question  arises  as  to  whether  Planning  is  consistent  with  the 
distinctive phenomenology of embodiment that we earlier called the Cartesian Non-Pilot. The 
starting point for our reflections on bodily awareness and its relation to bodily agency was 
Descartes‘s observation that we are not in our bodies as pilots are in their ships. There we 
suggested that Descartes‘s remark captures the distinctive role that the body plays in both 
perception and action. One‘s body is the only material object that one feels ‗from the inside‘ 
and is the direct respondent to one‘s will. These are the two aspects of the Cartesian Non-
Pilot: Feeling and Direct Control. 
It is very clear how a view like Necessity adequately captures the Cartesian Non-
Pilot, since it claims that parameters from conscious bodily awareness are always required in 
order for one to directly act with the body part in question. Thus Feeling and Direct Control 
are always present in any bodily action. But Necessity, as we saw, is subject to a large number 
of counterexamples from cognitive psychology and cannot be the correct articulation of the 
relation between bodily awareness and bodily action. However, once we relax the relation 
between Feeling and Direct Control – as on Planning – so that conscious bodily awareness is 
not  always  involved  in  the  online  control  of  action,  it  is  far  less  clear  how  the  two 
components  of  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot  come  together  to  capture  the  distinctive 
phenomenology of embodiment. On the planning view, Direct Control is to a large extent 
autonomous from Feeling, since there is no need to first target one‘s body part in order to 
strive with it, and also no need to rely on bodily awareness in online action control. Bodily 
awareness is only required for the planning of actions and also for a sense of the practical 
possibilities that body parts afford. But we do not need to plan all our actions and also do 
not always reflect on what we can do with a body part or how we can act with it – even in 
the most inarticulate sense – prior to acting to the body part in question. This, however, 
                                                 
122 Cf.  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  discussion  of  the  long-term  body  image  as  giving  one  a  sense  of  one‘s  practical 
possibilities in The Will, vol. 1, pp. 225, 246-248. 175 
 
raises the question of the role of the Feeling component in such a theory. Though it does 
play a crucial role, does it play enough of a role in order to capture the phenomenology of 
ordinary bodily action? After all, one could be a pilot in a ship in the sense of not feeling 
one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and having to perceive the body solely by sight, and yet have 
direct control of one‘s body – as we see in the cases of deafferented agents like IW. 
On Planning, the agent always has direct control over his body and yet does not 
always  need  to  feel  it  ‗from  the  inside‘  –  so  is  this  view  ultimately  consistent  with  the 
Cartesian Non-Pilot? This raises the question of the role of the ‗from the inside‘ element on 
the Planning theory, which we shall attempt to answer in the next chapter. 
 
 
5.6.   Summary and conclusion  
 
We have covered an enormous amount of ground in this chapter. Our reflections in this 
chapter began with the conflict between lived experience and cognitive psychology about the 
role of bodily awareness in bodily action that we ended chapter 4 with. The task of this 
chapter was to resolve the conflict. After a series of extended analyses of (one) where the 
arguments for Necessity went wrong, (two) of whether a role for bodily awareness in online 
control based on a requirement that bodily demonstratives are necessary for action was 
defensible, and (three) of differences between the bodily field and the visual field, we were 
finally in a position to articulate a plausible account of the intimate connexion between 
bodily awareness and bodily action: Planning.  
From our comparative study of the bodily and visual fields, we saw that the unique 
structure of the bodily sense field places constraints on how the agent can strive with his 
body.  This  provided  a  critical  clue  for  what  the  intimate  connexion  between  bodily 
awareness and bodily agency must consist in. We suggested that seeing bodily awareness as 
providing for a sense of practical possibility is the best way to understand the role of bodily 
awareness  in  motor  control.  This  is  because  Planning  allows  us  to  both  recognise  that 
Feeling is not essential on-line control yet affirm that it is crucial for the capacity for motor 
control in normal agents. Despite seeming progress, we were unable to rest on our laurels. A 
worry  arose  that  Planning  is  not  obviously  consistent  with  the  phenomenology  of 
embodiment in everyday experience, as Planning appears to stress the autonomy of Direct 176 
 
Control to the detriment of the ‗from the inside‘ element. The task of the next chapter is to 
show why Planning is consistent with the Cartesian Non-Pilot and to tease out the reasons 
behind their harmony. 177 
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In this chapter, we will attempt to show that the planning view best captures the intimate 
connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency. Let us review our progress up to 
now. In the previous chapter, we found a plausible way to resolve the conflict between lived 
experience  and  cognitive  psychology  concerning  the  role  of  bodily  awareness  in  bodily 
action.  We  carved  out  this  route  by  first  formulating  a  strategy  of  response,  and  then 
chiselling away to shape the exact response, which came in the form of Planning. Once we 
saw the force of the conflict we are faced with, we turned to devising a strategy in response. 
Our strategy, roughly, is to tease out the insight behind Necessity whilst articulating a role 
for bodily awareness in the control of action which is at a remove from on-line control. We 
implemented this strategy by first analysing what is mistaken in the arguments we considered 
for Necessity. We then considered a second way to argue for Necessity as the articulation of 
the relation between Feeling and Direct Control for normal agents by exploiting a perceived 
link between demonstratives and action explanation that has been used to tackle parallel 
empirical challenges facing visual awareness in the control of visuomotor actions. We tried 
to  develop  an  argument  for  the  indispensability  of  bodily  demonstratives  in  action 
explanation, which would ensure the need for feeling the body parts one is acting directly 
with  ‗from  the  inside‘  –  so  that  one  can  demonstrate  the  relevant  part.  This  led  us  to 
undertake a comparative study of the visual and bodily fields in order to evaluate this option. 178 
 
Our conclusion was that the bodily sense field differs radically in terms of its structure from 
the visual field, which is the sense modality that most other sense modalities are understood 
in terms of. It turns out that the unique structure of the bodily sense field places constraints 
on how the agent can strive with his body. We then suggested that seeing bodily awareness 
as providing for a sense of practical possibility is the best way to understand the role of 
bodily awareness in motor control. The planning view of bodily awareness allows us to 
simultaneously recognise that Feeling is not necessary for on-line control but accept that it is 
crucial for the capacity for motor control in normal agents, since bodily awareness is a condition 
on having a sense of the practical possibilities of one‘s body parts for normal agents. But a 
worry  arose  that  Planning  is  not  obviously  consistent  with  the  phenomenology  of 
embodiment in everyday experience, as Planning appears to emphasise the autonomy of 
Direct Control to the detriment of the ‗from the inside‘ element. 
We shall now pick up where we left off in the previous chapter, which is the worry 
that Planning is not consistent with the Cartesian Non-Pilot. In order to respond to this 
worry, we have to focus on the importance of the ‗from the inside‘ element. To this end, we 
will once again contrast vision with bodily awareness, not in terms of the different perceptual 
sense fields, but in terms of imagery within the modality – since planning has to do with 
knowledge of practical possibilities which are partially revealed in sensory imagination. This 
will allow us to pinpoint the contribution of bodily awareness through motor imagery. We 
then  turn  to  further  clarifying  the  planning  view  by  spelling  out  its  commitments  and 
through considering potential objections against it. We end the chapter by returning to the 
light the Planning theory sheds on the situation of the normal agent, describing the situation 
he finds himself in with respect to awareness of his own body ‗from the inside‘ and its 
relation to his bodily actions. 
 
 
6.1.   Is Planning consistent with the Cartesian Non-Pilot? 
 
We can put the worry that we ended the previous chapter with in another way: Does there 
remain an intimate connexion if we deny that bodily awareness always figures in online 
control?  179 
 
Let us remind ourselves of where we are in the dialectic: (1) We know that normal 
agents do have bodily awareness of various body parts that they can directly act with, and (2) 
that in certain (many? central?) instances, bodily awareness is both present, and provides a 
source  of  reasons  for  the  agent  acting  in  the  way  that  he  does.  (3)  In  discussing  the 
significance of numbsense (chapter 2), we drew the moral that given that bodily awareness is 
often present, when it is present it cannot merely play a causal role in driving behaviour. It 
also has to play a rational role: otherwise (4) we cannot understand the role of awareness 
(when  it  is  present)  in  normal  bodily  agency  and  (5)  we  will  be  committed  to  the 
phenomenology of ordinary agency being inaccurate. Therefore we are still compelled to 
articulate an intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily agency despite the 
failure  of  Necessity.  I  contend  that  Planning  satisfies  this  theoretical  demand.  But  does 
Planning capture the phenomenology of everyday agency? This is an issue of tremendous 
importance, since the Cartesian Non-Pilot was the initial stimulus for our reflections on the 
relation between bodily awareness and bodily agency. 
So far the statement of the phenomenological worry has been in intuitive, but rather 
imprecise  terms.  A  more  serious  engagement  with  the  worry  will  require  that  we  first 
articulate the alleged problem of the consistency of Planning with the Cartesian Non-Pilot in 
more detail. It is simplest to approach this task negatively. Remember that the Cartesian 
Non-Pilot consists of two aspects, Feeling and Direct Control. In bodily action as we know 
it, these two aspects are intertwined and complementary. Clearly the problem here is not one 
to do with the absence of Direct Control, but has to do with the role of Feeling. Necessity, it 
seems,  very  adequately  met  the  requirements  of  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot.  The  model 
embodied in Necessity is one where the two aspects of the Cartesian Non-Pilot are united in 
every bodily act: the parameters provided by feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ are always 
required for online control of one‘s bodily actions. Similarly, if we consider the related model 
that we arrived at through developing Campbell‘s ‗binding‘ strategy for bodily awareness 
(chapter 5, section 5.4), since a bodily demonstrative is critical for directly acting with a body 
part, Feeling and Direct Control are once again unified in the agent‘s bodily strivings. But 
when we examine the model embodied in Planning, neither bodily demonstratives directed 
at body parts one is striving with nor occurrent bodily awareness of the body parts one is 
directly acting with is required. So the Feeling aspect takes a back seat – which is the way 
things have to be given the counterexamples against Necessity. We should not see the role of 180 
 
bodily awareness as primarily residing in its being the crucial source of parameters for online 
control of bodily actions. We have shown that an agent can have direct control over body 
parts that he does not currently feel ‗from the inside‘. So Direct Control is autonomous from 
Feeling and there is neither a requirement for feeling to provide a ‗target-object‘ for the 
bodily will to engage with in every case of striving with a body part nor any necessity for 
relying on bodily awareness for feedback in online action control. Rather, on the planning 
view, the role of bodily awareness is primarily in action planning, through the contribution 
of bodily awareness to providing for a sense of the practical possibilities that body parts 
afford for the agent. But the question arises as to why bodily awareness should be thought to 
be necessary here – even for the normal agent engaged in ordinary bodily strivings. We don‘t 
need to plan all our actions and seldom reflect on what we can do with a body part of how 
we can act with it, and there is no denying that other sense modalities which are principally 
exteroceptive can also provide information about one‘s body parts when bodily awareness is 
absent.  
Does Planning, then, leave agents in the plight of pilots in body vessels? One might 
think that the answer is, in some sense, yes, since it is unclear what resources the planning 
theory has for ruling out the exteroceptive senses – most importantly, vision – as capable of 
providing substitute sources of information – in place of bodily awareness – about body 
parts that one  seeks to strive with, even for normal agents. If sight of one‘s limbs can 
provide  for  a  sense  of  the  practical  possibilities  afforded  by  one‘s  limbs  and  thus  also 
support action planning, it is unclear why there is a need for the agent to feel his body ‗from 
the  inside‘  and  why  bodily  awareness  should  be  thought  to  have  an  especially  intimate 
connexion with bodily agency. The looseness of the connexion between Feeling and Direct 
Control  is what allows Planning to cope with the empirical  counterexamples whilst still 
preserving an intimate connexion between the two aspects of the Cartesian Non-Pilot; but it 
is also what gives rise to the worry about the consistency of Planning with the Cartesian 
Non-Pilot. But if Planning is compatible with visual awareness providing for action planning 
in the complete absence of bodily awareness, then there is no obvious necessity on this score 
here and hence no intimate connexion. One could be a pilot in a body vessel in the sense of 
not feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and having to perceive the body solely by sight and 
yet have direct control of one‘s body – as we see in the cases of deafferented agents like IW. 
Our apparent ability to understand IW‘s case in terms of the planning model is due cause for 181 
 
concern: for IW does not have bodily awareness and touch from the collarline down and yet 
is able to directly control many of his body parts and plan actions with these. 
This  problem  with  this  objection  is  that  it  overestimates  what  we  can  read  off 
directly from the phenomenology of ordinary bodily action and fails to understand what sits 
at the heart of the planning theory. We know what the Cartesian Non-Pilot consists in, but it 
is not entirely clear what demands it makes on the relation between Feeling and Direct 
Control  –  except  that  in  our  ordinary  experience  of  agency,  these  two  aspects  are 
intertwined. Though Necessity represents the most straightforward way of articulating the 
connexion between Feeling and Direct Control, on reflection, it is quite unclear that the 
phenomenology of ordinary bodily agency demands anything as specific as Necessity or the 
bodily  demonstratives  model.  Reflection  on  what  it  is  like  to  act  in  no  way  forces  a 
commitment to a view where bodily awareness figures in online control. Think, for example, 
of what it is like to be intensely engaged in some sporting activity – such as table tennis or 
downhill skiing – where one has at least an advanced intermediate level of skill. As Marcel 
(2003) and others have observed, in these experiences of action where one performs actions 
in a state of so-called ‗flow experience‘ (Csikszentmihalyi 1978), one is immersed in one‘s 
skilled activity which often requires a high level of sensorimotor coordination, yet one feels 
that one is not consciously directing all of one‘s skilled responses to the unfolding situation. 
Instead, these responses smoothly unfold ‗by themselves‘ – though there is no sense of 
alienation from one‘s activity but rather an absolute immersion in it. Think of how one 
makes one‘s way through a mogul field (a field of sizeable bumps in the snow) on a steep 
slope  whilst  skiing  at  a  good  speed:  there  is  obviously  much  obstacle  avoidance  and 
sensorimotor coordination and control involved but not at all in the way that the model 
behind bodily demonstratives or Necessity would have us think. It is no element of these 
‗flow  experiences‘,  which  are  not  all  that  unusual,  that  Feeling  is  always  immediately 
implicated  in  Direct  Control.  The  phenomenology  of  these  situations  is  not  accurately 
described as involving conscious, deliberate online control. In fact, employing such a control 
strategy  is  often  counterproductive  in  situations  which  call  for  skilled,  split-second 
responses. But phenomenology does indicate that there is an intimate connexion between 
Feeling and Direct Control, and it may be said that we have not very adequately explained 
what this comes down to on the planning theory yet. Thus there is no simple argument from 
phenomenological grounds to the inconsistency of Planning with the Cartesian Non-Pilot, 182 
 
since  the  experienced  relation  between  Feeling  and  Direct  Control  may  be  less 
straightforward than the simple model embodied in Necessity. Though we have defused the 
charge of inconsistency with the Cartesian Non-Pilot, to adequately defend the planning 
theory we will also have to provide a positive account for why the planning agent is not like a 
pilot in a body vessel. This will require us to examine the importance of the ‗from the inside‘ 
element in imagery, for it is here that we can tease out the intimate connexion. 
 
 
6.2.   Awareness in imagination  
 
To complete our response to the worry about the planning theory‘s consistency with the 
Cartesian  Non-Pilot,  we will  have  to  bring  out  the  importance  of  the  ‗from  the  inside‘ 
element in the planning theory. To this end, we will once again contrast vision with bodily 
awareness, not in terms of the different perceptual sense fields, but in terms of imagery within 
the modality – since planning has to do with knowledge of practical possibilities which are 
partially revealed in sensory imagination. This will allow us to pinpoint the contribution of 
bodily awareness through motor imagery. 
  But before that, let us first remind ourselves of the argument for Planning, so that 
when we locate the precise role of the ‗from the inside‘ element we can see what it does for 
the  argument.  From  our  discussion  of  the  bodily  field,  we  learnt  saw  that  bodily 
demonstratives are not necessary for action and that bodily striving is constrained by a sense 
of what we can do with body parts. The question then arises as to how we get a sense of 
how we can strive with our body parts and what the limits of bodily striving are. The answer 
is bodily awareness. Thus the role of bodily awareness is to give us a practical sense of the 
spatial possibilities of our body parts – of how they afford action. This in turn is what the 
agent trades on in planning his actions. 
From the argument from numbsense in chapter 2 we learnt that intentional action on 
objects requires that the agent not just be able to exploit affordances of objects acted on but 
that  these  affordances  must  be  manifest  to  the  agent.  It  is  important  to  note  that  this 
condition applies only to intentional action and not all action, since this allows us to say that 
action  does  not  require  conscious  awareness  of  objects  in  all  instances,  and  therefore 
accommodate the counterexamples.  183 
 
What are the grounds for thinking that bodily awareness is a condition on intentional 
bodily action? We know that when bodily awareness is absent the agent loses a source of 
reasons for acting. It is clear in these cases that what is lost is a practical sense of the spatial 
possibilities of our body parts. We can see this by reasoning as follows. The notion of acting 
intentionally involves, in some sense, the agent knowingly taking some means toward an end. 
If  we  restrict ourselves to the  teleologically basic ways that an agent can act,  then  it is 
plausible to think that the agent has to have some grasp of the different possible ways he can 
directly act in order to achieve his overarching aim. But the teleologically basic ways an agent 
can act just is that range of things that he can take himself to do without doing anything else. 
If the agent lacked this grasp of the different possible ways that he can act basically in 
response to his aims when action is called for, it would be hard to see how he can exploit his 
basic  repertoire  of  abilities  to  achieve  his  overarching  end.  As  we  have  argued,  actions 
exhibit robust means-ends flexibility, so the agent‘s capacity to act must presuppose this 
practical grasp of possible basic means. This concludes the first stage of the argument for 
Planning. 
The second stage begins by posing the question of how we gain a practical sense of 
the basic actions open to one. A natural thought is that this will at least involve a practical 
sense of the spatial possibilities of our body parts since these will constrain what basic actions 
are possible for one. For normal agents, this practical sense will primarily derive from bodily 
awareness with contributions from vision if it is present. However, bodily awareness by itself 
cannot provide for awareness of bodily potential, since it is plausible to think that this is not 
given in perception. Awareness of bodily possibilities also requires some imaginative capacity 
on the part of the subject  to extrapolate from past trials and current awareness. Bodily 
awareness – as employed in motor imagery – thus has an imaginative role in action planning. 
In our discussion of spatial action and egocentric axes, we already came across a 
notion that is of clear importance here: the long-term body image. This, as we saw earlier, is, 
roughly,  a settled picture of one‘s own  physical dimensions,  which may change (slowly) 
depending on development of the body (grafts, amputations, growth). This describes the 
structure of one‘s body – how it is shaped, sized and hinged – and thus what possibilities of 
movement are open to one. This tells us what basic actions the body can afford and thus 
constrains  action  planning.  Note  that  the  long-term  body  image  is  not  an  occurrent 
experience but rather a kind of persisting cognitive representation of the body – one that the 184 
 
agent may exploit in imaginative consideration of what courses of action are open to him 
(i.e. off-line action planning). My suggestion is that what bodily awareness does, in part, is to 
contribute  to  fixing  one‘s  long  term  body  image  which  then  defines  a  sense  of  one‘s 
boundaries and provides for a practical grasp of what one can do with one‘s parts.
123 
Further links between awareness and action planning come to mind. Realising that 
the  connection  is  one  between  awareness  and  intentional action  yields  a  link  with  action 
planning, since intentional action is one of those notions in a web of interconnected notions 
that includes action planning (as Bratman and others have emphasised). Also, notice that in 
discussing the importance of the agent‘s practical sense of the basic actions open to him, the 
sense of basicness in question was teleological basicness (Hornsby 1980, Searle 1983). These 
are the agent‘s basic repertoire of things that he can just do without doing anything else. 
―Teleological basicness has reference to the agent‘s plan‖ (Annas 1978) and is tied to the 
agent‘s view of how he can strive with parts of his body. In acting, attention often fixated on 
the goals rather than the specific means (think of the experiments by Marcel and Jeannerod 
discussed in the previous chapters). Thus if we understand agency from the agent‘s point of 
view, he is likely to be focused on a grasp of the ways he can directly act – the teleologically 
basic ways – so as to achieve his goals. Since this need not – and in general does not – 
coincide with causally basic ways of bodily striving, the agent‘s grasp of practical possibility is 
concerned with the teleologically basic actions he can undertake to achieve his ends rather 
than the specific bodily means. Thus the practical planning of the agent need not invoke 
specific bodily means and thus need not require occurrent bodily awareness.
124 Rather, what 
the agent needs for practical planning is some sense of what he can do, what projects he can 
undertake with his body, which I contend is where bodily awareness comes in. 
Once we have sketched our view the major challenge is: why is bodily awareness is 
crucial (in the normal case) even when we have other perceptual modalities that can inform 
us about our body and its state? In other words, what‘s special about the ‗from the inside‘ 
element here? 
 
 
                                                 
123 Cf.  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  discussion  of  the  long-term  body  image  as  giving  one  a  sense  of  one‘s  practical 
possibilities in The Will (1980), vol. 1, pp. 225, 246-248. 
124 See the discussion on teleological basicness vs. causal basicness and possible negative ramifications of not 
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6.2.1.   Imagery and point of view 
 
The planning account as I‘ve developed it specifies a constraint on the imaginative aspect of 
intention  for the  subject. When one  imagines what one can do that is based  on bodily 
awareness and feeds into the sense of practical possibilities that one‘s body can afford. The 
constraint on the imaginative aspect of intention for the subject is this: that which you‘re 
imagining physical possibilities for must be that which you have sensation in. Thus the form 
of explanation must link imagination and sensation. But the question immediately arises to 
what the role is of the ‗from the inside‘ element of bodily awareness – the importance of 
which  has  been  stressed  throughout  this  dissertation  –  if  what‘s  key  to  the  account  is 
awareness as it figures in imagination?  
Before we turn to the importance of the ‗from the inside‘ element, we need to be 
clear on what distinguishes one‘s having imagery of something or some situation as opposed 
to one‘s merely thinking about it or perceiving it. In imagining that something is the case, 
there  need  be  no  imagery  associated  with  the  mental  act.  In  particular,  if  I  imagine  a 
chiliagon, which is a figure consisting of a thousand sides, I just imagine a figure with a 
thousand sides by simply positing that that is what I imagine. There need be no image of 
some thousand sided figure when I so posit the object of my imagination. (Similarly, to think 
of a chiliagon all I need to do is to think of a figure with a thousand sides; no imagery need 
be involved and no point of view on the object of thought is implicated.) In contrast, if I try 
to visually image a chiliagon, by imaging each and every side and holding them together in a 
figure as if they were in some way before me, this would take an immense effort; I would in 
all  likelihood  construct  some  confused  representation  of  some  figure  in  my  mind  (and 
simply posit that it is a chiliagon). The image constructed is unlikely to differ from that 
which I should form if I were trying to imagine a figure with many more sides than the 
figures we usually encounter visually, as Descartes points out in the Sixth Meditation. If I 
perceive a chiliagon, though I may not take in all the detail of the figure, so long as I am in 
visual  contact  with  the  figure,  then  I  see  it  and  I  see  it  from  a  certain  point  of  view. 
However, if I image a chiliagon or if I imagine seeing a chiliagon, while there is a chiliagon in 
front of me, I may imagine seeing the chiliagon from a different point of view from that 
which I actually have on the chiliagon before me.  186 
 
It is important to notice how a crucial aspect of what distinguishes one‘s having 
imagery of something or some situation as opposed to one‘s thinking about it or perceiving 
it is how the notion of point of view figures. Consider yet another example. Let us contrast: 
(1) seeing oneself ski, (2) feeling oneself ski through bodily awareness, (3) imagining that one 
is skiing, (4) having visual imagery of oneself skiing, and (5) having motor imagery of oneself 
skiing. Arguably, one might be said to see oneself ski in some sense, though this is not a 
natural usage, when one sees the movements of one‘s limbs and skis. The point of view one 
has here is that of the skier with whatever visual scene that is disclosed to the skier as he is 
skiing (including his own feet, skis, hands, one or both of the ski batons, and the inside of 
one‘s ski goggles). The more natural way of seeing oneself ski is if one sees oneself skiing in 
a video, but the point of view one has is not that of the skier who is skiing, but that of a 
distinct spectator on the visual scene which includes the skier seen. One can feel oneself ski 
through bodily awareness if one closes one‘s eyes briefly whilst skiing or if clouds suddenly 
descend  on  the  slopes  and  one  continues  skiing  slowly  despite  not  seeing  anything. 
Imagining that one is skiing need involve no imagery at all; one can simply posit that one is 
skiing. If one has visual imagery of oneself skiing, one can either take the point of view of 
the skier, with the attendant visual imagery being the scene that is before the skier (slope 
ahead, ski hut, his own hands and feet, his skis, etc.) or one can take the point of view of a 
spectator seeing oneself ski. But if one has motor imagery of oneself skiing, one can only 
take the point of view of the skier and there is no spectator point of view; any point of view 
through motor imagery on the subject matter is thereby one of the subject at the centre of 
the  experience.  This  feature  is  critical  for  why  that  which  you‘re  imagining  physical 
possibilities for must be that which you have sensation in, as we shall see.  
In order to bring out the importance of the ‗from the inside‘ element in the planning 
account, we need to examine its role in motor imagery. We will draw out the significance of 
the ‗from the inside‘ element by examining characteristics of motor imagery and how it 
differs from visual imagery.  
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6.2.2.   Motor versus visual imagery and ramifications for Planning 
 
Let‘s begin by considering a case of visualisation. If I visualise you playing etudes on the 
piano, I need not imagine what visual scene would be available to you, from the perspective 
you occupy, and imagine occupying that perspective and perceiving that visual scene; I can 
also visualise you playing from a detached perspective where I imagine seeing you play. 
There  is  no  constraint  on  visualising  that  compels  one  to  take  the  perspective  of  the 
visualised subject. Similarly with auditory imagination: I can imagine you playing etudes by 
imagining taking your place and producing the sounds or imagining hearing someone – you 
– produce the sounds. 
In motor imagery, however, there is no such room to ―distinguish between the point 
of view imagined and the object so imagined‖ (Martin 1995, p. 287, fn. 23). If I use bodily 
imagery in imagining your being in pain, I can only do so by imagining feeling pain ‗from the 
inside‘  and  supposing  that  I  am  you  (or  something  like  that).  There  is  no  detached 
perspective available for me to take such that I could continue to exploit motor or bodily 
imagery and yet not be imagining some bodily experience ‗from the inside‘. Motor or bodily 
imagining is always ‗from the inside‘ and engaged. Thus, the ‗from the inside‘ character is a 
constitutive aspect of motor imagination. 
To better appreciate the contrast between visual and motor imagery, let us contrast 
imagining the same action visually as opposed to motorically. Let us imagine typing this very 
sentence on a laptop. I can visually image this in two ways: I can take the point of view of 
the spectator watching myself typing on the laptop, or I can take the point of view of the 
typist typing the sentence. But if I imagine typing the sentence this through motor imagery, I 
feel  myself  executing  the  action.  This  is  so  even  if  I  have  motor  imagery  of  another 
philosopher typing that sentence. I can only do so by imagining typing ‗from the inside‘ and 
supposing that I am that other philosopher who is typing. There is no detached perspective 
available for me to take such that I could continue to exploit motor or bodily imagery and 
yet not be imagining some bodily experience ‗from the inside‘. 
It is not crucial to motor imagery that the subject is active; the subject may be passive 
in the imaged scenario and our observation about point of view still remains. One can see 
this if one tries to visually image an agent raising another agent‘s arm where neither agent is 
oneself; compare that with motorically imaging the same happening. In the latter case, the 188 
 
point  of  view  one  has  on  the  imaged  event  is  that  of  the  subject  at  the  centre  of  the 
experience, and there is no detached or spectator‘s point of view. I should also note that 
motor imagery can either involve the whole body, as when one imagines running or walking, 
or be restricted to a particular body part, as when one imagines moving an arm, bending a 
finger, or tilting one‘s head.
125 
But the question still remains as to why the constraint that the planning account 
specifies on the  imaginative aspect  of intention  for the  subject  – that that which you‘re 
imagining physical possibilities for must be that which you have sensation in – holds. Why 
does what I imagine possibilities for ‗from the inside‘ have to coincide with what I feel ‗from 
the inside‘? They must coincide – and in fact they do, as we saw in considering the case of 
motor  imagery  –  for  otherwise  the  possibilities  I  grasp  in  imagination  it  wouldn‘t  be 
imagined possibilities for that object in question – my body. As Martin puts it ―there is no 
distinct point of view that the subject posses independent of the object, his or her body, that 
she  is  aware  of  in  this  way‖  (1995,  p.  279);  thus  that  which  you‘re  imagining  physical 
possibilities for must be that which you have sensation in. The mode of imagination – motor 
imagery and its lack of a distinct perspective independent of that provided by the sole object 
in question – ensures this. 
It is only because of this distinctive correspondence of that which you‘re imagining 
physical possibilities and that which you have sensation in, which allows for the view that a 
general, practical grasp of one‘s possibilities of acting with one‘s body is what the intimate 
connexion of bodily awareness and bodily agency consists in. Whilst bodily awareness is not 
required for the control of all bodily action, it is required (in the normal case) for the agent 
to gain a crucial perspective on himself so that he knows the spatial possibilities of his body, 
which allows him to have a sense of what actions it can support. This takes us back to 
Descartes‘s observation that we are not lodged in our bodies as pilots in their vessels and the 
significance of this for the idea that acting with one‘s body is not like a form of remote 
control. It is because there is no epistemic gap – because I feel my body ‗from the inside‘ – 
                                                 
125 Interestingly, one might think that the contrast between points of view available in visual as opposed to 
motor imagery come down to differences between exteroceptive and proprioceptive senses. The difference is 
due to one modality primarily being one that is directed to the external world whereas the other is directed at 
one‘s states only. This explanation of the contrast cannot be completely correct, as tactile imagery has similar 
properties to motor imagery – it does not allow for a spectator‘s point of view – yet touch is typically directed 
toward objects other than oneself. 189 
 
between that of which I am aware of, and thus can plan possibilities for, and that which I 
can directly act with, that acting with my body is not like a form of remote control. 
Let  us  sum up the  argument of this section. We  began with a worry about the 
consistency  of  Planning  with  the  Cartesian  Non-Pilot.  We  defused  the  challenge  that 
consistency with the Cartesian Non-Pilot requires a commitment to a phenomenology of 
action on which what it is like to act bodily always involves a sense of deliberate, conscious 
online control by alluding to ‗flow‘ experiences in skilled behaviour like skiing. We then went 
further  and  provided  a  positive  account  for  the  importance  of  the  Feeling  element  in 
Planning by examining the role it plays in motor imagery. We have shown that the agent – 
on the planning theory – is not to his body as a pilot is to his ship. He cannot be to his body 
as a pilot is to his ship if he is to be able to draw on bodily awareness as providing for 
practical  possibilities  of  the  affordances  of  body  parts,  since  that  which  he  imagines 
possibilities for must be that which he feels ‗from the inside‘. Thus the distinctive ‗from the 
inside‘ character of motor imagery is at the heart of the planning account, ensuring that the 
Planning account meets the demands of the Cartesian Non-Pilot. 
 
 
6.3.   What is planning view committed to? 
 
In presenting the planning view, I have relied primarily on the reader‘s intuitive sense of 
what action planning is. What do I mean by action planning? I want to differentiate my 
notion from the two major notions of action planning that we find in the philosophical and 
scientific literature. 
First,  there  is  the  philosopher‘s  notion  of  action  planning,  which  derives  from 
Bratman‘s  (1987)  planning  theory  of  intention.  His  theory  is  that  intentions  have  two 
functions: they serve as premises in practical reasoning which sustain hierarchical structures 
of intentions and they have a volitional or executive role. These two roles are, naturally, 
interconnected. Bratman has emphasised the role that future-directed intentions play in plans 
for future behaviour that allow us to organise and coordinate our agency with that of other 
agents.  Bratman‘s  notion  of  action  planning,  as  stated,  is  essentially  tied  to  practical 
reasoning and linguistically articulated or articulable intentions that can enter as premises 190 
 
into  such  reasoning  processes  and  thus  help  us  organise  our  agency  over  temporally 
extended periods. 
Second, there is the neuropsychologist‘s notion of action planning in motor control, 
on which action planning is a sub-personal process whereby a large number of parameters 
(location of target, location of effector, state of effector, etc.) are taken into account in 
computations  that  compute  limb  trajectories  and  analyse  the  cost  of  alternate  limb 
trajectories.  On  this  view  action  planning  is  seen  as  the  setting  and  transformation  of 
parameters, and the computation of how alternate limb trajectories can be implemented and 
their costs. This is an entirely sub-personal process, though in recent work on motor imagery 
coming out of Jeannerod‘s group (Jeannerod 1997 and 2006) there has been an attempt to 
connect motor imagery with processes connected with motor planning. However, most of 
this work is at a relatively crude level and do not have clear implications for action planning 
at a personal level.  
There  are  two  key  results  from  the  work  of  Jeannerod‘s  group  and  from  other 
researchers in motor control who take an allied approach: (1) similar brain areas are used in 
motor imagery tasks as those which are involved in motor preparation and (2) from work 
done in the mental chronometry paradigm, we know that motor imagery is subject to motor 
constraints,  such  as  Fitt‘s  law,  which  is  a  law  concerning  speed-difficulty  tradeoffs 
formulated for actual motor tasks. (Fitt‘s law is the single most important law in the science 
of motor control.) Parsons conducted a series of experiments where he studied the time 
subjects take to mentally rotate their hand from an initial to a final position shown on a 
photograph.  He  found  that  mental  rotation  times  closely  matched  actual  rotation  times 
(Parsons  1994).  Studies  like  these  indicate  that  the  representation  of  actions  in  motor 
imagery  is  sensitive  to  the  actual  biomechanical  constraints  on  the  movement  imaged. 
Conversely, although subjects may feel their limbs to be in anatomically impossible positions 
under special conditions (e.g. vibrotactile illusions), ―there is no evidence that subjects are 
able to simulate these positions during imagery in normal conditions‖ (Jeannerod 1997, p. 
108). This suggests that motor imagery has an important role in action planning, since motor 
imagery is constrained by the motor capacities of the agent. 
I hope it has been clear that my notion of action planning is neither Bratman‘s 
linguistically  tied  notion  nor  the  psychologist‘s  sub-personal  computational  processes 
employed for planning which effectors and which trajectories to use. The notion of action 191 
 
planning that I have sketched in the remarks above is a personal level phenomena that is 
more primitive than one which involves intentions that can be articulated linguistically and is 
not merely a matter of parameter setting and computations regarding limb trajectories at a 
sub-personal level. Rather it is a matter of having some practical grasp of the basic repertoire 
of things that one can do with one‘s body, a matter of having a sense of what basic actions 
one‘s body affords. Given that, one is able to exploit this capacity off-line, in motor imagery, 
to plan one‘s actions ahead of their executions, but also just to probe whether one has any 
likelihood of being able to perform the action. I take it that this practical grasp is something 
that can be articulated in some instances by human agents, but is something that is more 
primitive  and  present  in  sentient  animals  as  they  act  on  one  of  various  different  open 
possibilities to them. Even in human agents, often this practical grasp is hard to articulate, 
and agents give evidence of their practical grasp by demonstrating with their body some 
movement, and saying something like ‗One can do this‘. 
In fact, the planning conception of the role of bodily awareness is just what we 
would expect on general psychological grounds. I shall raise two problems that suggest that 
something like plans are essential  to structuring sensory  inputs:  what I call  the  ‗sensory 
overload‘ problem and Bernstein‘s well known ‗degrees of freedom‘ problem. 
Animals  are  faced  with  a  constant  barrage  of  sensory  input,  but  ―compulsive 
responsiveness  to every  input has low survival  value‖  (Kalaska  et al.  1998, p.  178).  Just 
consider  the  sheer  volume  of  input:  kinaesthetic  and  postural  information,  pressure 
sensations on the part of the body surface that touches the surface that the animal sits or lies 
on,  temperature  sensations…  In  fact,  the  incoming  sensory  input  may  demand  several 
different and mutually incompatible actions in response. Thus if the animal is conceived of 
as  something  of  a  stimulus-response  system,  lacking  a  capacity  for  selecting  between 
different courses of action but having to respond to all stimuli, then it would be faced with 
an impossible situation. Furthermore, it is not the case that each and every stimulus calls for 
the animal to act in response; in some cases the most appropriate thing to do is to not do 
anything. And for animals that have more complex behavioural repertoires, there may be a 
whole series of alternative courses of action that are appropriate to a single stimulus event. 
(This relates to Bernstein‘s problem that we will discuss next.) Yet it would be pointless for 
the animal to perform all these actions. Indeed it need not even be the case that the animal is 
able to perform all these actions since some may be mutually incompatible. This suggests 192 
 
that if the animal is not to be overwhelmed by incoming sensory input and compulsion to 
act in response to each and every sensory input that it receives, then selecting amongst 
alternate possible courses of action must play an important role in the animal‘s cognitive 
dynamics. This sensory overload problem suggests a need for action selection; plans impose 
the necessary structure on sensory input in two ways: (one) plans allow the animal to cut the 
direct stimulus-response link, and enable them to structure their behaviour in response to 
sensory input so that this can be sensitive to their current needs; and (two) plans may help to 
structure  selective  attention to salient sensory  inputs that are responsive to the  animal‘s 
current needs and wants. 
The need for planning is also suggested by Nicolai Bernstein‘s crucial insight when 
he proposed that we need a hierarchical model of action in response to his ‗degrees of 
freedom‘ problem. The degrees of freedom problem is that if the information processing 
system were involved in the production of all decisions about each of the muscles involved 
in a motor act, this would be computationally way too expensive (i.e. require way too much 
mental work). Why? The motor system has too many degrees of freedom. This would lead 
to an impossible situation for the central nervous system if it had to control all these degrees 
of freedom separately by conscious decisions (Bernstein 1967, Greene 1972, Whiting 1984). 
Thus plans allow the agent to orient his behaviour in some general way, and a descending 
hierarchy of systems implement these plans ever more specifically as we work down the 
control hierarchy. So the planning model is not at all ad hoc and fits well with how we expect 
bodily agency should be.
126 
 
 
6.4.   Clarifications and objections 
 
Here I discuss five objections to the planning account. Working through the objections  will 
help us to clarify the commitments of the planning account. 
                                                 
126 A possible sceptical remark here is that neither of the two problems mentioned provide direct support for 
the practical grasp view of planning that I hold. Rather, the advantages of a planning account for these two 
problems derives from plans introducing a hierarchical structure of motivation that allows the animal to ignore 
overly specific details of situations but concentrate on its overarching aim. I agree. But I want to suggest that 
practical grasp is the best way to make sense of the hierarchical model when we look at things from the agent‘s 
perspective  on  action  rather  than  from  the  theorist‘s  perspective  when  we  decompose  the  agent  into 
constituent mechanisms. 
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(One) The possibility of illusion. It is widely known that bodily awareness, like other 
perceptual modalities, is subject to a range of illusions. There are pathological cases, such as 
phantom limbs and supernumerary limbs (Haggard and Wolpert 2005), and cases where 
illusions can be induced under experimental conditions, such as the vibro-tactile illusions 
discussed earlier (Lackner 1988, Jones 1988, and Marcel 2003). Consider the vibro-tactile 
illusions. Experimental work exploiting these illusions show that ―during vibration a limb 
can  be  perceived  to  be  in  an  anatomically  impossible  position,  which  suggests  that 
perceptually the limits of the sense of position are not set by the anatomical constraints of 
joint  excursion,  and  that  the  cortical  sensory  centers  will  extrapolate  beyond  previous 
experiences to interpret incoming afferent signals‖ (Jones 1996, p. 351). One might complain 
that  action  planning  cannot  be  based  on  bodily  awareness  since  there  can  be  illusory 
experiences  of  one‘s  body  and  its  parts  ‗from  the  inside‘  which  are  anatomically  and 
biomechanically impossible. 
The proper response here is that these experiences are just that – illusions. Bodily 
awareness must not be an infallible source of knowledge about one‘s body in order that it 
can play a role in action planning and providing for practical possibilities. 
(Two) Deafferented agents. But at this point the astute reader of this essay may ask: 
what of our deafferented agents? If the foregoing remarks are on track, then the possibility 
of action  hinges on the agent having  a sense  of his practical  possibilities. But if bodily 
awareness is what provides for a sense of practical possibilities then we are left with a puzzle 
about how deafferented agents can possibly act, since they have no touch and sensation in 
many parts of their bodies that they can act directly with. Furthermore, some deafferented 
agents, like IW, appear to be able to plan actions perfectly well. He can plan to move an egg 
from the refrigerator and crack its shell over the frying pan so as to make an omelette. He 
can plan whether he can fit through a door of a certain size, or the ways in which he has to 
walk in order to not fall over on a stretch of surface. Earlier, we noted that IW relies on 
visual information for bodily areas where he does not have bodily awareness, but an agent 
might exploit visual feedback to learn how to exploit parts of his body which he can move at 
will but yet has no ‗feel‘ in if they are placed in a suitable training environment. Whilst this is 
an important part of the story, it does not yet tell us how action seems possible from IW‘s 
perspective. We have to provide for the possibility of acting from within his perspective – 
what the  Bayesian learning mechanisms show  is  that there  are mechanisms that can be 194 
 
exploited where these are not constrained by the way normal agents do things (and in fact 
normal agents could in principle increase their repertoire by employing these methods) and 
these enlargements of repertoire likely come with changes in the agent‘s conception of what 
he can do. This is to say that IW‘s sense of practical possibility is likely to be shaped by the 
distinctive conditions under which he has trained himself to strive with his body, and his 
sense of practical possibility need not correspond to that had by normal agents (and in fact 
normal  agents  will  have  different  senses  of  practical  possibilities  dependent  on  their 
behavioural repertoires). We speculate that IW‘s sense of practical possibility is largely visual, 
perhaps mixed with some primitive bodily modes, but all we need to say at this point is that 
IW does have a sense of practical possibility and that it is different from ours. This challenge 
indicates that the notion of practical possibility is tied in with awareness at a more general 
level and suggests that the planning model may have a more general applicability than to the 
case of bodily awareness and agency. 
Another worry here might be that since we have admitted that deafferented agents 
have a different sense of practical possibility than normal agents, why does the planning 
account do better than simply appealing to the connections between bodily awareness and 
agency in normal agency? I take it that we have shown that even in cases of normal agency, 
bodily awareness cannot be seen as necessary, since it is not the case that feeling a body part 
‗from the inside‘ is necessary for acting with that body part at the time of acting. To take just 
the  case  of  fast  intentional  actions,  which  are  within  the  ordinary  repertoire  of  normal 
agents, it is implausible to think that bodily awareness has a direct role to play in either 
initiating movement or in control. The planning account better captures what the connection 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency is for normal agents, since it is at a remove 
from claiming any essential role for bodily awareness in initiating action or online control. 
 (Three) Numbsense as providing for a sense of practical possibilities? But this leads us to a 
third challenge that takes us back to the cases of blindsight and blindtouch.
127 Our sceptical 
opponent raises the question of why the affordances that a blindsighter or blindtoucher 
picks up on don‘t provide for a sense of practical possibility; after all, they can exploit these 
information channels when probed to act.  I am somewhat wary of using practical possibility 
to  characterise  the  possibilities  open  to  these  patients  on  the  basis  of  receptive  yet 
nonconscious  information  channels,  since,  even  from  the  patient‘s  point  of  view,  these 
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courses of action do not strike him as things he might do in response to a way the world 
strikes him as being. Rather, from his perspective they seem like blind hunches. But we 
should distinguish between how blindsighters pick up on the affordances of objects and how 
affordances that are manifest in conscious experience are exploited by agents. Only in the 
latter case can these play in role in shaping a sense of practical possibility that is properly 
sensitive to the demands of understanding action as a rational response to experience. 
(Four) Can the action system function entirely without conscious bodily awareness? It might be 
suggested that, in the final analysis, conscious bodily awareness can simply drop out entirely 
for the purposes of motor control, and we should see bodily awareness simply as one causal 
factor amongst many that can influence behaviour.
128 The thought here is that since we have 
already retreated from bodily awareness playing a direct role in online control, why can‘t the 
action  system  go  entirely without conscious bodily awareness,  even  for the  purposes of 
action planning? For the purposes of understanding action, all we need for answering the 
question at hand is the ‗pragmatic‘ (as opposed to the ‗semantic‘ or ‗perception‘) pathway for 
the somatosensory system.
129 After all, there are situations where we don‘t need conscious 
bodily awareness even for targeting a body part, and situations where even though there is 
targeting through bodily awareness, this cannot be providing the exact spatial parameters for 
motor control since the subject may be under some proprioceptive illusion (e.g. Marcel‘s 
vibrotactile cases) but yet accomplish his task successfully. The objector goes on to observe 
that in the latter kind of case conscious attention somehow picks out the targets for action 
and  then  (somehow)  it  is  handed  over  to  the  action  system  which  doesn‘t  need  such 
attention, and then he raises the question: why doesn‘t this imply that the action system can 
function entirely without conscious awareness? And, similarly, why should we think that the 
role  that  bodily  awareness  plays  in  providing  for  a  sense  of  practical  possibility  is 
indispensible for normal agents? 
There are two things to say in response. The first is to note that this contention is 
empirically false. As a matter of fact numbsensers and blindsighters are able to direct their 
actions  toward  an  unseen  or  unfelt  stimulus  only  if  they  receive  instructions  from 
experimenters about the kind of stimuli they should attend to and the kind of action they 
                                                 
128 Thanks to Paul Snowdon for pushing me on this point. 
129 See Dijkerman and de Haan 2007 for discussion of the neural bases underlying the claim that there are 
multiple processing pathways in the somatosensory system. For functional dissociations, see the di scussion in 
chapter 3, section 3.5.3. 196 
 
should  perform.
130 This suggests that ―implicit [i.e.  unconscious,  subpersonal] processing 
does  not  have  access  to  integrated  information  but  only  to  partial  data  about  the 
environment or the objects [that action is directed at] … [thus,] the unconscious system 
driving the information has to receive proper instructions from the conscious system about 
the aim being pursued‖ (Rossetti et al. 2001, p. 284).
131 The second point is something we 
have already discussed in detail in chapter 5 (section 5.2) when we were grappling with the 
conflict between what lived experience and cognitive psychology teach us about action. 
Absent any role for awareness, we are placed in the position of numbsensers with respect to 
our  action  –  this  is  inaccurate  as  to  the  phenomenology  of  ordinary  bodily  action. 
Furthermore, even though we have shown that the kind of target-based approach to bodily 
awareness  that  we  find  in  Necessity  and  the  bodily  demonstratives  model  is  false,  the 
counterexamples we have considered do not impugn a weaker target-based approach, on 
which the agent needs to have some awareness of his body so that he can have a perspective 
on his activity, without this condition applying to each and every bodily action the agent 
performs. 
(Five) Action planning and animals. The objection here is that surely bodily awareness is 
present in dogs and cats without any form of planning. But notice that action planning in my 
sense is tied to having some sense of the practical possibilities open to one rather than a 
notion  like  Bratman‘s  which  is  tied  essentially  to  a  linguistically  expressible  notion  of 
intentions which are embedded in a nested hierarchy. There is strong evidence from studies 
of animal behaviour that at least some animals – dolphins, scrub jays, rats, and the higher 
primates are some examples – are capable of some form of means-ends reasoning and are 
thus plausibly thought to be capable of intentional action (in some sense).
132  
Finally, the point that planning is  associated with offline manipulation also makes 
sense  of  the  intuitive  appeal  of  O‘Shaughnessy‘s  Target-Object  Argument.  We  earlier 
attempted to argue from the inconceivability of seeing how one could act with a limb that 
was  anaesthetised  to  the  conclusion  that  bodily  awareness  is  necessary  for  basic  bodily 
action. We saw that in its unrestricted version this claim is false since there are basic bodily 
actions that don‘t require conscious bodily awareness. We demonstrated counterexamples to 
                                                 
130 This is widely noted in the literature. See, e.g., Weiskrantz 1986 and Rossetti et al. 2001. 
131 See Hommel 2000 for more general discussion of how the two systems interact. 
132 See the array of studies in Hurley and Nud ds 2006, especially the one from Dickinson‘s lab on scrub jays 
caching food. For a sceptical take see Papineau and Heyes‘s article in the collection. 197 
 
this thesis both for more outré cases and also noted that mundane basic actions are such that 
online control is typically non-conscious. But the challenge appeared to have some force, 
and  that  was  because  we  were  really  thinking  about  the  inconceivability  of  planning any 
actions with that limb. 
Further evidence of the viability of the planning conception of the role of bodily 
awareness, is the plausibility of the general planning model for understanding the role of 
awareness in various sense modalities and across modalities. The planning model provides a 
more general explanation for the Binding approach that Campbell takes in response to the 
visuomotor dissociations. (We discussed Campbell‘s Binding model in chapter 5, section 
5.4.1.) Campbell‘s Binding model can be made sense of by the general model where the 
point of awareness is in helping plan actions. On his picture objects are visually bound and 
thus selected for action – this is precisely awareness for action planning, whilst execution is taken 
care of by a distinct system (the vision-for-action system). In Campbell‘s picture, the focus is 
specifically on the role of experience in binding visual demonstratives that determine just 
what the dedicated action systems engage. But once we see that demonstratives cannot in 
general play such a role across all sense fields, then we may seek for a deeper reason for why 
demonstratives can do the work they do in the visuomotor case. The planning model better 
encapsulates the rational role of experience in guiding action. 
In sum: When we plan actions, what we do is to form some conception of actions 
that we want to undertake on the basis of some conception of our abilities. But we can have 
no conception of what we can do with our body, without having bodily awareness. The role 
of bodily awareness in paradigm cases of embodiment, then, is to provide for a conception 
of the body and its limits such that we have a conception of how we can act with our bodies. 
Notice  that  the  claim  is  not  that  conscious  bodily  awareness  is  required  for  any  one 
particular  action  that  we  undertake  within  the  range  of  central  cases  of  ordinary  bodily 
action,  but  that  the  possibility  of  basic  bodily  action  presupposes  background  bodily 
awareness such that the subject possesses some sense of how he may strive with his body. 
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6.5.   The situation of the normal agent 
 
Where does this leave us with the situation of the normal agent? Bodily awareness is not 
always  involved  in  online  control,  but  (a)  anchors  one‘s  embodiment  by  providing  for 
awareness of the object that one can directly act with
133 and furthermore (b) is necessary for 
providing for a sense of practical possibility of the actions that one‘s body can afford (in part 
by feeding into the long-term body image). 
Perhaps we can draw on the notion of knowledge, and in particular, knowledge of 
the state and position of one‘s limbs to make the picture of the normal agent‘s situation 
more complete (and more consoling?). Knowledge, like belief is a mental state. The category 
of mental states contrasts with that of mental events, like perceptual episodes.
134 Examples 
of mental states are belief, knowledge, and intention. Examples of mental events include 
mental acts such as noticing something, deliberating and passive mental occurrences like 
hearing something or feeling a pain. Mental states are not episodes; a mental state is not 
something that happens and does not persist by having temporal parts, but is wholly present 
at each time it are ascribed to a subject. Unlike mental events, which are particulars that have 
properties and take time, having a mental state can be understood as the having of a certain 
kind of property: to say that a subject is in a certain kind of mental state is to say that he 
instantiates a certain kind of property. Since knowledge is a state, it is not an event and does 
not persist by having temporal parts. Only mental events can appear in a subject‘s stream of 
consciousness as something which occurs in the stream of consciousness would have to be 
episodic and evolve over time. Think of the ebb and flow of a headache, for example.  
Given this contrast between mental states and mental events, since knowledge is a 
mental state rather than a mental episode, an agent can be said to know the position of his 
limbs without being consciously aware of or feeling his limbs at that point in time. His 
knowledge will be based on the representation of the position and state of body parts in the 
dynamic  sensorimotor representation that is the  bodily schema, which  is a sub-personal 
system of motor capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance 
of posture, but where this information that he can draw on if he wishes counts as knowledge 
                                                 
133 I am thinking here of what I earlier called a ‗weaker target-based conception‘ (chapter 5, section 5.2 and also 
chapter 6, section 6.4, fourth objection). 
134 For this distinction, see Crane (2001), pp. 35-40 and 102-108, who ascribes this way of drawing the contrast 
between mental states and events to unpublished work by Michael Martin. See also Soteriou 2009. 199 
 
only because it is accessible to awareness if he attends to his body, and shunts into his 
general cognitive apparatus so that he can, e.g. make judgements about it. Thus we can say 
that internal bodily channels are always there to provide the parameters for action, even 
though  bodily  awareness  might  not  be,  and  this  provides  for  –  in  the  normal  case  – 
knowledge of the state and position of one‘s limbs. This helps us to vindicate the ‗general 
picture‘ that we began with, that to act with a body part, one needs to know the state and 
position of it in order to have some sense of what one needs to do in order to achieve one‘s 
aims  in  the  scenario.  It  is  false  that  bodily  awareness  is  always  there  to  provide  these 
parameters, but it is true to say that ordinary action requires that bodily awareness anchors 
our embodiment (so we are not as pilots in ships).  
 
 
6.6.   Summary and conclusion 
 
We began this chapter with a worry about whether Planning is consistent with the Cartesian 
Non-Pilot.  The  challenge  came  at  two  levels:  a  phenomenological  challenge  to  explain 
whether Planning is consistent with the phenomenology of bodily action as we know it and 
an explanatory challenge to specify why the ‗from the inside‘ element is crucial to Planning. 
We responded to the challenge by contrasting visual and motor imagery and pinpointing the 
contribution of bodily awareness to action planning through its role in motor imagery. The 
planning account as I‘ve developed it specifies a constraint on the imaginative aspect of 
intention  for  the  subject.  The  constraint  on  the  imaginative  aspect  of  intention  for  the 
subject is this: that which you‘re imagining physical possibilities for must be that which you 
have  sensation  in.  The  mode  of  imagination  involved  –  motor  imagery  –  ensures  the 
satisfaction of this constraint. It is only because of this distinctive correspondence of that 
which you‘re imagining physical possibilities and that which you have sensation in, which 
allows for the view that a general, practical grasp of one‘s possibilities of acting with one‘s 
body is what the intimate connexion of bodily awareness and bodily agency consists in. 
Whilst bodily awareness is not required for the control of all bodily action, it is required (in 
the normal case) for the agent to gain a crucial perspective on himself so that he knows the 
spatial possibilities of his body, which allows him to have a sense of what actions it can 
support. In the second half of the chapter we turned to further clarifying the planning view 200 
 
by spelling out its commitments and through considering potential objections against it. We 
ended the chapter by returning to consider the situation of the normal agent in the light of 
the Planning theory. In the final chapter we shall summarise the entire argument of this 
dissertation. 201 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion: 
The Intimate Connexion 
 
 
We have come to the end of our investigations. It is now time to take stock of our situation. 
The thought we began this thesis with was that our as human beings, we find ourselves set in 
a world that dictates that we must be subjects and agents in order to survive. At the heart of 
our  survival  is  a  sensorimotor  knot:  we  must  be  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  ambient 
environment, and also to our own condition, so as to intervene to satisfy our needs. At the 
centre of this sensorimotor knot, we find a recessive set of experiences that are at once 
ubiquitous and unattended to. While these experiences lurk behind our experiences of the 
world outside, experiences of the outside world seem to depend in some important sense on 
these shadowy bodily experiences. As we noted, the presence of this ‗modality‘ is brought 
out, its importance is obvious: whatever the sensory modalities involved in a sensorimotor 
transaction, it will involve acting with one‘s body in some way – even if the action goes 
beyond the boundaries of one‘s body as it often does. Intuitively, to act with a body part, 
one needs to know the state and position of it in order to have some sense of what one 
needs to do in order to achieve one‘s aims in the scenario. The thought, then, is that bodily 
awareness is always there to provide these parameters, presenting them to the acting subject so 
that he can control his actions. 
Despite the intuitive force of these sketchy thoughts, this alleged centrality of bodily 
awareness in sensorimotor action is hard to articulate and consequently hard to evaluate. In 
this dissertation, I took up the challenge of attempting to articulate the relation of bodily 
awareness to bodily action.  
We began the project by reflecting on Descartes‘s observation that we are not in our 
bodies as pilots are in their ships. We broke down Descartes‘s observation into two aspects: 
(one) feeling one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ and (two) the direct control one has over one‘s 
body, which we dubbed Feeling and Direct Control respectively. This enabled us to pose the 
question of this dissertation: What is the connexion between feeling one’s body ‘from the inside’ and 
one’s power to act directly with it? Once we put the problem in this way, we immediately saw 202 
 
three broad options based on different relations between the two aspects: (one) that the two 
aspects  are  independent  (Independence),  (two)  that  direct  control  over  one‘s  body  confers 
feeling (Enaction), and (three) that feeling is necessary for direct control. There are two ways 
of working out the third option – one deriving from O‘Shaughnessy and based on the idea 
of bodily awareness as necessary for online control (Necessity) and another based on the idea 
that bodily awareness is necessary for action planning in the case of normal agents and hence 
necessary for the capacity for motor control (Planning). 
The examination of the first and simplest response to our question – Independence 
–  came  in  chapter  2.  We  developed  an  argument  for  Independence  through  exploiting 
Strawson‘s procedure for arguing that it is a contingent fact that one‘s body plays a unique 
role in perceptual experience and applied it to sensorimotor transactions, by supplementing 
Strawson‘s procedure with Shoemaker‘s theory of embodiment. We attempted to imagine a 
case where a subject was sensorily embodied in one body but volitionally embodied in a 
different body. If this case were really possible, then Feeling and Direct Control would be 
independent of each other, which would mean that there can be no intimate connexion 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency. We saw that the argument based on Strawson‘s 
procedure  failed,  but  the  Independence  theorist  then  provided  an  alternative  argument 
which drew on (one) a picture of the relations between perception and action as merely 
causal and (two) actual cases of dissociations between sensory and volitional embodiment. In 
order answer the Independence theorist‘s first point, we argued from an analysis of the 
pathologies of blindsight and numbsense that in order to make sense of action as a rational 
response  to  experience,  there  has  to  be  some  substantial  dependency  relation  between 
perception and action. We also had an opportunity to clarify the significance of pathological 
cases  in  our  inquiry  in  response  to  the  Independence  theorist‘s  second  point.  Finding 
Independence  unsatisfactory  is  the  force  of  the  intuition  toward  some  kind  of  intimate 
connexion  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency.  The  failure  of  Independence 
indicates that there has to be some deep connexion between bodily awareness and bodily 
agency. Our concern in the chapters that followed was to articulate the connexion. 
In chapter 3, we explored one way of articulating the connexion between bodily 
awareness and bodily agency. Enaction claims that one can feel one‘s body ‗from the inside‘ 
because one has direct power over it. We had to formulate Enaction for ourselves as no 
theorist has developed the claim in detail, and our approach was to develop Enaction by way 203 
 
of considering a more general dependency on perception on action. We saw that the general 
dependency claim is subject to various difficulties, such as its inability to cope with optic 
ataxia and paralysed agents. With the difficulties of the general dependency thesis in mind, 
we then set about formulating Enaction by exploring ideas from Hampshire, Evans  and 
Brewer. We isolated a dispositional formulation of Enaction from Evans, but argued that it 
provided  no  answer  to  objections  from  paralysed  subjects  and  pains  in  internal  organs. 
Finally, we saw that recent empirical work showing double dissociations between bodily 
awareness and bodily agency present an obstacle for any account that claims that bodily 
action is a condition on bodily awareness. Thus Enaction cannot be the correct account of 
the  relation  between  bodily  awareness  and  bodily  agency.  Given  that  Independence  is 
unsatisfactory,  the  task  remained  for  us  to  articulate  some  kind  of  intimate  connexion 
between bodily awareness and bodily agency.  
In  the  subsequent  chapters  we  explored  a  dependency  thesis  in  the  opposite 
direction of explanation: that one can directly act with one‘s body because one can feel it 
‗from the inside‘. We considered two ways to develop a dependency thesis with this direction 
of explanation: Necessity and Planning. Necessity is the most straightforward way to develop 
the picture that we have direct control of our bodies because we can feel them ‗from the 
inside‘.  Necessity  claims  that  feeling  a  body  part  ‗from  the  inside‘  is  necessary  for  any 
instance of directly acting with that body part. We considered arguments for Necessity based 
on  the  idea  that  bodily  awareness  provides  an  ineliminable  source  of  feedback  for  the 
control of actions and the claim that that there is a conceptual tie between bodily awareness 
and  bodily  agency.  Despite  the  intuitive  attractions  of  Necessity,  a  number  of 
counterexamples present problems for it: (one) the case of deafferented agents, who appear 
to be able to directly act with parts of their body that they have no sensation in; (two) the 
case of direct brain control of physical apparatus that has been made possible by various 
brain-machine interface technologies; and (three) the majority of our bodily actions seem to 
be accomplished without conscious attention to or awareness of the body parts involved. At 
this  point  in  the  dialectic  we  were  left  with  a  seeming  antinomy:  There  are  compelling 
reasons for believing in Necessity, but we are also faced with powerful counterexamples 
against it. We appeared to be caught between a brutely causal understanding of the link 
between perception and action and having to reject the counterexamples from cognitive 
psychology – neither option was acceptable.  204 
 
 Whilst the intimacy between bodily awareness and agency was not in doubt, the 
counterexamples suggested that their relation cannot quite be understood in the way that 
Necessity claims. In chapter 5, we worked toward another way to develop the idea that we 
have direct control of our bodies because we can feel them ‗from the inside‘, but one where 
bodily awareness does not always have to play a role in online control. This was part of our 
basic strategy in response to the conflict which was to accept that while the counterexamples 
show  that  occurrent  awareness  ‗from  the  inside‘  of  a  particular  body  part  cannot  be 
necessary for on-line control of actions employing the body part in question, they do not 
impugn the presence of some intimate connexion between bodily awareness and agency. 
After a series of extended analyses of (one) where the arguments for Necessity went wrong, 
(two) of whether a role for bodily awareness in online control based on a requirement that 
bodily demonstratives are necessary for action was defensible, and (three) of differences 
between the bodily field and the visual field, we were finally in a position to articulate a 
plausible account of the intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily action: 
Planning.  
From our comparative study of the bodily and visual fields, we saw that the unique 
structure of the bodily sense field places constraints on how the agent can strive with his 
body.  This  provided  a  critical  clue  for  what  the  intimate  connexion  between  bodily 
awareness and bodily agency must consist in. We suggested that seeing bodily awareness as 
providing for a sense of practical possibility is the best way to understand the role of bodily 
awareness  in  motor  control.  This  is  because  Planning  allows  us  to  both  recognise  that 
Feeling is not essential on-line control yet affirm that it is crucial for the capacity for motor 
control in normal agents. A worry then arose that Planning is not obviously consistent with 
the  phenomenology  of  embodiment  in  everyday  experience,  as  Planning  appears  to 
emphasise the autonomy of Direct Control to the detriment of the ‗from the inside‘ element. 
To respond to this worry we had to analyse the importance of the ‗from the inside‘ element 
in motor imagery. The key question here concerns the constraint that the planning account 
specifies  on  the  imaginative  aspect  of  intention  for  the  subject:  that  that which  you‘re 
imagining physical possibilities for must be that which you have sensation in. Why does what 
I imagine possibilities for ‗from the inside‘ have to coincide with what I feel ‗from the 
inside‘? The answer, as we saw, is that if they did not coincide, then the practical possibilities 
I grasp in imagination wouldn‘t be imagined possibilities for my body. The distinctive mode 205 
 
of imagination, motor imagery, ensures the coincidence between what I imagine possibilities 
for  ‗from  the  inside‘  and  what  I  feel  ‗from  the  inside‘.  Whilst  bodily  awareness  is  not 
required for the control of all bodily action, it is required for the agent (in the normal case ) 
to gain a perspective on himself so that he grasps the spatial possibilities of his body, which 
allows him to have a sense of what actions it can support. It is because there is no epistemic 
gap between that of which I am aware of, and thus can plan possibilities for, and that which 
I can directly act with, that acting with my body is not like a form of remote control. 
My argument has been that, contrary to the orthodox view, bodily awareness is not 
necessary for every instance of directly acting with a certain body part. It is unlikely that 
bodily  experience  plays  a  role  in  online  control,  since  this  is  mostly  non-conscious.  I 
proposed that the point of bodily awareness is to give the agent a sense of what he can do 
with his body parts so that he can plan his actions. When we plan actions, what we do is to 
form  some  conception  of  actions  that  we  want  to  undertake  on  the  basis  of  some 
conception of our abilities. But we can have no conception of what we can do with our 
body, without having bodily awareness. The role of bodily awareness in paradigm cases of 
embodiment, then, is to provide for a conception of the body and its limits such that we 
have a conception of how we can act with our bodies. 
Though  I  contend  that  Planning  is  the  best  account  of  the  intimate  connexion 
between bodily awareness and bodily action, I do not pretend to have shown that there has 
to an intimate connexion between bodily awareness and bodily action. For all we know, 
bodily actions may be triggered and controlled entirely by sub-personal processes that are 
just causally upstream of the production of conscious awareness and it is hard to see how we 
could  gather  empirical  evidence  to  rule  this  out.  But  if  there  were  no  such  intimate 
connexion, then we would be pilots in ships that we cannot steer. At the moment, we have 
no evidence that we should take this to be the case. 206 
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